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Over the course of this year, the U.S. economy has shown resilience in a context of sweeping changes in economic policy. In terms of the Fed's dual-mandate goals, the labor market remains near maximum employment, and inflation, though still somewhat elevated, has come down a great deal from its post-pandemic highs. At the same time, the balance of risks appears to be shifting.

今年以來，在經(jīng)濟(jì)政策發(fā)生廣泛變化的背景下，美國經(jīng)濟(jì)展現(xiàn)出了韌性。就美聯(lián)儲的雙重使命目標(biāo)而言，勞動力市場仍接近充分就業(yè)狀態(tài)，而通貨膨脹雖仍有些偏高，但已從疫情后的高點大幅回落。與此同時，風(fēng)險的平衡似乎正在轉(zhuǎn)變。

In my remarks today, I will first address the current economic situation and the near-term outlook for monetary policy. I will then turn to the results of our second public review of our monetary policy framework, as captured in the revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy that we released today.

在我今天的講話中，我將首先談?wù)劗?dāng)前的經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢和貨幣政策的近期展望。然后，我將轉(zhuǎn)向我們今天發(fā)布的、經(jīng)修訂的《長期目標(biāo)與貨幣政策策略聲明》中所體現(xiàn)的、我們第二次貨幣政策框架公開評估的結(jié)果。

Current Economic Conditions and Near-Term Outlook 當(dāng)前經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況與近期展望

When I appeared at this podium one year ago, the economy was at an inflection point. Our policy rate had stood at 5-1/4 to 5-1/2 percent for more than a year. That restrictive policy stance was appropriate to help bring down inflation and to foster a sustainable balance between aggregate demand and supply. Inflation had moved much closer to our objective, and the labor market had cooled from its formerly overheated state. Upside risks to inflation had diminished. But the unemployment rate had increased by almost a full percentage point, a development that historically has not occurred outside of recessions. Over the subsequent three Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, we recalibrated our policy stance, setting the stage for the labor market to remain in balance near maximum employment over the past year (figure 1).

一年前我站上這個講臺時，經(jīng)濟(jì)正處于一個轉(zhuǎn)折點。我們的政策利率已在5.25%至5.5%的水平上維持了一年多。這種限制性的政策立場是適當(dāng)?shù)模兄诮档屯洸⒋龠M(jìn)總需求與總供給之間達(dá)成可持續(xù)的平衡。通脹已非常接近我們的目標(biāo)，勞動力市場也已從先前過熱的狀態(tài)降溫。通脹的上行風(fēng)險已經(jīng)減弱。但失業(yè)率上升了近一個百分點，這種情況在歷史上除了衰退時期外從未發(fā)生過。在隨后的三次聯(lián)邦公開市場委員會（FOMC）會議上，我們重新校準(zhǔn)了我們的政策立場，為過去一年勞動力市場在接近充分就業(yè)的水平上保持平衡奠定了基礎(chǔ)（圖1）。

This year, the economy has faced new challenges. Significantly higher tariffs across our trading partners are remaking the global trading system. Tighter immigration policy has led to an abrupt slowdown in labor force growth. Over the longer run, changes in tax, spending, and regulatory policies may also have important implications for economic growth and productivity. There is significant uncertainty about where all of these polices will eventually settle and what their lasting effects on the economy will be.

今年，經(jīng)濟(jì)面臨著新的挑戰(zhàn)。我們貿(mào)易伙伴間大幅提高的關(guān)稅正在重塑全球貿(mào)易體系。更緊的移民政策導(dǎo)致了勞動力增長的突然放緩。從更長遠(yuǎn)來看，稅收、支出和監(jiān)管政策的變化也可能對經(jīng)濟(jì)增長和生產(chǎn)率產(chǎn)生重要影響。所有這些政策最終將走向何方，以及它們對經(jīng)濟(jì)的持久影響將是什么，都存在著巨大的不確定性。

Changes in trade and immigration policies are affecting both demand and supply. In this environment, distinguishing cyclical developments from trend, or structural, developments is difficult. This distinction is critical because monetary policy can work to stabilize cyclical fluctuations but can do little to alter structural changes.

貿(mào)易和移民政策的變化正在同時影響需求和供給。在這種環(huán)境下，區(qū)分周期性發(fā)展與趨勢性（或結(jié)構(gòu)性）發(fā)展是困難的。這一區(qū)分至關(guān)重要，因為貨幣政策可以努力穩(wěn)定周期性波動，但對改變結(jié)構(gòu)性變化無能為力。

The labor market is a case in point. The July employment report released earlier this month showed that payroll job growth slowed to an average pace of only 35,000 per month over the past three months, down from 168,000 per month during 2024 (figure 2). This slowdown is much larger than assessed just a month ago, as the earlier figures for May and June were revised down substantially. But it does not appear that the slowdown in job growth has opened up a large margin of slack in the labor market--an outcome we want to avoid. The unemployment rate, while edging up in July, stands at a historically low level of 4.2 percent and has been broadly stable over the past year. Other indicators of labor market conditions are also little changed or have softened only modestly, including quits, layoffs, the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, and nominal wage growth. Labor supply has softened in line with demand, sharply lowering the "breakeven" rate of job creation needed to hold the unemployment rate constant. Indeed, labor force growth has slowed considerably this year with the sharp falloff in immigration, and the labor force participation rate has edged down in recent months.

勞動力市場就是一個很好的例子。本月早些時候發(fā)布的7月份就業(yè)報告顯示，過去三個月平均每月新增就業(yè)崗位放緩至僅3.5萬個，低于2024年期間的每月16.8萬個（圖2）。這一放緩幅度遠(yuǎn)大于僅一個月前的評估，因為5月和6月的早期數(shù)據(jù)被大幅下修。但這似乎并未導(dǎo)致勞動力市場出現(xiàn)我們希望避免的大量松弛。失業(yè)率雖在7月份略有上升，但仍處于4.2%的歷史低位，并在過去一年中基本保持穩(wěn)定。其他勞動力市場狀況指標(biāo)也變化不大或僅溫和走軟，包括離職、裁員、職位空缺與失業(yè)人數(shù)之比以及名義工資增長。勞動力供給與需求同步走軟，大幅降低了維持失業(yè)率不變所需的“盈虧平衡”就業(yè)創(chuàng)造率。事實上，隨著移民數(shù)量的急劇下降，今年的勞動力增長已顯著放緩，勞動力參與率在近幾個月也有所下降。

Overall, while the labor market appears to be in balance, it is a curious kind of balance that results from a marked slowing in both the supply of and demand for workers. This unusual situation suggests that downside risks to employment are rising. And if those risks materialize, they can do so quickly in the form of sharply higher layoffs and rising unemployment.

總體而言，雖然勞動力市場看似處于平衡狀態(tài)，但這是一種由勞動力供給和需求雙雙顯著放緩所導(dǎo)致的奇特平衡狀態(tài)。這種不尋常的情況表明，就業(yè)的下行風(fēng)險正在上升。而如果這些風(fēng)險成為現(xiàn)實，它們可能以裁員急劇增加和失業(yè)率上升的形式迅速顯現(xiàn)。

At the same time, GDP growth has slowed notably in the first half of this year to a pace of 1.2 percent, roughly half the 2.5 percent pace in 2024 (figure 3). The decline in growth has largely reflected a slowdown in consumer spending. As with the labor market, some of the slowing in GDP likely reflects slower growth of supply or potential output.

與此同時，今年上半年GDP增長已顯著放緩至1.2%的水平，約為2024年2.5%增速的一半（圖3）。增長的下滑主要反映了消費支出的放緩。與勞動力市場一樣，GDP的部分放緩可能反映了供給或潛在產(chǎn)出增長的放緩。

Turning to inflation, higher tariffs have begun to push up prices in some categories of goods. Estimates based on the latest available data indicate that total PCE prices rose 2.6 percent over the 12 months ending in July. Excluding the volatile food and energy categories, core PCE prices rose 2.9 percent, above their level a year ago. Within core, prices of goods increased 1.1 percent over the past 12 months, a notable shift from the modest decline seen over the course of 2024. In contrast, housing services inflation remains on a downward trend, and nonhousing services inflation is still running at a level a bit above what has been historically consistent with 2 percent inflation (figure 4).

轉(zhuǎn)向通脹方面，更高的關(guān)稅已開始推高某些類別商品的價格?；谧钚驴捎脭?shù)據(jù)的估計顯示，在截至7月的12個月里，總體PCE價格上漲了2.6%。剔除波動的食品和能源類別后，核心PCE價格上漲了2.9%，高于一年前的水平。在核心通脹內(nèi)部，過去12個月商品價格上漲了1.1%，這與2024年期間出現(xiàn)的溫和下降相比是一個顯著的轉(zhuǎn)變。相比之下，住房服務(wù)通脹仍處于下降趨勢，而非住房服務(wù)通脹的運行水平仍略高于歷史上與2%通脹相符的水平（圖4）。

The effects of tariffs on consumer prices are now clearly visible. We expect those effects to accumulate over coming months, with high uncertainty about timing and amounts. The question that matters for monetary policy is whether these price increases are likely to materially raise the risk of an ongoing inflation problem. A reasonable base case is that the effects will be relatively short lived--a one-time shift in the price level. Of course, "one-time" does not mean "all at once." It will continue to take time for tariff increases to work their way through supply chains and distribution networks. Moreover, tariff rates continue to evolve, potentially prolonging the adjustment process.

關(guān)稅對消費價格的影響現(xiàn)在已清晰可見。我們預(yù)計這些影響將在未來幾個月內(nèi)累積，但其時間和幅度存在高度不確定性。對貨幣政策而言，重要的問題是，這些價格上漲是否可能實質(zhì)性地增加持續(xù)性通脹問題的風(fēng)險。一個合理的基準(zhǔn)情景是，其影響將是相對短暫的——即物價水平的一次性變動。當(dāng)然，“一次性”并不意味著“一次完成”。關(guān)稅上調(diào)需要時間才能傳導(dǎo)至整個供應(yīng)鏈和分銷網(wǎng)絡(luò)。此外，關(guān)稅稅率仍在不斷變化，可能會延長調(diào)整過程。

It is also possible, however, that the upward pressure on prices from tariffs could spur a more lasting inflation dynamic, and that is a risk to be assessed and managed. One possibility is that workers, who see their real incomes decline because of higher prices, demand and get higher wages from employers, setting off adverse wage--price dynamics. Given that the labor market is not particularly tight and faces increasing downside risks, that outcome does not seem likely.

然而，關(guān)稅帶來的價格上行壓力也有可能引發(fā)更持久的通脹動態(tài)，這是一個需要評估和管理的風(fēng)險。一種可能性是，因物價上漲而實際收入下降的工人，向雇主提出并獲得了更高的工資要求，從而引發(fā)不利的工資-物價動態(tài)。鑒于勞動力市場并非特別緊張且面臨日益增加的下行風(fēng)險，這種結(jié)果似乎不太可能發(fā)生。

Another possibility is that inflation expectations could move up, dragging actual inflation with them. Inflation has been above our target for more than four years and remains a prominent concern for households and businesses. Measures of longer-term inflation expectations, however, as reflected in market- and survey-based measures, appear to remain well anchored and consistent with our longer-run inflation objective of 2 percent.

另一種可能性是通脹預(yù)期可能上升，并帶動實際通脹隨之上行。通脹已連續(xù)四年多高于我們的目標(biāo)，并且仍然是家庭和企業(yè)的一個突出擔(dān)憂。然而，從基于市場和調(diào)查的指標(biāo)來看，長期通脹預(yù)期似乎仍保持良好錨定，并與我們2%的長期通脹目標(biāo)相符。

Of course, we cannot take the stability of inflation expectations for granted. Come what may, we will not allow a one-time increase in the price level to become an ongoing inflation problem.

當(dāng)然，我們不能想當(dāng)然地認(rèn)為通脹預(yù)期會保持穩(wěn)定。無論發(fā)生什么，我們都不會允許物價水平的一次性上漲演變成一個持續(xù)的通脹問題。

Putting the pieces together, what are the implications for monetary policy? In the near term, risks to inflation are tilted to the upside, and risks to employment to the downside--a challenging situation. When our goals are in tension like this, our framework calls for us to balance both sides of our dual mandate. Our policy rate is now 100 basis points closer to neutral than it was a year ago, and the stability of the unemployment rate and other labor market measures allows us to proceed carefully as we consider changes to our policy stance. Nonetheless, with policy in restrictive territory, the baseline outlook and the shifting balance of risks may warrant adjusting our policy stance.

綜合來看，這對貨幣政策有何啟示？在短期內(nèi)，通脹風(fēng)險偏向上行，而就業(yè)風(fēng)險偏向下行——這是一個充滿挑戰(zhàn)的局面。當(dāng)我們的目標(biāo)像這樣處于緊張關(guān)系時，我們的框架要求我們在雙重使命的兩方面進(jìn)行平衡。我們的政策利率現(xiàn)在比一年前離中性水平近了100個基點，而失業(yè)率和其他勞動力市場指標(biāo)的穩(wěn)定性使我們能夠在考慮改變政策立場時謹(jǐn)慎行事。盡管如此，在政策處于限制性區(qū)域的情況下，基線前景和不斷變化的風(fēng)險平衡可能需要我們調(diào)整政策立場。

Monetary policy is not on a preset course. FOMC members will make these decisions, based solely on their assessment of the data and its implications for the economic outlook and the balance ofrisks. We will never deviate from that approach.

貨幣政策沒有預(yù)設(shè)的路徑。聯(lián)邦公開市場委員會的成員將僅根據(jù)他們對數(shù)據(jù)及其對經(jīng)濟(jì)前景和風(fēng)險平衡影響的評估來做出這些決定。我們永遠(yuǎn)不會偏離這一方法。

Evolution of Monetary Policy Framework 貨幣政策框架的演變

Turning to my second topic, our monetary policy framework is built on the unchanging foundation of our mandate from Congress to foster maximum employment and stable prices for the American people. We remain fully committed to fulfilling our statutory mandate, and the revisions to our framework will support that mission across a broad range of economic conditions. Our revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, which we refer to as our consensus statement, describes how we pursue our dual-mandate goals. It is designed to give the public a clear sense of how we think about monetary policy, and that understanding is important both for transparency and accountability, and for making monetary policy more effective.

轉(zhuǎn)向我的第二個主題，我們的貨幣政策框架建立在國會授予我們的、為美國人民促進(jìn)充分就業(yè)和穩(wěn)定物價這一不變的使命基礎(chǔ)之上。我們?nèi)匀煌耆铝τ诼男形覀兊姆ǘㄊ姑?，對我們框架的修訂將在廣泛的經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下支持這一使命。我們經(jīng)修訂的《長期目標(biāo)與貨幣政策策略聲明》，我們稱之為共識聲明，描述了我們?nèi)绾巫非笪覀兊碾p重使命目標(biāo)。它旨在讓公眾清楚地了解我們?nèi)绾嗡伎钾泿耪?，而這種理解對于透明度和問責(zé)制，以及使貨幣政策更有效都至關(guān)重要。

The changes we made in this review are a natural progression, grounded in our ever-evolving understanding of our economy. We continue to build upon the initial consensus statement adopted in 2012 under Chair Ben Bernanke's leadership. Today's revised statement is the outcome of the second public review of our framework, which we conduct at five-year intervals.? This year's review included three elements: Fed Listens events at Reserve Banks around the country, a flagship research conference, and policymaker discussions and deliberations, supported by staff analysis, at a series of FOMC meetings.

我們在此次評估中所做的改變是一個自然的演進(jìn)過程，植根于我們對經(jīng)濟(jì)不斷深化的理解。我們繼續(xù)在2012年本·伯南克主席領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下通過的最初共識聲明的基礎(chǔ)上發(fā)展。今天經(jīng)修訂的聲明是我們框架第二次公開評估的成果，我們每五年進(jìn)行一次評估。今年的評估包括三個要素：在全國各儲備銀行舉行的“美聯(lián)儲在傾聽”（Fed Listens）活動，一次旗艦研究會議，以及在一系列FOMC會議上由工作人員分析支持的決策者討論和審議。

In approaching this year's review, a key objective has been to make sure that our framework is suitable across a broad range of economic conditions. At the same time, the framework needs to evolve with changes in the structure of the economy and our understanding of those changes. The Great Depression presented different challenges from those of the Great Inflation and the Great Moderation, which in turn are different from the ones we face today.

在進(jìn)行今年的評估時，一個關(guān)鍵目標(biāo)是確保我們的框架適用于廣泛的經(jīng)濟(jì)條件。與此同時，框架需要隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)的變化以及我們對這些變化的理解而演變。大蕭條提出的挑戰(zhàn)不同于大通脹和大緩和時期的挑戰(zhàn)，而這些又與我們今天面臨的挑戰(zhàn)不同。

At the time of the last review, we were living in a new normal, characterized by the proximity of interest rates to the effective lower bound (ELB), along with low growth, low inflation, and a very flat Phillips curve--meaning that inflation was not very responsive to slack in the economy. To me, a statistic that captures that era is that our policy rate was stuck at the ELB for seven long years following the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in late 2008. Many here will recall the sluggish growth and painfully slow recovery of that era. It appeared highly likely that if the economy experienced even a mild downturn, our policy rate would be back at the ELB very quickly, probably for another extended period. Inflation and inflation expectations could then decline in a weak economy, raising real interest rates as nominal rates were pinned near zero. Higher real rates would further weigh on job growth and reinforce the downward pressure on inflation and inflation expectations, triggering an adverse dynamic.

在上一次評估時，我們生活在一個新常態(tài)中，其特點是利率接近有效利率下限（ELB），同時伴隨著低增長、低通脹和一條非常平坦的菲利普斯曲線——這意味著通脹對經(jīng)濟(jì)中的松弛反應(yīng)不靈敏。對我而言，一個能捕捉那個時代特征的統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)是，自2008年末全球金融危機（GFC）爆發(fā)后，我們的政策利率在有效利率下限上停留了長達(dá)七年之久。在座的許多人都會記得那個時代增長乏力和復(fù)蘇極其緩慢的痛苦。當(dāng)時看來，極有可能的情況是，即使經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)歷一次溫和的衰退，我們的政策利率也會很快回到有效利率下限，并可能再次停留很長一段時間。屆時，通脹和通脹預(yù)期可能在疲弱的經(jīng)濟(jì)中下降，在名義利率被釘在近零水平的情況下推高實際利率。更高的實際利率會進(jìn)一步拖累就業(yè)增長，并加劇通脹和通脹預(yù)期的下行壓力，從而引發(fā)一種不利的動態(tài)。

The economic conditions that brought the policy rate to the ELB and drove the 2020 framework changes were thought to be rooted in slow-moving global factors that would persist for an extended period--and might well have done so, if not for the pandemic. The 2020 consensus statement included several features that addressed the ELB-related risks that had become increasingly prominent over the preceding two decades. We emphasized the importance of anchored longer-term inflation expectations to support both our price-stability and maximum-employment goals. Drawing on an extensive literature on strategies to mitigate risks associated with the ELB, we adopted flexible average inflation targeting--a "makeup" strategy to ensure that inflation expectations would remain well anchored even with the ELB constraint. In particular, we said that, following periods when inflation had been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy would likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.

那些將政策利率推至有效利率下限并推動2020年框架變革的經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況，被認(rèn)為根植于緩慢變化的全球性因素，這些因素將持續(xù)很長一段時間——如果不是因為疫情，它們很可能確實如此。2020年的共識聲明包含了幾個應(yīng)對過去二十年日益突出的、與有效利率下限相關(guān)風(fēng)險的特征。我們強調(diào)了錨定長期通脹預(yù)期對于支持我們價格穩(wěn)定和充分就業(yè)雙重目標(biāo)的重要性。借鑒大量關(guān)于減輕有效利率下限相關(guān)風(fēng)險策略的文獻(xiàn)，我們采納了靈活形式的平均通脹目標(biāo)制——一種“彌補”策略，以確保即使在有效利率下限的約束下，通脹預(yù)期也能保持良好錨定。具體來說，我們表示，在通脹持續(xù)低于2%的時期過后，適當(dāng)?shù)呢泿耪呖赡軙谝欢螘r間內(nèi)旨在實現(xiàn)適度高于2%的通脹。

In the event, rather than low inflation and the ELB, the post-pandemic reopening brought the highest inflation in 40 years to economies around the world. Like most other central banks and private-sector analysts, through year-end 2021 we thought that inflation would subside fairly quickly without a sharp tightening in our policy stance (figure 5). When it became clear that this was not the case, we responded forcefully, raising our policy rate by 5.25 percentage points over 16 months. That action, combined with the unwinding of pandemic supply disruptions, contributed to inflation moving much closer to our target without the painful rise in unemployment that has accompanied previous efforts to counter high inflation.

結(jié)果，后疫情時期的重新開放帶來的不是低通脹和有效利率下限，而是全球經(jīng)濟(jì)體40年來最高的通脹。像大多數(shù)其他央行和私營部門分析師一樣，直到2021年底，我們都認(rèn)為通脹會在沒有我們大幅收緊政策立場的情況下相當(dāng)快地消退（圖5）。當(dāng)情況變得明朗并非如此時，我們做出了強有力的回應(yīng)，在16個月內(nèi)將我們的政策利率提高了5.25個百分點。這一行動，加上疫情期間供應(yīng)中斷的緩解，促使通脹在沒有伴隨以往抗擊高通脹時出現(xiàn)的痛苦的失業(yè)率上升的情況下，更接近我們的目標(biāo)。

Elements of the Revised Consensus Statement 經(jīng)修訂的共識聲明的要素

This year's review considered how economic conditions have evolved over the past five years. During this period, we saw that the inflation situation can change rapidly in the face of large shocks. In addition, interest rates are now substantially higher than was the case during the era between the GFC and the pandemic. With inflation above target, our policy rate is restrictive--modestly so, in my view. We cannot say for certain where rates will settle out over the longer run, but their neutral level may now be higher than during the 2010s, reflecting changes in productivity, demographics, fiscal policy, and other factors that affect the balance between saving and investment (figure 6). During the review, we discussed how the 2020 statement's focus on the ELB may have complicated communications about our response to high inflation. We concluded that the emphasis on an overly specific set of economic conditions may have led to some confusion, and, as a result, we made several important changes to the consensus statement to reflect that insight.

今年的評估考慮了過去五年經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況的演變。在此期間，我們看到在巨大沖擊面前，通脹形勢可以迅速改變。此外，現(xiàn)在的利率水平遠(yuǎn)高于全球金融危機與疫情之間時期的水平。在通脹高于目標(biāo)的情況下，我們的政策利率是限制性的——在我看來，是溫和的限制性。我們無法確定利率在長期內(nèi)將穩(wěn)定在何處，但其中性水平現(xiàn)在可能高于2010年代，這反映了生產(chǎn)率、人口結(jié)構(gòu)、財政政策以及其他影響儲蓄與投資平衡因素的變化（圖6）。在評估期間，我們討論了2020年聲明對有效利率下限的關(guān)注，可能如何使我們對高通脹回應(yīng)的溝通變得復(fù)雜。我們得出結(jié)論，對一套過于特定的經(jīng)濟(jì)條件的強調(diào)可能導(dǎo)致了一些困惑，因此，我們對共識聲明做出了幾項重要修改以反映這一見解。

First, we removed language indicating that the ELB was a defining feature of the economic landscape. Instead, we noted that our "monetary policy strategy is designed to promote maximum employment and stable prices across a broad range of economic conditions." The difficulty of operating near the ELB remains a potential concern, but it is not our primary focus. The revised statement reiterates that the Committee is prepared to use its full range of tools to achieve its maximum-employment and price-stability goals, particularly if the federal funds rate is constrained by the ELB.

首先，我們刪除了表明有效利率下限是經(jīng)濟(jì)格局決定性特征的措辭。相反，我們指出，我們的“貨幣政策策略旨在在廣泛的經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下促進(jìn)充分就業(yè)和穩(wěn)定物價”。在有效利率下限附近操作的困難仍然是一個潛在的擔(dān)憂，但它不是我們的主要焦點。經(jīng)修訂的聲明重申，委員會準(zhǔn)備好使用其全部工具來實現(xiàn)其充分就業(yè)和價格穩(wěn)定的目標(biāo)，特別是在聯(lián)邦基金利率受到有效利率下限約束的情況下。

Second, we returned to a framework of flexible inflation targeting and eliminated the "makeup" strategy. As it turned out, the idea of an intentional, moderate inflation overshoot had proved irrelevant. There was nothing intentional or moderate about the inflation that arrived a few months after we announced our 2020 changes to the consensus statement, as I acknowledged publicly in 2021.

其次，我們回歸了靈活通脹目標(biāo)制的框架，并取消了“彌補”策略。事實證明，有意讓通脹適度超調(diào)的想法已變得無關(guān)緊要。在我們宣布2020年共識聲明修改后的幾個月里到來的通脹，既非有意也非適度，這一點我已在2021年公開承認(rèn)。

Well-anchored inflation expectations were critical to our success in bringing down inflation without a sharp increase in unemployment. Anchored expectations promote the return of inflation to target when adverse shocks drive inflation higher, and limit the risk of deflation when the economy weakens. Further, they allow monetary policy to support maximum employment in economic downturns without compromising price stability. Our revised statement emphasizes our commitment to act forcefully to ensure that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored, to the benefit of both sides of our dual mandate. It also notes that "price stability is essential for a sound and stable economy and supports the well-being of all Americans." This theme came through loud and clear at our Fed Listens events. The past five years have been a painful reminder of the hardship that high inflation imposes, especially on those least able to meet the higher costs of necessities.

良好錨定的通脹預(yù)期對于我們在沒有導(dǎo)致失業(yè)率急劇上升的情況下成功降低通脹至關(guān)重要。錨定的預(yù)期在不利沖擊推高通脹時能促進(jìn)通脹回歸目標(biāo)，并在經(jīng)濟(jì)疲軟時限制通縮風(fēng)險。此外，它們允許貨幣政策在經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退時支持充分就業(yè)而不損害價格穩(wěn)定。我們經(jīng)修訂的聲明強調(diào)，我們致力于采取有力行動，確保長期通脹預(yù)期保持良好錨定，以利于我們雙重使命的兩方面。聲明還指出，“價格穩(wěn)定是健全穩(wěn)定經(jīng)濟(jì)的基礎(chǔ)，并支持所有美國人的福祉。”這一主題在我們的“美聯(lián)儲在傾聽”活動中得到了響亮而清晰的體現(xiàn)。過去五年痛苦地提醒我們，高通脹帶來的困難，特別是對那些最無力承擔(dān)必需品更高成本的人們。

Third, our 2020 statement said that we would mitigate "shortfalls," rather than "deviations," from maximum employment. The use of "shortfalls" reflected the insight that our real-time assessments of the natural rate of unemployment--and hence of "maximum employment"--are highly uncertain. The later years of the post-GFC recovery featured employment running for an extended period above mainstream estimates of its sustainable level, along with inflation running persistently below our 2 percent target. In the absence of inflationary pressures, it might not be necessary to tighten policy based solely on uncertain real-time estimates of the natural rate of unemployment.

第三，我們2020年的聲明稱，我們將致力于減輕與充分就業(yè)之間的“不足”（shortfalls），而非“偏離”（deviations）。使用“不足”一詞反映了這樣一種見解，即我們對自然失業(yè)率——也就是“充分就業(yè)”——的實時評估是高度不確定的。在全球金融危機后復(fù)蘇的后期，就業(yè)在很長一段時間內(nèi)都高于主流對其可持續(xù)水平的估計，而通脹則持續(xù)低于我們2%的目標(biāo)。在沒有通脹壓力的情況下，可能沒有必要僅僅基于不確定的自然失業(yè)率實時估計來收緊政策。

We still have that view, but our use of the term "shortfalls" was not always interpreted as intended, raising communications challenges. In particular, the use of "shortfalls" was not intended as a commitment to permanently forswear preemption or to ignore labor market tightness. Accordingly, we removed "shortfalls" from our statement. Instead, the revised document now states more precisely that "the Committee recognizes that employment may at times run above real-time assessments of maximum employment without necessarily creating risks to price stability." Of course, preemptive action would likely be warranted if tightness in the labor market or other factors pose risks to price stability.

我們?nèi)匀怀钟羞@一觀點，但我們對“不足”一詞的使用并未總能按預(yù)期被解讀，從而帶來了溝通上的挑戰(zhàn)。特別是，使用“不足”一詞并非意在承諾永久放棄先發(fā)制人的行動或忽視勞動力市場的緊張狀況。因此，我們從聲明中刪除了“不足”一詞。相反，經(jīng)修訂的文件現(xiàn)在更精確地指出，“委員會認(rèn)識到，就業(yè)有時可能會高于對充分就業(yè)的實時評估，而不必然對價格穩(wěn)定構(gòu)成風(fēng)險?！碑?dāng)然，如果勞動力市場的緊張或其他因素對價格穩(wěn)定構(gòu)成風(fēng)險，采取先發(fā)制人的行動可能是必要的。

The revised statement also notes that maximum employment is "the highest level of employment that can be achieved on a sustained basis in a context of price stability." This focus on promoting a strong labor market underscores the principle that "durably achieving maximum employment fosters broad-based economic opportunities and benefits for all Americans." The feedback we received at Fed Listens events reinforced the value of a strong labor market for American households, employers, and communities.

經(jīng)修訂的聲明還指出，充分就業(yè)是“在價格穩(wěn)定的背景下可以持續(xù)實現(xiàn)的最高就業(yè)水平”。這種對促進(jìn)強勁勞動力市場的關(guān)注，強調(diào)了“持久地實現(xiàn)充分就業(yè)能為所有美國人帶來基礎(chǔ)廣泛的經(jīng)濟(jì)機會和利益”的原則。我們在“美聯(lián)儲在傾聽”活動中收到的反饋，強化了強勁勞動力市場對美國家庭、雇主和社區(qū)的價值。

Fourth, consistent with the removal of "shortfalls," we made changes to clarify our approach in periods when our employment and inflation objectives are not complementary. In those circumstances, we will follow a balanced approach in promoting them. The revised statement now more closely aligns with the original 2012 language. We take into account the extent of departures from our goals and the potentially different time horizons over which each is projected to return to a level consistent with our dual mandate. These principles guide our policy decisions today, as they did over the 2022--24 period, when the departure from our 2 percent inflation target was the overriding concern.

第四，與刪除“不足”一詞相一致，我們做出了修改，以闡明在我們的就業(yè)和通脹目標(biāo)不互補的時期我們的方法。在這些情況下，我們將采取一種平衡的方法來促進(jìn)它們。經(jīng)修訂的聲明現(xiàn)在與2012年的原始措辭更為一致。我們會考慮偏離我們目標(biāo)的程度，以及預(yù)計每個目標(biāo)回歸到與我們雙重使命相符水平的可能不同時間跨度。這些原則指導(dǎo)著我們今天的政策決定，就像它們在2022-24年期間指導(dǎo)我們一樣，當(dāng)時偏離我們2%通脹目標(biāo)是壓倒一切的擔(dān)憂。

In addition to these changes, there is a great deal of continuity with past statements. The document continues to explain how we interpret the mandate Congress has given us and describes the policy framework that we believe will best promote maximum employment and price stability. We continue to believe that monetary policy must be forward looking and consider the lags in its effects on the economy. For this reason, our policy actions depend on the economic outlook and the balance of risks to that outlook. We continue to believe that setting a numerical goal for employment is unwise, because the maximum level of employment is not directly measurable and changes over time for reasons unrelated to monetary policy.

除了這些變化，與過去的聲明也有很大的連續(xù)性。該文件繼續(xù)解釋我們?nèi)绾谓庾x國會賦予我們的使命，并描述我們認(rèn)為將最好地促進(jìn)充分就業(yè)和價格穩(wěn)定的政策框架。我們繼續(xù)認(rèn)為，貨幣政策必須是前瞻性的，并考慮其對經(jīng)濟(jì)影響的時滯。因此，我們的政策行動取決于經(jīng)濟(jì)前景以及該前景面臨的風(fēng)險平衡。我們繼續(xù)認(rèn)為，為就業(yè)設(shè)定一個數(shù)字目標(biāo)是不明智的，因為充分就業(yè)的水平無法直接衡量，并且會因與貨幣政策無關(guān)的原因隨時間變化。

We also continue to view a longer-run inflation rate of 2 percent as most consistent with our dual-mandate goals. We believe that our commitment to this target is a key factor helping keep longer-term inflation expectations well anchored. Experience has shown that 2 percent inflation is low enough to ensure that inflation is not a concern in household and business decisionmaking while also providing a central bank with some policy flexibility to provide accommodation during economic downturns.

我們也繼續(xù)認(rèn)為，2%的長期通脹率最符合我們的雙重使命目標(biāo)。我們相信，我們對這一目標(biāo)的承諾是幫助保持長期通脹預(yù)期良好錨定的一個關(guān)鍵因素。經(jīng)驗表明，2%的通脹率足夠低，可以確保通脹不會成為家庭和企業(yè)決策中的一個擔(dān)憂，同時也為央行在經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退期間提供寬松政策提供了一些靈活性。

Finally, the revised consensus statement retained our commitment to conduct a public review roughly every five years. There is nothing magic about a five-year pace. That frequency allows policymakers to reassess structural features of the economy and to engage with the public, practitioners, and academics on the performance of our framework. It is also consistent with several global peers.

最后，經(jīng)修訂的共識聲明保留了我們大約每五年進(jìn)行一次公開評估的承諾。五年這個節(jié)奏并沒有什么神奇之處。這個頻率允許決策者重新評估經(jīng)濟(jì)的結(jié)構(gòu)性特征，并與公眾、從業(yè)者和學(xué)者就我們框架的表現(xiàn)進(jìn)行交流。這也與幾個全球同行的做法相一致。

Conclusion 結(jié)論

In closing, I want to thank President Schmid and all his staff who work so diligently to host this outstanding event annually. Counting a couple of virtual appearances during the pandemic, this is the eighth time I have had the honor to speak from this podium. Each year, this symposium offers the opportunity for Federal Reserve leaders to hear ideas from leading economic thinkers and focus on the challenges we face. The Kansas City Fed was wise to lure Chair Volcker to this national park more than 40 years ago, and I am proud to be part of that tradition.

最后，我要感謝施密德主席和他所有辛勤工作以每年舉辦這一杰出活動的工作人員。算上疫情期間的幾次線上露面，這已是我第八次有幸在這個講臺上發(fā)言。每年，這個研討會都為美聯(lián)儲的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者們提供機會，聽取頂尖經(jīng)濟(jì)思想家的想法，并專注于我們面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。四十多年前，堪薩斯城聯(lián)儲將沃爾克主席吸引到這個國家公園是明智之舉，我很自豪能成為這一傳統(tǒng)的一部分。