10小時(shí)前Ray全平臺(tái)發(fā)布署名文章《2025》，從他的視角回顧了去年一整年，并對(duì)今年會(huì)發(fā)生什么進(jìn)行判斷。在此整理編譯，

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Naturally, as a systematic global macro investor leaving 2025, I reflected on the mechanics of what happened, particularly in the markets. That's what today’s reflection is about.

作為一名在 2025 年離場(chǎng)的系統(tǒng)性全球宏觀投資者，我自然而然地反思了發(fā)生的機(jī)制，特別是在市場(chǎng)中的表現(xiàn)。這就是今天反思的主題。

Though the facts and returns are indisputable, I see things differently from most others. While most people see US stocks and particularly US AI stocks to be the best investments and hence the biggest investment story of 2025, it is indisputably true that the biggest returns (and hence the biggest story) came from 1) what happened to the value of money (most importantly the dollar, other fiat currencies, and gold) and 2) US stocks significantly underperforming both non-US stock markets and gold (which was the best performing major market) principally as a result of fiscal and monetary stimulations, productivity gains, and big shifts in asset allocations away from US markets. In these reflections, I step back and look at how this money/debt/market/economy dynamic worked last year, and I briefly touch on how the other four big forces—politics, geopolitics, acts of nature, and technology—affected the global macro picture in the context of the evolving Big Cycle.

盡管事實(shí)和回報(bào)無可爭辯，但我與大多數(shù)人的看法不同。雖然大多數(shù)人認(rèn)為美國股票，尤其是美國人工智能股票，是最好的投資，因此將成為 2025 年最大的投資故事，但有一點(diǎn)毋庸置疑：

最大的回報(bào)（因此也是最大的故事）來自于 1）貨幣價(jià)值的變化（最重要的是美元、其他法定貨幣和黃金）以及 2）美國股票顯著不及非美股市和黃金（黃金是表現(xiàn)最好的主要市場(chǎng)），這主要是財(cái)政和貨幣刺激、生產(chǎn)率提高以及大幅資產(chǎn)配置從美國市場(chǎng)轉(zhuǎn)移所致。

在這些反思中，我退一步審視去年這一貨幣/債務(wù)/市場(chǎng)/經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)態(tài)的運(yùn)作方式，并簡要觸及其他四大力量——政治、地緣政治、自然因素和技術(shù)——在不斷演變的大周期背景下如何影響全球宏觀格局。

Regarding 1) what happened to the value of money: the dollar fell by 0.3% against the yen, 4% against the renminbi, 12% against the euro, 13% against the Swiss franc, and 39% against gold (which is the second largest reserve currency and the only major non-fiat currency). So, all fiat currencies fell, and the biggest story and the biggest market moves of the year were the result of the weakest fiat currencies falling the most, while the strongest/hardest currencies strengthened the most. The best major investment of the year was long gold (returning 65% in dollar terms), which outperformed the S&P index (which returned 18% in dollars) by 47%. Or, said differently, the S&P fell by 28% in gold-money terms. Let's remember some key principles that pertain to what is happening:

關(guān)于第一點(diǎn)：貨幣價(jià)值發(fā)生了什么變化。

美元對(duì)日元下跌了 0.3%，對(duì)人民幣下跌了 4%，對(duì)歐元下跌了 12%，對(duì)瑞士法郎下跌了 13%，對(duì)黃金下跌了 39%（黃金是第二大儲(chǔ)備貨幣，也是唯一主要的非法定貨幣）。

因此，所有法定貨幣都在走弱，而今年最大的故事和最大的市場(chǎng)波動(dòng)，是由最弱的法定貨幣跌得最多所導(dǎo)致的，同時(shí)最強(qiáng)/最硬的貨幣則漲得最多。

今年表現(xiàn)最好的主要投資是做多黃金（以美元計(jì)回報(bào)為 65%），比標(biāo)普指數(shù)（以美元計(jì)回報(bào)為 18%）超出 47%。換句話說，按黃金計(jì)價(jià)，標(biāo)普下跌了 28%。

讓我們記住一些與當(dāng)前情況相關(guān)的關(guān)鍵原則：

When one's own currency goes down, it makes it look like the things measured in it went up. In other words, looking at the investment returns through the lens of a weak currency makes them look stronger than they really are. In this case, the S&P returned 18% for a dollar-based investor, 17% for a yen-based investor, 13% for a renminbi-based investor, only 4% for a euro-based investor, only 3% for a Swiss franc-based investor, and, for a gold-based investor, it returned -28%.

當(dāng)本國貨幣貶值時(shí)，會(huì)讓以該貨幣計(jì)量的東西看起來上漲了。換句話說，通過疲弱貨幣的視角來看投資回報(bào)，會(huì)讓它們看起來比實(shí)際更強(qiáng)。

在這個(gè)例子中，標(biāo)普對(duì)以美元計(jì)價(jià)的投資者回報(bào)為 18%，對(duì)以日元計(jì)價(jià)的投資者為 17%，對(duì)以人民幣計(jì)價(jià)的投資者為 13%，對(duì)以歐元計(jì)價(jià)的投資者僅為 4%，對(duì)以瑞士法郎計(jì)價(jià)的投資者僅為 3%，而對(duì)以黃金計(jì)價(jià)的投資者則為-28%。

What happens with the currency matters a lot to shifts in wealth and what happens economically. When one's currency goes down, it reduces one's wealth and one's buying power, it makes one's goods and services cheaper in others' currencies, and it makes others' goods and services more expensive in one's own currency. In these ways, it affects inflation rates and who buys what from whom, though it does so with a lag. Whether or not you are currency hedged matters a lot. What if you don't have, and don't want to take, a view on the currency? What should you do? You should always be hedged to your least-risk currency mix and make tactical moves from there if you think you are capable of making them well. I won't digress now into an explanation of how I do that, though I will later.

貨幣的變化對(duì)財(cái)富轉(zhuǎn)移和經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況有重大影響。當(dāng)一種貨幣貶值時(shí)，它會(huì)減少該貨幣持有者的財(cái)富和購買力，使其在他國貨幣計(jì)價(jià)下的商品和服務(wù)變得更便宜，同時(shí)使他國在該貨幣計(jì)價(jià)下的商品和服務(wù)變得更昂貴。通過這些途徑，貨幣變動(dòng)影響通貨膨脹率以及誰向誰購買什么，盡管這些影響存在滯后。

是否對(duì)沖貨幣風(fēng)險(xiǎn)非常重要。假如你既沒有也不想對(duì)貨幣持有觀點(diǎn)，該怎么辦？

你應(yīng)該始終按你風(fēng)險(xiǎn)最小的貨幣組合來對(duì)沖，然后在此基礎(chǔ)上如果你認(rèn)為自己有能力做得好，就進(jìn)行戰(zhàn)術(shù)性調(diào)整。我現(xiàn)在不會(huì)展開說明我是如何做到這一點(diǎn)的，但我以后會(huì)說明。

As for bonds—i.e., debt assets—because they are promises to deliver money, when the value of money goes down, their real worth is lowered even as their nominal prices rise. Last year, 10-year US Treasury bonds returned 9% (roughly half from yield and half from price) in dollar terms, 9% in yen terms, 5% In renminbi terms, and -4% in euro terms, -4% in Swiss franc terms, and -34% in gold terms—and cash was an even worse investment. You can see why foreign investors didn't like dollar bonds and cash (unless they were currency hedged). Thus far, the bond supply/demand imbalance has not been a serious problem, but a large amount of debt (nearly $10tn) will need to be rolled going forward. At the same time, it appears likely the Fed will be inclined to ease to push real interest rates down. For these reasons, debt assets look unappealing, especially at the long end of the curve, and a further steepening of the yield curve seems probable, though it seems questionable to me that the Fed’s easing will be as much as is discounted in the current pricing.

至于債券——即債務(wù)資產(chǎn)——因?yàn)樗鼈兪侵Ц督疱X的承諾，當(dāng)貨幣的價(jià)值下降時(shí)，即便名義價(jià)格上漲，它們的實(shí)際價(jià)值也會(huì)降低。去年，按美元計(jì)，10 年期美國國債回報(bào)率為 9%（大約一半來自收益率，一半來自價(jià)格）；按日元計(jì)為 9%；按人民幣計(jì)為 5%；按歐元計(jì)為-4%；按瑞士法郎計(jì)為-4%；按黃金計(jì)為-34%；而現(xiàn)金則更糟。你可以理解為什么外國投資者不喜歡美元債券和現(xiàn)金（除非他們進(jìn)行了貨幣對(duì)沖）。

到目前為止，債券的供需失衡還不是一個(gè)嚴(yán)重問題，但未來將有大量債務(wù)（近 10 萬億美元）需要展期。同時(shí)，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)似乎可能傾向于寬松以壓低實(shí)際利率。

基于這些原因，債務(wù)資產(chǎn)顯得缺乏吸引力，尤其是在期限曲線的長期端，收益率曲線進(jìn)一步陡峭化似乎很可能，盡管我認(rèn)為美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的寬松幅度可能并不像當(dāng)前定價(jià)所折算的那么大，這一點(diǎn)值得懷疑。

Regarding2) US stocks significantly underperforming non-US stocks and gold (which was the best performing major market), as previously mentioned, while US stocks were strong in dollar terms, they were much less strong in the currencies that were strong, and they significantly underperformed other countries' equities. Clearly, investors would have much rather been in non-US stocks than in US stocks, just as they would have preferred to be in non-US bonds than in US bonds and US cash. More specifically, European stocks outperformed US stocks by 23%, Chinese stocks outperformed by 21%, UK stocks outperformed by 19%, and Japanese stocks outperformed by 10%. Emerging market stocks as a whole did better, returning 34%, while emerging market dollar debt returned 14% and emerging market local currency debt in dollar terms returned 18% as a whole. In other words, there were big shifts in flows, values, and, in turn, wealth away from the US, and what is happening will probably lead to more rebalancing and diversifying.

關(guān)于第二點(diǎn)：美國股票大幅落后于非美國股票和黃金

如前所述，盡管以美元計(jì)價(jià)美國股票表現(xiàn)強(qiáng)勁，但以那些走強(qiáng)貨幣計(jì)價(jià)時(shí)并不那么強(qiáng)勁，并且明顯落后于其他國家的股票。很明顯，投資者更愿意持有非美國股票而不是美國股票，正如他們更愿意持有非美國債券而不是美國債券和美元現(xiàn)金。

更具體地說，歐洲股票比美國股票多跑了 23%，中國股票多跑了 21%，英國股票多跑了 19%，日本股票多跑了 10%。

整體來看，新興市場(chǎng)股票表現(xiàn)更好，回報(bào)為 34%，而新興市場(chǎng)美元債回報(bào)為 14%，以美元計(jì)價(jià)的新興市場(chǎng)本幣債整體回報(bào)為 18%。

換言之，資金流、估值及由此帶來的財(cái)富都發(fā)生了重大轉(zhuǎn)移，遠(yuǎn)離美國，而正在發(fā)生的這一切可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致更多的再平衡與多元化。

As for US stocks last year, the strong results were due to both strong earnings growth and a P/E expansion. More specifically, earnings were up 12% in dollar terms, the P/E rose by about 5%, and the dividend yield was about 1%, so the total return of the S&P was about 18% in dollars. The “Magnificent 7” stocks in the S&P 500, which account for about a third of its market cap, had earnings growth of 22% in 2025, and, contrary to popular thinking, the other 493 stocks in the S&P also had strong earnings growth at 9%, so the whole S&P 500 index had earnings growth of 12%. That happened as a result of sales increasing by 7% and margins increasing by 5.3%, so sales were responsible for 57% of the earnings increase and margin improvements were responsible for 43% of it.* It appears that some significant portion of the margin improvements was due to technology efficiencies, but I can't see the numbers to tell for sure. In any case the earnings improvements were largely due to the economic pie (i.e., sales) increasing and companies (hence the capitalists who own them) capturing most the improvement and workers capturing relatively little of it. It will be very important to monitor the margin increases that go to profits going forward because the markets are now discounting that these increases will be large while leftist political forces are trying to capture a greater share of the pie.

至于去年的美國股票，強(qiáng)勁的表現(xiàn)既歸因于盈利增長，也歸因于市盈率擴(kuò)張。更具體地說，按美元計(jì)，盈利增長了 12%，市盈率上升了約 5%，股息收益率約為 1%，因此標(biāo)普的美元總回報(bào)約為 18%。

標(biāo)普 500 中占其市值約三分之一的“七大巨頭”在 2025 年的盈利增長為 22%，與普遍看法相反，標(biāo)普的其余 493 只股票也有 9%的強(qiáng)勁盈利增長，所以整個(gè)標(biāo)普 500 指數(shù)的盈利增長為 12%。這是由于銷售額增長了 7%且利潤率提高了 5.3%，因此銷售額對(duì)盈利增長的貢獻(xiàn)約為 57%，利潤率改善貢獻(xiàn)約為 43%.

看起來利潤率改善中有相當(dāng)一部分是由于技術(shù)效率，但我無法看到具體數(shù)據(jù)來確認(rèn)。無論如何，盈利改善在很大程度上是由于經(jīng)濟(jì)蛋糕（即銷售額）的擴(kuò)大，企業(yè)（因此擁有它們的資本家）獲得了大部分改善，而工人獲得的相對(duì)較少。

未來需密切關(guān)注流向利潤的利潤率上升情況，因?yàn)槭袌?chǎng)現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)在假定這些上升將會(huì)很大，而左翼政治力量正試圖奪取更大份額。

While it is easier to know the past than the future, we do know something about the present that can help us better anticipate the future if we understand the most important cause/effect relationships. For example, we know that with PE multiples high and credit spreads low, valuations appear to be stretched. If history is a guide, this portends low future equity returns. When I calculate expected returns based on where stock and bond yields are using normal productivity growth and the profits growth that results from it, my long-term equity expected return would be at about 4.7% (a sub-10th percentile reading), which is very low relative to existing bond returns at about 4.9%, so equity risk premiums are low. Also, credit spreads contracted to very low levels in 2025, which was a positive for lower credit and equity assets, but it leaves these spreads less likely to decline and more likely to rise, which is a negative for these assets. All this means that there isn't much more return that can be squeezed out of the equity risk premiums, credit spreads, and liquidity premiums.** It also means that if interest rates rise, which is possible as there are growing supply/demand driven pressures (i.e., supply is increasing while the demand picture is worsening) to have happen because the value of money is declining, all else being equal, it will have a large negative effect on the credit and stock markets.

雖然了解過去比預(yù)測(cè)未來容易，但如果我們理解最重要的因果關(guān)系，就能從對(duì)當(dāng)前狀況的認(rèn)識(shí)中更好地預(yù)測(cè)未來。

例如，我們知道市盈率（PE）高而信用利差低時(shí)，估值顯得被拉伸。如果以歷史為鑒，這預(yù)示著未來股票回報(bào)將較低。當(dāng)我根據(jù)股票和債券收益率所在水平，結(jié)合正常的生產(chǎn)力增長及由此帶來的利潤增長來計(jì)算預(yù)期回報(bào)時(shí)，我的長期股票預(yù)期回報(bào)約為 4.7%（處于不到第 10 百分位的水平），相對(duì)于約 4.9%的現(xiàn)有債券回報(bào)而言，這非常低，因此股權(quán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)很低。此外，信用利差在 2025 年收窄至極低水平，這對(duì)降低信貸和股票資產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是一個(gè)積極因素，但也使這些利差不太可能進(jìn)一步下降、反而更可能上升，這對(duì)這些資產(chǎn)是不利的。

所有這些意味著，從股權(quán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)、信用利差和流動(dòng)性溢價(jià)中已很難再榨取更多回報(bào)。這也意味著，如果利率上升——這是有可能的，因?yàn)殡S著貨幣價(jià)值下降，出現(xiàn)了日益由供需驅(qū)動(dòng)的壓力（例如供應(yīng)增加而需求前景惡化）——在其他條件不變的情況下，這將對(duì)信貸和股票市場(chǎng)產(chǎn)生重大負(fù)面影響。

Of course, there are big questions about Fed policy and productivity growth ahead. It appears most likely that the newly appointed Fed chair and the FOMC will be biased to push nominal and real interest rates down, which would be supportive to prices and inflate bubbles. As for productivity growth, it will likely improve in 2026, though a) how much it will improve and b) how much of it will be allowed to flow through to benefit company profits, stock prices, and, in turn, capitalist owners versus how much will go to workers and socialists in the form of comp changes and taxes (which is the classic political right/left question) are uncertain.

當(dāng)然，未來對(duì)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)政策和生產(chǎn)力增長存在重大疑問。

目前看來，新任美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席和聯(lián)邦公開市場(chǎng)委員會(huì)很可能傾向于將名義利率和實(shí)際利率抬低，這將有利于物價(jià)并助長資產(chǎn)泡沫。至于生產(chǎn)力增長，預(yù)計(jì)會(huì)在 2026 年改善，盡管 a) 改善幅度如何，以及 b) 改善帶來的收益有多少會(huì)被允許流向公司利潤、股票價(jià)格，進(jìn)而流向資本所有者，和有多少會(huì)以薪酬變動(dòng)和稅收的形式流向工人和社會(huì)化安排（這是典型的政治右/左問題）仍不確定。

Consistent with how the machine works, in 2025 the Fed’s cutting interest rates and easing the availability of credit lowered the discount rate, determining the present value of future cash flows and lowering risk premia, which together contributed to the previously described results. These changes supported the prices of assets that do well in reflations, especially those with long-durations, like equities and gold, so now these markets are no longer cheap. Also, notably, these reflationary moves didn't help venture capital, private equity, and real estate—i.e., the illiquid markets—very much. Those markets are having problems. If one believes the stated valuations in VC and PE (which most people don't), liquidity premiums are now very low; I think it's obvious that they are likely to rise a lot as the debt these entities took on has to be financed at higher interest rates and the pressures to raise liquidity build, which would make illiquid investments fall relative to liquid ones.

與該機(jī)制的運(yùn)作一致，2025 年美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)降息并放松信貸供應(yīng)，降低了貼現(xiàn)率（決定未來現(xiàn)金流的現(xiàn)值）并壓低了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)，這些共同促成了前述的結(jié)果。

這些變化支撐了在再通脹環(huán)境中表現(xiàn)良好的資產(chǎn)價(jià)格，尤其是那些久期較長的資產(chǎn)，如股票和黃金，因此這些市場(chǎng)現(xiàn)在不再便宜了。此外，值得注意的是，這些再通脹措施并未對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資、私募股權(quán)和房地產(chǎn)等非流動(dòng)性市場(chǎng)帶來太大幫助——這些市場(chǎng)正面臨問題。如果相信風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資和私募股權(quán)所標(biāo)示的估值（大多數(shù)人不信），流動(dòng)性溢價(jià)現(xiàn)在就很低；

我認(rèn)為顯而易見，隨著這些實(shí)體所承擔(dān)的債務(wù)必須以更高利率籌資且籌資壓力增加，流動(dòng)性溢價(jià)很可能大幅上升，這將使得非流動(dòng)性投資相對(duì)于流動(dòng)性投資下跌。

In summary, just about everything went up a lot in dollar terms because of the big fiscal and monetary reflationary policies and are now relatively expansive.

總之，由于大規(guī)模的財(cái)政和貨幣再通脹政策，幾乎所有以美元計(jì)價(jià)的資產(chǎn)都大幅上漲，現(xiàn)在這些政策相對(duì)寬松。

One cannot look at the changes in the markets without looking at the changes in the political order, especially in 2025. Because markets and the economy affect politics and politics affect markets and the economy, politics played a big role in driving markets and economies. More specifically in the US and for the world:

在觀察市場(chǎng)變化時(shí)，不能不看政治秩序的變化，尤其是在 2025 年。因?yàn)槭袌?chǎng)與經(jīng)濟(jì)影響政治，政治又影響市場(chǎng)與經(jīng)濟(jì)，所以政治在推動(dòng)市場(chǎng)和經(jīng)濟(jì)方面發(fā)揮了重要作用。

更具體地說，在美國以及對(duì)世界而言：

a) the Trump administration’s domestic economic policies were and still are a levered bet on the power of capitalism to revitalize American manufacturing and enable American AI technology, which contributed to the market movements I described above,

a) 特朗普政府的國內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)政策曾經(jīng)并且仍然是對(duì)資本主義力量的杠桿式押注，期望通過振興美國制造業(yè)并推動(dòng)美國人工智能技術(shù)發(fā)展來實(shí)現(xiàn)，這助長了我上文所描述的市場(chǎng)變動(dòng)，

b) its foreign policy has scared and turned off some foreign investors as fears of sanctions and conflicts supported the sort of portfolio diversification and buying of gold that we saw, and

b) 其外交政策使一些外國投資者感到恐懼并遠(yuǎn)離，擔(dān)心制裁和沖突，這支持了我們所見到的那種投資組合多元化和買入黃金的行為

c) its policies increased wealth and income gaps because the “haves” (those in the top 10%), who are capitalists, have more wealth in stocks and because their income gains were bigger.

c) 其政策擴(kuò)大了財(cái)富和收入差距，因?yàn)椤坝挟a(chǎn)者”（頂層 10%）是資本家，他們?cè)诠善敝袚碛懈嘭?cái)富且收入增長更大。

As a result of c), those capitalists who are in the top 10% now don’t see inflation as a problem, while the majority (those in the bottom 60%) feel overwhelmed by it. The value of money issue, otherwise known as the affordability issue, will probably be the number one political issue next year, contributing to the Republicans losing the House and a very messy 2027 on the way to a very interesting 2028 election in which the clash between the right and the left is shaping up to be a big one.

因此根據(jù) c)，那些處于頂層 10%的資本家現(xiàn)在并不認(rèn)為通脹是個(gè)問題，而大多數(shù)人（底層 60%）則被通脹壓得喘不過氣來。

貨幣價(jià)值問題，也就是可負(fù)擔(dān)性問題，可能將成為明年最重要的政治議題，這將促成共和黨失去眾議院，并導(dǎo)致一個(gè)非常混亂的 2027 年，進(jìn)而走向一個(gè)非常有意思的 2028 年選舉——在那里右翼與左翼的沖突正逐漸演變成一次重大對(duì)決。

More specifically, 2025 was the first year of the Trump four-year term in which he had control of both houses, which is classically the best year for presidents to push through what they want, so we saw his administration’s all-out aggressive bet on capitalism—i.e., the aggressively stimulative fiscal policy, reducing regulations so that money and capital would be more plentiful, making it easier to produce most things, raising tariffs to both protect domestic producers and to bring in tax revenue, providing proactive supports to key industries' production. Behind these moves, there was a Trump-led shift from free-market capitalism to government-directed capitalism.

更具體地說，2025 年是特朗普在兩院都掌控下的第一個(gè)四年任期的年份，按常理這是總統(tǒng)推動(dòng)其意愿最有利的一年，因此我們看到了他的政府對(duì)資本主義的全面激進(jìn)押注——即大規(guī)模刺激性財(cái)政政策、減少監(jiān)管以使資金和資本更加充裕、簡化生產(chǎn)流程以便更容易生產(chǎn)大多數(shù)商品、提高關(guān)稅以既保護(hù)國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)者又帶來稅收、為關(guān)鍵產(chǎn)業(yè)的生產(chǎn)提供積極支持。

在這些舉措的背后，是由特朗普主導(dǎo)的從自由市場(chǎng)資本主義向政府主導(dǎo)資本主義的轉(zhuǎn)變。

Because of how our democracy works, President Trump has a two-year unimpeded mandate that can be weakened greatly in the ‘26 mid-term elections and reversed in the '28 elections. He must feel that this doesn't give him enough time to get done what he believes he needs to get done. Nowadays, it is rare for one party to be able to stay in power for long because it is difficult for them to live up to their promises to satisfy their electorates’ financial and social expectations. In fact, there is reason to question the viability of democratic decision-making when those in office are unable to govern long enough to meet the voters’ expectations. It is becoming a norm in developed countries to see populist politicians from the left or the right who advocate for extreme policies to bring about extreme improvements and then fail to deliver and are thrown out of office. These frequent changes from one extreme to another are destabilizing. It's like it used to be in underdeveloped countries. In any case, it is increasingly apparent that a big fight is brewing between the hard right, now led by President Trump, and the hard left. On Jan 1, we saw the opposition coalescing as Zohran Mamdani, Bernie Sanders, and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez united at Mamdani's inauguration behind the anti-billionaire, “Democratic socialist” movement. This will be a fight over wealth and money that will likely affect the markets and economies.

由于我們的民主運(yùn)作方式，特朗普總統(tǒng)擁有為期兩年的不受阻礙的授權(quán)，但這可能在 2026 年中期選舉中大幅削弱，并在 2028 年選舉中被逆轉(zhuǎn)。

他一定會(huì)覺得這段時(shí)間不足以完成他認(rèn)為必須完成的事情。如今，一個(gè)政黨長期執(zhí)政已成難事，因?yàn)橐獌冬F(xiàn)承諾以滿足選民在經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)方面的期望非常困難。事實(shí)上，當(dāng)掌權(quán)者無法執(zhí)政足夠長的時(shí)間以滿足選民期望時(shí)，就有理由質(zhì)疑民主決策的可行性。

在發(fā)達(dá)國家，越來越常見的是來自左翼或右翼的民粹主義政治家主張極端政策以帶來極大改善，卻未能兌現(xiàn)承諾而被罷黜。這種從一個(gè)極端頻繁轉(zhuǎn)向另一個(gè)極端的變化具有破壞性，就像過去在欠發(fā)達(dá)國家那樣。

無論如何，現(xiàn)在越來越明顯的是，由特朗普總統(tǒng)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的極右與極左之間的一場(chǎng)大沖突正在醞釀。 在 1 月 1 日，我們看到反對(duì)派開始聯(lián)合，佐赫蘭·曼達(dá)尼（Zohran Mamdani）、伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）和亞歷山大·奧卡西奧-科爾特斯（Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez）在曼達(dá)尼的就職典禮上團(tuán)結(jié)在反億萬富翁的“民主社會(huì)主義者”運(yùn)動(dòng)背后。

這將是一場(chǎng)關(guān)于財(cái)富和金錢的斗爭，可能會(huì)影響市場(chǎng)和經(jīng)濟(jì)。

Regarding how the world order and geopolitics are changing, in 2025 there was a clear shift from multilateralism (in which there is an aspiration to operate by rules overseen by multilateral organizations) to unilateralism (in which power rules and countries operate in their self-interest). That raised and will continue to raise threats of conflict and lead to increased military spending, and borrowing to finance it, in most countries. It also contributed to the increased use of economic threats and sanctions, protectionism, deglobalization, many more investment and business deals, more foreign capital promised to be invested in the United States, strengthening demand for gold, and reduced foreign demand for US debt, dollars, and other assets.

關(guān)于世界秩序和地緣政治的變化，2025 年明顯從多邊主義（即有通過多邊組織監(jiān)督的規(guī)則來運(yùn)作的愿望）轉(zhuǎn)向單邊主義（即以實(shí)力為主導(dǎo)、各國按自身利益行事）。這加劇并將繼續(xù)加劇沖突威脅，導(dǎo)致大多數(shù)國家增加軍事開支，并為此舉借款。

這也促成了更多使用經(jīng)濟(jì)威脅和制裁、保護(hù)主義、去全球化、更多投資和商業(yè)交易、更多對(duì)美國承諾的外資流入、對(duì)黃金需求的增強(qiáng)，以及對(duì)美國債務(wù)、美元和其他資產(chǎn)的外國需求減少。

Regrading acts of nature, the progression of climate change continued while there was a politically led Trump shift in spending money and encouraging energy production in an attempt to minimize the issue.

關(guān)于自然現(xiàn)象，氣候變化仍在持續(xù)，而在政治上由特朗普主導(dǎo)的轉(zhuǎn)向則通過增加支出和鼓勵(lì)能源生產(chǎn)來試圖將問題降到最低。

Regarding technology, obviously the AI boom that is now in the early stages of a bubble had a big effect on everything. I will soon send out an explanation of what my bubble indicators are showing, so I won't get into that subject now.

關(guān)于技術(shù)，顯然當(dāng)前處于早期泡沫階段的人工智能熱潮對(duì)一切都產(chǎn)生了重大影響。我很快會(huì)發(fā)出一份關(guān)于我的泡沫指標(biāo)所顯示內(nèi)容的解釋，所以現(xiàn)在我不在此詳述這個(gè)話題。

That’s a lot to think about, and we didn’t cover much about what’s going on outside the US. I have found that having an understanding of the patterns of history and the cause/effect relationships that drove them, having a well back tested and systemized game plan, and using AI and great data is invaluable. That’s how I play the game and what I want to pass along to you.

這是很多需要思考的事情，我們也沒有多談美國以外發(fā)生的情況。我發(fā)現(xiàn)，理解歷史模式及驅(qū)動(dòng)這些模式的因果關(guān)系、擁有經(jīng)充分回測(cè)和系統(tǒng)化的行動(dòng)計(jì)劃，以及利用人工智能和優(yōu)質(zhì)數(shù)據(jù)，都是非常寶貴的。這就是我玩這場(chǎng)游戲的方式，也是我希望傳授給你們的。

In summary, this approach has led me to believe that the debt/money/markets/economy force, the domestic political force, the forces of geopolitics (e.g., increased military spending and borrowing to finance it), the force of nature (climate), and the force of new technologies (e.g., the costs and benefits of AI) will continue to be the major drivers shaping the whole picture, and that these forces will broadly track the Big Cycle template I laid out in my books. As I have already gone on for too long, I won’t go deeper into all this now. If you read my book

How Countries Go Broke: The Big Cycle

, you know what I think about how the cycle will evolve, and if you want to learn more and haven’t read it, I suggest that you do.

總之，這種方法讓我相信，債務(wù)/貨幣/市場(chǎng)/經(jīng)濟(jì)力量、國內(nèi)政治力量、地緣政治力量（例如為增加軍費(fèi)而增加借貸）、自然力量（氣候）以及新技術(shù)力量（例如人工智能的成本與收益）將繼續(xù)成為塑造整體局勢(shì)的主要驅(qū)動(dòng)因素，而且這些力量大致會(huì)遵循我在書中提出的大周期模板。鑒于我已經(jīng)說得太多了，現(xiàn)在就不再深入展開。如果你讀過我的《國家如何破產(chǎn)：大周期》，你就知道我對(duì)周期如何演變的看法；如果你想了解更多且還沒讀過，我建議你去讀一讀。

As for portfolio positioning, while I don’t want to be your investment advisor (meaning I don’t want to tell you what positions to have and have you simply follow my advice), I do want to help you invest well. Though I think you can surmise the types of positions I like and don’t like, the most important thing for you to have is the ability to make your investment decisions yourself, whether to place your own bets on which markets will do well and poorly, or to build a great strategic asset allocation mix that you stick with, or to pick managers who will invest well for you. If you want my advice about how to do these things well to help you be successful at investing, I recommend the

Dalio Market Principles

course which is put out by the Wealth Management Institute of Singapore.

至于投資組合配置，雖然我不想成為你的投資顧問（意思是我不想告訴你應(yīng)該持有什么倉位然后讓你盲目按我的建議去做），但我確實(shí)想幫助你做好投資。雖然我想你可能已經(jīng)能推斷出我喜歡和不喜歡的倉位類型，但對(duì)你來說最重要的是具備自己做出投資決策的能力：

無論是自己下注哪些市場(chǎng)會(huì)表現(xiàn)好或差，還是建立并堅(jiān)持一個(gè)優(yōu)秀的戰(zhàn)略資產(chǎn)配置組合，或是挑選能為你做好投資的經(jīng)理人。如果你想要我的建議來幫助你做好這些事情并在投資上取得成功，我推薦由新加坡財(cái)富管理學(xué)院推出的《達(dá)利奧市場(chǎng)原則》課程。

* Since we won’t have this info with certainty until Q4 results are reported, these are estimates.

* 由于我們要到第四季度財(cái)報(bào)公布才能確定這些信息，因此這些都是估計(jì)值。

** When these things decline, it exerts upward pressure on stocks.

** 當(dāng)這些項(xiàng)目下降時(shí)，會(huì)對(duì)股票構(gòu)成上行壓力。

更多內(nèi)容均在星球?qū)?。我們?cè)谶^去的日子里已針對(duì)全球資產(chǎn)完成了數(shù)百萬字的運(yùn)行邏輯及體系闡述，

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