作者：加拿大總理卡尼

來(lái)源：財(cái)經(jīng)會(huì)議圈整理

加拿大現(xiàn)任總理馬克·卡尼（Mark Carney）（2025年上任）于周二（2026年1月20日）在瑞士達(dá)沃斯世界經(jīng)濟(jì)論壇上的講話(huà)。演講稿由其本人親筆草擬，這并不常見(jiàn)。

馬克·卡尼（Mark Carney）此前曾擔(dān)任加拿大央行行長(zhǎng)、英國(guó)央行行長(zhǎng)，在國(guó)際金融領(lǐng)域有重要影響力。

本文包括三部分：

1.簡(jiǎn)要總結(jié)

2.演講中文翻譯版全文

3.演講英文原文

一、簡(jiǎn)要總結(jié)

馬克·卡尼的演講直言不諱且具有挑釁性，核心觀點(diǎn)包括：

1. “舊秩序不會(huì)回來(lái)了”

卡尼明確指出，過(guò)去以美國(guó)為主導(dǎo)、強(qiáng)調(diào)自由主義全球化和多邊合作的“舊世界秩序”已經(jīng)結(jié)束，不會(huì)再恢復(fù)。他表達(dá)了對(duì)當(dāng)前全球格局深刻變化的擔(dān)憂(yōu)。

1. 大國(guó)將“經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化”當(dāng)作武器使用

他批評(píng)主要大國(guó)正在利用經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與貿(mào)易機(jī)制作為地緣政治工具，而非純粹為了促進(jìn)繁榮。例如，通過(guò)制裁、脫鉤、技術(shù)封鎖等方式，把經(jīng)濟(jì)手段武器化。

1. 對(duì)美式霸權(quán)的反思

他提到，長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)由美國(guó)主導(dǎo)的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)體系正在瓦解，這種體系不再被視為可靠或可持續(xù)。他暗示，西方國(guó)家需要重新思考其在全球治理中的角色。

1. 呼吁建立新的全球規(guī)則

雖然沒(méi)有詳細(xì)說(shuō)明替代方案，但他的語(yǔ)氣表明：世界需要一種新的、更包容的全球秩序，不能依賴(lài)過(guò)去的模式。

二、演講中文翻譯版全文

（法語(yǔ)）：在加拿大以及世界處于這一轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)之際，與各位在一起既是一種榮幸——也是一種責(zé)任。

今天，我將談?wù)撌澜缰刃虻臄嗔�，一個(gè)美好故事的終結(jié)，以及一個(gè)殘酷現(xiàn)實(shí)的開(kāi)始：在這個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)中，大國(guó)之間的地緣政治不受任何約束。

但我也想向各位提出，其他國(guó)家——尤其是像加拿大這樣的中等強(qiáng)國(guó)——并非無(wú)能為力。它們有能力建立一種體現(xiàn)我們價(jià)值觀的新秩序，例如：尊重人權(quán)、可持續(xù)發(fā)展、團(tuán)結(jié)、主權(quán)以及國(guó)家的領(lǐng)土完整。

相對(duì)不那么強(qiáng)大的國(guó)家的力量，始于誠(chéng)實(shí)。

似乎我們每天都會(huì)被提醒：我們生活在一個(gè)大國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的時(shí)代。以規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的國(guó)際秩序正在消退。強(qiáng)者可以為所欲為，而弱者只能承受他們必須承受的。

修昔底德的這一格言被呈現(xiàn)為不可避免——仿佛國(guó)際關(guān)系的自然邏輯正在重新彰顯。而面對(duì)這種邏輯，各國(guó)有一種強(qiáng)烈傾向：為了相安無(wú)事而隨波逐流。去遷就。去避免麻煩。去希望服從能換來(lái)安全。

不會(huì)的。

那么，我們有哪些選擇？

1978年，捷克異議人士瓦茨拉夫·哈維爾（后來(lái)成為總統(tǒng)）寫(xiě)了一篇題為《無(wú)權(quán)者的力量》的文章。在其中，他提出了一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的問(wèn)題：共產(chǎn)主義體制是如何維系自身的？

他的回答從一位蔬菜店老板講起。每天早晨，這位店主都會(huì)在櫥窗里擺上一塊牌子：“全世界無(wú)產(chǎn)者，聯(lián)合起來(lái)！”他并不相信這句話(huà)。沒(méi)有人相信。但他還是把牌子擺出來(lái)，是為了避免麻煩，是為了表明服從，是為了相安無(wú)事。正因?yàn)槊恳粭l街上的每一家店鋪都在做同樣的事情，這個(gè)體制才得以延續(xù)。

它并非僅僅依靠暴力維持，而是依靠普通人參與那些他們?cè)趦?nèi)心深處明知是虛假的儀式。

哈維爾將這種狀態(tài)稱(chēng)為“生活在謊言之中”。這個(gè)體制的力量并不來(lái)自其真實(shí)性，而來(lái)自每個(gè)人都愿意表現(xiàn)得仿佛它是真的。而它的脆弱性也正源于此：當(dāng)哪怕只有一個(gè)人停止表演——當(dāng)那位蔬菜店老板把牌子撤下——這種幻象便開(kāi)始出現(xiàn)裂縫。

朋友們，現(xiàn)在是企業(yè)和國(guó)家把牌子取下來(lái)的時(shí)候了。

幾十年來(lái)，加拿大這樣的國(guó)家在我們所謂的“以規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的國(guó)際秩序”下實(shí)現(xiàn)了繁榮。我們加入了它的制度，贊美它的原則，從它的可預(yù)期性中獲益。也正因?yàn)槿绱�，我們才能在其庇護(hù)之下推行以?xún)r(jià)值為導(dǎo)向的外交政策。

我們心里清楚，關(guān)于國(guó)際規(guī)則秩序的這套敘事在一定程度上是虛假的。最強(qiáng)大的國(guó)家會(huì)在方便時(shí)為自己開(kāi)脫。貿(mào)易規(guī)則被不對(duì)稱(chēng)地執(zhí)行。而國(guó)際法的適用力度，會(huì)因被指控者或受害者的身份不同而有所差異。

這種虛構(gòu)曾經(jīng)是有用的。尤其是美國(guó)的霸權(quán)，在相當(dāng)程度上提供了公共產(chǎn)品：開(kāi)放的海上航道、穩(wěn)定的金融體系、集體安全，以及支持解決爭(zhēng)端的制度框架。

因此，我們把標(biāo)語(yǔ)掛在了櫥窗里。我們參與了這些儀式。我們?cè)诤艽蟪潭壬匣乇芰酥赋鲅赞o與現(xiàn)實(shí)之間的落差。

但這種交易已經(jīng)不再奏效。

“這是一次斷裂，而非過(guò)渡”

讓我直言不諱：我們正身處一次斷裂之中，而不是一次過(guò)渡。

在過(guò)去二十年里，金融、公共衛(wèi)生、能源和地緣政治領(lǐng)域接連發(fā)生的一系列危機(jī)，徹底暴露了極端全球一體化所蘊(yùn)含的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

而在更近的時(shí)期，大國(guó)開(kāi)始將經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化本身當(dāng)作武器使用：把關(guān)稅當(dāng)作杠桿，把金融基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施當(dāng)作脅迫工具，把供應(yīng)鏈當(dāng)作可以被利用的脆弱點(diǎn)。

當(dāng)一體化成為你被支配的根源時(shí)，你就無(wú)法繼續(xù)“生活在互利共贏的一體化謊言之中”。

中等強(qiáng)國(guó)長(zhǎng)期依賴(lài)的多邊機(jī)構(gòu)——世貿(mào)組織、聯(lián)合國(guó)、《聯(lián)合國(guó)氣候變化框架公約》締約方大會(huì)（COP）——這一整套集體解決問(wèn)題的制度架構(gòu)，正面臨威脅。

因此，許多國(guó)家正在得出相同的結(jié)論：它們必須在能源、糧食、關(guān)鍵礦產(chǎn)、金融和供應(yīng)鏈等領(lǐng)域，發(fā)展更大的戰(zhàn)略自主性。

這種沖動(dòng)是可以理解的。一個(gè)無(wú)法養(yǎng)活自己、無(wú)法為自己提供能源、無(wú)法自我防衛(wèi)的國(guó)家，幾乎沒(méi)有選擇。當(dāng)規(guī)則不再保護(hù)你時(shí)，你就必須保護(hù)自己。

但我們必須清醒地認(rèn)識(shí)到，這條道路將通向何處。一個(gè)由堡壘組成的世界，將更加貧窮、更為脆弱，也更不可持續(xù)。

還有另一個(gè)事實(shí)必須正視：如果大國(guó)連對(duì)規(guī)則和價(jià)值的表面尊重都放棄了，而轉(zhuǎn)向毫無(wú)約束地追逐自身的權(quán)力和利益，那么“交易主義”所能帶來(lái)的收益將越來(lái)越難以復(fù)制。霸權(quán)國(guó)家不可能持續(xù)不斷地將關(guān)系貨幣化。

盟友將通過(guò)多元化來(lái)對(duì)沖不確定性。他們會(huì)購(gòu)買(mǎi)“保險(xiǎn)”，增加選擇，以重建主權(quán)——這種主權(quán)曾經(jīng)建立在規(guī)則之上，但未來(lái)將越來(lái)越多地錨定在抵御壓力的能力之上。

在座各位都清楚，這正是經(jīng)典的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理——而風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理是有成本的。但戰(zhàn)略自主、主權(quán)的成本，同樣可以被分擔(dān)。共同進(jìn)行韌性投資，比各自修建堡壘要便宜得多。共同的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)可以減少碎片化。互補(bǔ)性帶來(lái)的是正和結(jié)果。

而對(duì)像加拿大這樣的中等強(qiáng)國(guó)而言，問(wèn)題并不在于是否要適應(yīng)這一新的現(xiàn)實(shí)——我們必須適應(yīng)。真正的問(wèn)題在于：我們是僅僅通過(guò)修建更高的壁壘來(lái)適應(yīng)，還是能夠采取一種更具雄心的方式。

加拿大是最早聽(tīng)到這記警鐘的國(guó)家之一，這促使我們從根本上調(diào)整了自身的戰(zhàn)略姿態(tài)。

加拿大人清楚地認(rèn)識(shí)到，我們過(guò)去那些舒適的假設(shè)——認(rèn)為我們的地理位置和盟友身份會(huì)自動(dòng)帶來(lái)繁榮與安全——這一假設(shè)已經(jīng)不再成立。

而我們的新路徑，建立在亞歷山大·斯圖布所稱(chēng)的“以?xún)r(jià)值為基礎(chǔ)的現(xiàn)實(shí)主義”之上——換句話(huà)說(shuō)，我們力圖在原則性與務(wù)實(shí)性之間取得平衡。

在原則上，我們堅(jiān)定致力于基本價(jià)值：主權(quán)與領(lǐng)土完整，除非符合《聯(lián)合國(guó)憲章》，否則禁止使用武力，以及對(duì)人權(quán)的尊重。

在務(wù)實(shí)層面上，我們承認(rèn)進(jìn)步往往是漸進(jìn)的，承認(rèn)各方利益并不總是一致，也承認(rèn)并非每一個(gè)伙伴都會(huì)認(rèn)同我們的價(jià)值觀。因此，我們以開(kāi)放而清醒的態(tài)度，廣泛而有策略地開(kāi)展交往。我們主動(dòng)直面現(xiàn)實(shí)世界，而不是等待一個(gè)我們希望出現(xiàn)的世界。

我們正在校準(zhǔn)對(duì)外關(guān)系，使其深度能夠反映我們的價(jià)值觀。鑒于世界秩序的流動(dòng)性、由此帶來(lái)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，以及未來(lái)走向所涉及的重大利害關(guān)系，我們正優(yōu)先推動(dòng)廣泛參與，以最大化我們的影響力。

而且，我們不再僅僅依賴(lài)價(jià)值觀本身的力量，也同樣依賴(lài)我們自身力量的價(jià)值。

我們正在國(guó)內(nèi)建設(shè)這種力量。

自我的政府上任以來(lái)，我們下調(diào)了個(gè)人所得稅、資本利得稅以及企業(yè)投資相關(guān)稅負(fù)。我們已經(jīng)清除了所有聯(lián)邦層面對(duì)省際貿(mào)易的壁壘。我們正在加速推進(jìn)總額達(dá)一萬(wàn)億美元的投資，涵蓋能源、人工智能、關(guān)鍵礦產(chǎn)、新的貿(mào)易通道等領(lǐng)域。

我們將在本世紀(jì)末之前把國(guó)防開(kāi)支提高一倍，并以能夠促進(jìn)國(guó)內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展的方式來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)。

同時(shí)，我們也在迅速推進(jìn)對(duì)外多元化。我們已與歐盟達(dá)成一項(xiàng)全面戰(zhàn)略伙伴關(guān)系，其中包括加入 SAFE，即歐洲防務(wù)采購(gòu)安排。

在六個(gè)月內(nèi)，我們已在四大洲簽署了另外十二項(xiàng)貿(mào)易與安全協(xié)議。

在過(guò)去幾天里，我們又與中國(guó)和卡塔爾達(dá)成了新的戰(zhàn)略伙伴關(guān)系。

我們正在與印度、東盟、泰國(guó)、菲律賓以及南方共同市場(chǎng)談判自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定。

我們還在做另一件事。為了幫助解決全球性問(wèn)題，我們正在推進(jìn)“可變幾何”模式——換言之，就是圍繞不同議題，根據(jù)共同的價(jià)值與利益，組建不同的合作聯(lián)盟。

因此，在烏克蘭問(wèn)題上，我們是“志愿聯(lián)盟”的核心成員之一，也是其國(guó)防與安全事務(wù)中人均投入規(guī)模最大的國(guó)家之一。

在北極主權(quán)問(wèn)題上，我們堅(jiān)定地與格陵蘭和丹麥站在一起，充分支持他們決定格陵蘭未來(lái)的獨(dú)特權(quán)利。

我們對(duì)《北大西洋公約》第五條的承諾堅(jiān)定不移。

因此，我們正與北約盟友——包括北歐—波羅的海八國(guó)（Nordic-Baltic Eight）——一道，進(jìn)一步鞏固聯(lián)盟的北翼和西翼安全，其中包括加拿大前所未有的投入：超視距雷達(dá)、潛艇、航空力量以及地面部隊(duì)的部署。

加拿大堅(jiān)決反對(duì)針對(duì)格陵蘭的關(guān)稅措施，并呼吁通過(guò)有針對(duì)性的對(duì)話(huà)，實(shí)現(xiàn)我們?cè)诒睒O地區(qū)共同的安全與繁榮目標(biāo)。

在多邊貿(mào)易方面，我們正積極推動(dòng)在《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》和歐盟之間架起一座橋梁，從而打造一個(gè)覆蓋15億人口的新貿(mào)易集團(tuán)。

在關(guān)鍵礦產(chǎn)領(lǐng)域，我們正以七國(guó)集團(tuán)為核心組建“買(mǎi)方俱樂(lè)部”，使世界能夠減少對(duì)高度集中供應(yīng)來(lái)源的依賴(lài)。

在人工智能領(lǐng)域，我們正與志同道合的民主國(guó)家開(kāi)展合作，以確保我們最終不會(huì)被迫在霸權(quán)國(guó)家與超級(jí)規(guī)模平臺(tái)之間作出選擇。

這并非天真的多邊主義，也不是依賴(lài)既有機(jī)構(gòu)的做法，而是圍繞具體議題，構(gòu)建切實(shí)有效的聯(lián)盟，與那些擁有足夠共同基礎(chǔ)、能夠采取共同行動(dòng)的伙伴合作。在某些情況下，這樣的聯(lián)盟將涵蓋世界上絕大多數(shù)國(guó)家。

其所做的，是在貿(mào)易、投資、文化等領(lǐng)域編織一張緊密的聯(lián)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)，使我們能夠在未來(lái)的挑戰(zhàn)與機(jī)遇中加以運(yùn)用。

“中等強(qiáng)國(guó)必須共同行動(dòng)”

中等強(qiáng)國(guó)必須共同行動(dòng)，因?yàn)槿绻覀儾辉诓妥琅�，我們就�?huì)出現(xiàn)在菜單上。

但我也要指出，大國(guó)在目前階段是有條件單打獨(dú)斗的。它們擁有市場(chǎng)規(guī)模、軍事能力以及施加條件的杠桿。中等強(qiáng)國(guó)沒(méi)有。但當(dāng)我們只與一個(gè)霸權(quán)國(guó)家進(jìn)行雙邊談判時(shí)，我們是在弱勢(shì)中談判。我們只能接受對(duì)方給出的條件。我們彼此競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，看誰(shuí)更順從。

這不是主權(quán)。這是在接受從屬地位的同時(shí)，表演主權(quán)。

在大國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的世界中，夾在中間的國(guó)家面臨一個(gè)選擇：是為了爭(zhēng)取青睞而彼此競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，還是聯(lián)合起來(lái)，創(chuàng)造一條具有實(shí)際影響力的第三條道路。

我們不應(yīng)讓硬實(shí)力的崛起蒙蔽我們的雙眼，而忽視合法性、誠(chéng)信與規(guī)則的力量仍將保持強(qiáng)大——前提是我們選擇共同運(yùn)用它們。

這也讓我回到哈維爾。

中等強(qiáng)國(guó)“活在真實(shí)之中”，意味著什么？

首先，這意味著直面現(xiàn)實(shí)。不要再仿佛它仍按宣傳那樣運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)似的去援引“以規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的國(guó)際秩序”。要如其所是地稱(chēng)呼它：一個(gè)大國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)不斷加劇的體系，在其中，最強(qiáng)大的國(guó)家將經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化當(dāng)作脅迫工具來(lái)追逐自身利益。

這意味著言行一致，對(duì)盟友和對(duì)手適用同樣的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。當(dāng)中等強(qiáng)國(guó)在一個(gè)方向上批評(píng)經(jīng)濟(jì)脅迫，卻在另一個(gè)方向上保持沉默時(shí)，我們就是還把那塊牌子掛在櫥窗里。

這意味著去建設(shè)我們所宣稱(chēng)信奉的東西。與其等待舊秩序恢復(fù)，不如去創(chuàng)造真正按其所述運(yùn)作的制度與協(xié)議。

還意味著削弱使脅迫成為可能的杠桿。建設(shè)強(qiáng)大的國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)，始終應(yīng)當(dāng)是每個(gè)政府的當(dāng)務(wù)之急。而在國(guó)際上實(shí)現(xiàn)多元化，不僅是經(jīng)濟(jì)上的審慎之舉——它更是誠(chéng)實(shí)外交的物質(zhì)基礎(chǔ)。因?yàn)閲?guó)家只有降低遭受報(bào)復(fù)的脆弱性，才有資格采取有原則的立場(chǎng)。

“誠(chéng)實(shí)面對(duì)真實(shí)的世界”

因此，加拿大擁有世界所需要的東西。我們是能源超級(jí)大國(guó)。我們擁有豐富的關(guān)鍵礦產(chǎn)儲(chǔ)備。我們擁有世界上受教育程度最高的人口。我們的養(yǎng)老金基金是全球規(guī)模最大、最成熟的投資者之一。換言之，我們擁有資本，擁有人才，同時(shí)也擁有具備強(qiáng)大財(cái)政能力、能夠果斷行動(dòng)的政府。

而且，我們還擁有許多人所向往的價(jià)值觀。

加拿大是一個(gè)行之有效的多元社會(huì)。我們的公共空間喧鬧、多樣而自由。加拿大人始終致力于可持續(xù)發(fā)展。

在一個(gè)極不穩(wěn)定的世界中，我們是一個(gè)穩(wěn)定、可靠的伙伴——一個(gè)著眼長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)、重視并建設(shè)關(guān)系的伙伴。

我們還有另一種東西。我們對(duì)正在發(fā)生之事的清醒認(rèn)知，以及據(jù)此采取行動(dòng)的決心。

我們明白，這場(chǎng)斷裂所要求的不僅是適應(yīng)，而是對(duì)真實(shí)世界的誠(chéng)實(shí)以對(duì)。

我們正在把那塊牌子從櫥窗里取下來(lái)。

我們知道，舊秩序不會(huì)回來(lái)了。我們不該為它哀悼。懷舊不是一種戰(zhàn)略。

但我們相信，正是從這道裂縫中，我們能夠建造出更好、更強(qiáng)大、更公正的東西。

這正是中等強(qiáng)國(guó)的使命——那些在“堡壘世界”中損失最大、卻能從真正合作中獲益最多的國(guó)家。

強(qiáng)者擁有他們的力量。但我們也擁有屬于我們的東西——停止假裝的能力，直面現(xiàn)實(shí)的能力，在國(guó)內(nèi)建設(shè)實(shí)力并共同行動(dòng)的能力。

這就是加拿大的道路。我們公開(kāi)而自信地選擇了它。

而這條道路，向任何愿意與我們同行的國(guó)家敞開(kāi)。

非常感謝。

三、英文演講原文

Below are Prime Minister Mark Carney's remarks at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on Tuesday.

(In French): It's a pleasure — and a duty — to be with you at this turning point for Canada and for the world.

Today, I'll talk about the rupture in the world order, the end of a nice story and the beginning of a brutal reality where geopolitics among the great powers is not subject to any constraints.

But I also submit to you that other countries, particularly middle powers like Canada, are not powerless. They have the capacity to build a new order that embodies our values, like respect for human rights, sustainable development, solidarity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.

The power of the less powerful begins with honesty.

It seems that every day we're reminded that we live in an era of great power rivalry. That the rules-based order is fading. That the strong can do what they can, and the weak must suffer what they must.

This aphorism of Thucydides is presented as inevitable — as the natural logic of international relations reasserting itself. And faced with this logic, there is a strong tendency for countries to go along to get along. To accommodate. To avoid trouble. To hope that compliance will buy safety.

It won't.

So, what are our options?

In 1978, the Czech dissident Václav Havel, later president, wrote an essay called The Power of the Powerless. And in it, he asked a simple question: How did the communist system sustain itself?

And his answer began with a greengrocer. Every morning, this shopkeeper places a sign in his window: "Workers of the world, unite!" He doesn't believe it. No one does. But he places the sign anyway to avoid trouble, to signal compliance, to get along. And because every shopkeeper on every street does the same, the system persists.

Not through violence alone, but through the participation of ordinary people in rituals they privately know to be false.

Havel called this "living within a lie." The system's power comes not from its truth but from everyone's willingness to perform as if it were true. And its fragility comes from the same source: when even one person stops performing — when the greengrocer removes his sign — the illusion begins to crack.

Friends, it is time for companies and countries to take their signs down.

For decades, countries like Canada prospered under what we called the rules-based international order. We joined its institutions, we praised its principles, we benefited from its predictability. And because of that we could pursue values-based foreign policies under its protection.

We knew the story of the international rules-based order was partially false. That the strongest would exempt themselves when convenient. That trade rules were enforced asymmetrically. And we knew that international law applied with varying rigour depending on the identity of the accused or the victim.

This fiction was useful. And American hegemony, in particular, helped provide public goods: open sea lanes, a stable financial system, collective security and support for frameworks for resolving disputes.

So, we placed the sign in the window. We participated in the rituals. And we largely avoided calling out the gaps between rhetoric and reality.

This bargain no longer works.

'A rupture, not a transition'

Let me be direct: We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition.

Over the past two decades, a series of crises in finance, health, energy and geopolitics have laid bare the risks of extreme global integration.

But more recently, great powers have begun using economic integration as weapons. Tariffs as leverage. Financial infrastructure as coercion. Supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited.

You cannot "live within the lie" of mutual benefit through integration when integration becomes the source of your subordination.

The multilateral institutions on which middle powers have relied — the WTO, the UN, the COP — the very architecture of collective problem solving, are under threat.

And as a result, many countries are drawing the same conclusions — that they must develop greater strategic autonomy: in energy, food, critical minerals, in finance and supply chains.

And this impulse is understandable. A country that cannot feed itself, fuel itself or defend itself has few options. When the rules no longer protect you, you must protect yourself.

But let's be clear-eyed about where this leads. A world of fortresses will be poorer, more fragile and less sustainable.

And there's another truth: if great powers abandon even the pretense of rules and values for the unhindered pursuit of their power and interests, the gains from "transactionalism" will become harder to replicate. Hegemons cannot continually monetize their relationships.

Allies will diversify to hedge against uncertainty. They'll buy insurance, increase options in order to rebuild sovereignty — sovereignty that was once grounded in rules, but will be increasingly anchored in the ability to withstand pressure.

This room knows, this is classic risk management — risk management comes at a price. But that cost of strategic autonomy — of sovereignty — can also be shared. Collective investments in resilience are cheaper than everyone building their own fortresses. Shared standards reduce fragmentation. Complementarities are positive sum.

And the question for middle powers, like Canada, is not whether to adapt to the new reality — we must. The question is whether we adapt by simply building higher walls or whether we can do something more ambitious.

Canada was amongst the first to hear the wake-up call, leading us to fundamentally shift our strategic posture.

Canadians know that our old, comfortable assumptions — that our geography and alliance memberships automatically conferred prosperity and security — that assumption is no longer valid.

And our new approach rests on what Alexander Stubb has termed "values-based realism" — or, to put another way, we aim to be principled and pragmatic.

Principled in our commitment to fundamental values: sovereignty and territorial integrity, the prohibition of the use of force except when consistent with the UN Charter and respect for human rights.

And pragmatic in recognizing that progress is often incremental, that interests diverge, that not every partner will share our values. So we're engaging broadly, strategically, with open eyes. We actively take on the world as it is, not wait around for a world we wish to be.

We are calibrating our relationships so their depth reflects our values. And we're prioritizing broad engagement to maximize our influence, given the fluidity of the world order, the risks that this poses, and the stakes for what comes next.

And we are no longer relying on just the strength of our values, but also on the value of our strength.

We are building that strength at home.

Since my government took office, we have cut taxes on incomes, on capital gains and business investment. We have removed all federal barriers to interprovincial trade. We are fast-tracking a trillion dollars of investment in energy, AI, critical minerals, new trade corridors and beyond.

We are doubling our defence spending by the end of this decade and we're doing so in ways that build our domestic industries.

And we are rapidly diversifying abroad. We've agreed a comprehensive strategic partnership with the EU, including joining SAFE, the European defence procurement arrangements.

We have signed 12 other trade and security deals on four continents in six months.

In the past few days, we have concluded new strategic partnerships with China and Qatar.

We're negotiating free trade pacts with India, ASEAN, Thailand, Philippines and Mercosur.

We're doing something else. To help solve global problems, we are pursuing variable geometry — in other words, different coalitions for different issues based on common values and interests.

So on Ukraine, we're a core member of the coalition of the willing and one of the largest per-capita contributors to its defence and security.

On Arctic sovereignty, we stand firmly with Greenland and Denmark and fully support their unique right to determine Greenland's future.

Our commitment to Article 5 is unwavering.

So we're working with our NATO allies — including the Nordic-Baltic Eight — to further secure the alliance's northern and western flanks, including through Canada's unprecedented investments in over-the-horizon radar, in submarines, in aircraft and boots on the ground.

Canada strongly opposes tariffs over Greenland and calls for focused talks to achieve our shared objectives of security and prosperity in the Arctic.

On plurilateral trade, we're championing efforts to build a bridge between the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the European Union, which would create a new trading block of 1.5 billion people.

On critical minerals we're forming buyer's clubs anchored in the G7 so the world can diversify away from concentrated supply.

And on AI we're co-operating with like-minded democracies to ensure we won't ultimately be forced to choose between hegemons and hyperscalers.

This is not naive multilateralism. Nor is it relying on their institutions. It's building coalitions that work, issue by issue, with partners who share enough common ground to act together. In some cases, this will be the vast majority of nations.

What it's doing is creating a dense web of connections across trade, investment, culture on which we can draw for future challenges and opportunities.

'Middle powers must act together'

Middle powers must act together because if we're not at the table, we're on the menu.

But I'd also say that great powers can afford, for now, to go it alone. They have the market size, the military capacity and the leverage to dictate terms. Middle powers do not. But when we only negotiate bilaterally with a hegemon, we negotiate from weakness. We accept what's offered. We compete with each other to be the most accommodating.

This is not sovereignty. It's the performance of sovereignty while accepting subordination.

In a world of great power rivalry, the countries in between have a choice: compete with each other for favour or to combine to create a third path with impact.

We shouldn't allow the rise of hard power to blind us to the fact that the power of legitimacy, integrity and rules will remain strong — if we choose to wield them together.

Which brings me back to Havel.

What would it mean for middle powers to "live the truth"?

First it means naming reality. Stop invoking "rules-based international order" as though it still functions as advertised. Call it what it is: a system of intensifying great power rivalry where the most powerful pursue their interests using economic integration as a weapon of coercion.

It means acting consistently, applying the same standards to allies and rivals. When middle powers criticize economic intimidation from one direction but stay silent when it comes from another, we are keeping the sign in the window.

It means building what we claim to believe in. Rather than waiting for the old order to be restored, it means creating institutions and agreements that function as described.

And it means reducing the leverage that enables coercion. Building a strong domestic economy should always be every government's immediate priority. And diversification internationally is not just economic prudence — it is the material foundation for honest foreign policy. Because countries earn the right to principled stands by reducing their vulnerability to retaliation.

'Honesty about the world as it is'

So Canada has what the world wants. We are an energy superpower. We hold vast reserves of critical minerals. We have the most educated population in the world. Our pension funds are amongst the world's largest and most sophisticated investors. In other words, we have capital, talent, we also have a government with the immense fiscal capacity to act decisively.

And we have the values to which many others aspire.

Canada is a pluralistic society that works. Our public square is loud, diverse and free. Canadians remain committed to sustainability.

We are a stable and reliable partner in a world that is anything but. A partner that builds and values relationships for the long term.

And we have something else. We have a recognition of what's happening and a determination to act accordingly.

We understand that this rupture calls for more than adaptation. It calls for honesty about the world as it is.

We are taking the sign out of the window.

We know the old order is not coming back. We shouldn't mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy.

But we believe that from the fracture, we can build something better, stronger, more just.

This is the task of the middle powers. The countries that have the most to lose from a world of fortresses and the most to gain from genuine co-operation.

The powerful have their power. But we have something too — the capacity to stop pretending, to name reality, to build our strength at home and to act together.

That is Canada's path. We choose it openly and confidently.

And it is a path wide open to any country willing to take it with us.

Thank you very much.

THE END