廣東
IPP評論是國家高端智庫華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院（IPP）官方微信平臺。
導(dǎo)語：3月7日，美國和以色列對伊朗的軍事打擊進(jìn)入第八天。美國總統(tǒng)特朗普3月6日在社交媒體發(fā)文稱，他已與美國大型軍工企業(yè)召開會(huì)議，討論武器生產(chǎn)計(jì)劃與排期。參會(huì)企業(yè)同意將“精良級”武器產(chǎn)量翻兩番，并以最快速度達(dá)到最高產(chǎn)能。同日，伊朗外長阿拉格齊則表示，美軍“速戰(zhàn)速?zèng)Q計(jì)劃已失敗”。伊朗方面還稱，將在未來幾天動(dòng)用“先進(jìn)且鮮少使用的遠(yuǎn)程導(dǎo)彈”。種種跡象顯示，伊朗戰(zhàn)事正逐漸演變?yōu)槌志脩?zhàn)。
3月6日，CGTN刊登IPP副研究員徐偉鈞的文章。文章指出，本輪沖突的演進(jìn)取決于美伊雙方彈藥庫存與產(chǎn)能博弈，若伊朗持續(xù)用低成本武器消耗美軍攔截彈庫存，將迫使美軍按威脅等級攔截、收縮防護(hù)范圍甚至放棄非核心目標(biāo)。他指出，美國摧毀伊朗核能力、推動(dòng)政權(quán)更迭、提振選情等戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)均難以通過遠(yuǎn)程打擊實(shí)現(xiàn)，維持長期戰(zhàn)爭的高額代價(jià)可能會(huì)重塑特朗普政府的對伊打擊意愿，推動(dòng)其轉(zhuǎn)向以"敘事層面的勝利"終止本輪軍事行動(dòng)。
徐偉鈞 博士
華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院（IPP）副研究員
自2月28日美國和以色列對伊朗發(fā)動(dòng)高強(qiáng)度軍事打擊以來，本輪沖突中決定戰(zhàn)場態(tài)勢的關(guān)鍵變量，已逐漸由單輪打擊的戰(zhàn)術(shù)命中精度與毀傷效果，轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)?strong>美國在長期高強(qiáng)度對抗中能否承受精確打擊彈藥與防空反導(dǎo)攔截彈的迅速消耗。
據(jù)媒體報(bào)道，白宮計(jì)劃召集主要國防承包商高管要求加快生產(chǎn)，五角大樓也著手準(zhǔn)備約500億美元的補(bǔ)充預(yù)算用于補(bǔ)充近期行動(dòng)造成的裝備庫存缺口。這些動(dòng)向表明，美國國防工業(yè)體系的彈藥產(chǎn)能與庫存補(bǔ)充能力，已經(jīng)成為制約美國繼續(xù)開展對伊朗軍事行動(dòng)的重要影響因素。
當(dāng)?shù)貢r(shí)間3月6日，美國國防部長皮特·赫格塞斯表示，美國在伊朗展開軍事行動(dòng)“彈藥儲(chǔ)備充足”。圖源：Getty Images
美國對伊朗發(fā)動(dòng)軍事打擊的現(xiàn)實(shí)限制
與此同時(shí)，美國國內(nèi)政治層面圍繞對伊軍事行動(dòng)的質(zhì)疑愈演愈烈。國會(huì)圍繞總統(tǒng)戰(zhàn)爭權(quán)力的拉鋸持續(xù)升溫，盡管參議院程序性否決了限制特朗普政府對伊軍事行動(dòng)權(quán)限的決議案，但兩黨圍繞戰(zhàn)爭授權(quán)的分歧已進(jìn)入白熱化階段。
此外，路透社/益普索民調(diào)顯示，僅27%的美國人支持政府對伊朗發(fā)起軍事打擊[1]，民眾對海外長期戰(zhàn)爭的抵觸情緒顯著，這意味著特朗普政府維持大規(guī)模、長時(shí)段對伊軍事行動(dòng)的國內(nèi)政治合法性與民意基礎(chǔ)較為薄弱。
在上述背景下，美國維持長期戰(zhàn)爭的高額代價(jià)可能會(huì)重塑特朗普政府的對伊打擊意愿與戰(zhàn)略選擇，推動(dòng)其轉(zhuǎn)向以“敘事層面的勝利”結(jié)束此輪打擊行動(dòng)，而非繼續(xù)追求高難度的長期目標(biāo)。
美國公眾對特朗普襲擊伊朗的態(tài)度總體上為：僅27%支持，43%反對，30%不確定。圖源：路透社
雖然美國在短期內(nèi)可以通過補(bǔ)充預(yù)算法案滿足對伊軍事行動(dòng)的軍費(fèi)開支需求，但相關(guān)武器的庫存和產(chǎn)能可能會(huì)制約進(jìn)一步的軍事行動(dòng)。除了向中東地區(qū)調(diào)遣大量海空軍力量之外，美國還在此輪軍事行動(dòng)中大量使用了戰(zhàn)斧巡航導(dǎo)彈、“愛國者”導(dǎo)彈、“標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”-3型導(dǎo)彈、“薩德”系統(tǒng)攔截彈、LUCAS無人機(jī)等消耗性裝備。
根據(jù)《華盛頓郵報(bào)》的報(bào)道，美國正在以驚人速度消耗其精準(zhǔn)制導(dǎo)武器和先進(jìn)防空導(dǎo)彈的庫存，這可能迫使美軍在數(shù)天之內(nèi)就“不得不按優(yōu)先級選擇攔截目標(biāo)”。[2]
史汀生中心專家指出，用于攔截伊朗威力最強(qiáng)彈道導(dǎo)彈的末段高空區(qū)域防御系統(tǒng)（THAAD）導(dǎo)彈供應(yīng)尤其短缺。如果美國以去年與伊朗持續(xù)12天的沖突期間的強(qiáng)度使用THAAD導(dǎo)彈，其儲(chǔ)備可能僅夠維持兩周左右。 圖源：美國空軍
這些精準(zhǔn)制導(dǎo)武器和先進(jìn)防空反導(dǎo)攔截彈的共同點(diǎn)在于造價(jià)高昂、生產(chǎn)速度慢、庫存補(bǔ)充周期長。在本輪沖突彈藥消耗遠(yuǎn)超預(yù)期的情況下，國防工業(yè)的生產(chǎn)能力將很快成為制約美國對伊軍事行動(dòng)可持續(xù)性的戰(zhàn)略約束。
不可否認(rèn)，美國依托全球領(lǐng)先的軍事力量與規(guī)模龐大的戰(zhàn)略儲(chǔ)備，若執(zhí)意推進(jìn)對伊朗的長期高強(qiáng)度打擊，可通過跨戰(zhàn)區(qū)調(diào)撥全球部署的彈藥庫存，在短期內(nèi)維持戰(zhàn)場消耗需求。但這種“拆東墻補(bǔ)西墻”式的庫存調(diào)配，將直接擠壓美軍未來在更高烈度情景下的戰(zhàn)略儲(chǔ)備冗余，對其全球軍事布局形成不可逆的戰(zhàn)略透支。
尤其值得注意的是，在美國將中國定位為首要戰(zhàn)略競爭對手與核心假想敵的頂層戰(zhàn)略框架下，美軍必須為印太方向可能發(fā)生的高烈度大國對抗預(yù)留足額的戰(zhàn)備彈藥與作戰(zhàn)資源，無法大規(guī)模抽調(diào)印太戰(zhàn)區(qū)的核心戰(zhàn)備儲(chǔ)備用于中東地區(qū)的局部沖突。
圖為美國在印太地區(qū)的軍事存在。信息來源：US Library of Congress 圖源：BBC
從進(jìn)攻端來看，隨著美國和以色列迅速掌握伊朗空域的制空權(quán)并且壓制伊朗的防空能力，美軍可以降低對戰(zhàn)斧巡航導(dǎo)彈等高成本遠(yuǎn)程精準(zhǔn)打擊彈藥的依賴，轉(zhuǎn)而大規(guī)模使用聯(lián)合直接攻擊彈藥（JDAM）等庫存規(guī)模大、量產(chǎn)補(bǔ)充快、單位成本低的制導(dǎo)炸彈維持對伊朗的打擊。這將大幅降低打擊伊朗的軍火成本，有效提升其軍事打擊行動(dòng)的可持續(xù)性。
但從防御端來看，對伊朗反擊火力的攔截行動(dòng)將帶來攔截彈藥的持續(xù)大規(guī)模消耗。本輪沖突的長期演進(jìn)態(tài)勢，將在很大程度上取決于美伊雙方彈藥庫存規(guī)模、國防工業(yè)量產(chǎn)能力與供應(yīng)鏈韌性的博弈。
——如果美軍的打擊在摧毀伊朗導(dǎo)彈發(fā)射平臺、導(dǎo)彈及無人機(jī)庫存以及核心軍工生產(chǎn)能力方面取得決定性進(jìn)展，將從根源上削弱伊朗的反擊能力，進(jìn)而大幅緩解防御端彈藥消耗對美軍軍事行動(dòng)的約束。
——反之，如果伊朗方面能夠維持一定的軍工生產(chǎn)和反擊能力，持續(xù)使用相對成本較低的導(dǎo)彈和廉價(jià)無人機(jī)消耗美軍彈藥庫存，美軍用于防護(hù)中東前沿基地和區(qū)域盟友要地的攔截彈庫存，將會(huì)成為制約其對伊軍事行動(dòng)持續(xù)性的重要阻礙。
這種短缺可能會(huì)迫使美軍改變行為模式，包括按照來襲目標(biāo)的威脅等級劃定攔截優(yōu)先級、更多依賴低成本的反無人機(jī)手段，甚至主動(dòng)收縮防護(hù)范圍、放棄非核心目標(biāo)的防御任務(wù)。
這種調(diào)整的直接后果，是美軍中東前沿基地、區(qū)域盟友關(guān)鍵設(shè)施面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)顯著上升。這將不僅會(huì)導(dǎo)致美國在中東地區(qū)安全承諾可信度的受損，更將使特朗普政府面臨的政治與軍事壓力快速累積。
當(dāng)?shù)貢r(shí)間3月6日晚，伊朗伊斯蘭革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)宣布啟動(dòng)第23波“真實(shí)承諾-4”軍事行動(dòng)，對以色列和該地區(qū)美軍基地目標(biāo)發(fā)動(dòng)無人機(jī)和導(dǎo)彈聯(lián)合打擊。圖源：Getty Images
特朗普可以宣布“勝利”并結(jié)束戰(zhàn)爭
在本輪對伊軍事打擊發(fā)起前，美伊兩國之間的外交談判仍在持續(xù)推進(jìn)。然而，美方開出的價(jià)碼觸及伊朗核心利益紅線，始終未獲伊方接受。從本輪軍事行動(dòng)的兵力部署與實(shí)施特征來看，特朗普政府短期內(nèi)并無向伊朗境內(nèi)派遣地面作戰(zhàn)部隊(duì)的明確動(dòng)向，其更可能的戰(zhàn)略意圖，是用軍事優(yōu)勢強(qiáng)行重設(shè)談判邊界，從而迫使伊朗接受更為苛刻的限制性條款。
綜合來看，特朗普政府通過此次對伊打擊，已經(jīng)實(shí)現(xiàn)的短期戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)包括：對哈梅內(nèi)伊和部分伊斯蘭革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)高層的定點(diǎn)清除、對伊朗海軍主力作戰(zhàn)力量的實(shí)質(zhì)性癱瘓、對伊朗常規(guī)遠(yuǎn)程打擊能力的系統(tǒng)性削弱。
然而，美國試圖通過持續(xù)軍事打擊繼續(xù)推進(jìn)的戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)——摧毀伊朗的核能力、推動(dòng)伊朗的政權(quán)更迭以及提振美國國內(nèi)中期選舉選情——仍然難以實(shí)現(xiàn)。
只不過，上述美國尚未實(shí)現(xiàn)的戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)都難以通過遠(yuǎn)程打擊的方式實(shí)現(xiàn)。
從摧毀伊朗核能力的目標(biāo)來看，盡管遠(yuǎn)程打擊能夠?qū)σ阎墓潭ê嗽O(shè)施與部分關(guān)鍵研發(fā)節(jié)點(diǎn)造成實(shí)質(zhì)性毀傷，但是由于伊朗核問題的長期延宕，伊朗已構(gòu)建起分散化、地下化、隱蔽化的核設(shè)施與備份體系。美軍僅靠遠(yuǎn)程打擊無法全面清除這些設(shè)施，更難以實(shí)現(xiàn)對伊朗核能力的永久性摧毀。
從推動(dòng)伊朗政權(quán)更迭的目標(biāo)來看，要靠遠(yuǎn)程打擊要實(shí)現(xiàn)政權(quán)更迭，除非伊朗內(nèi)部本就處于政權(quán)合法性崩塌、統(tǒng)治體系瀕臨崩潰的臨界狀態(tài)。這需要精英階層出現(xiàn)重大分裂，并伴隨大規(guī)模的社會(huì)動(dòng)員，同時(shí)反對派勢力必須掌握足夠強(qiáng)有力的武裝力量。在美國不派遣地面部隊(duì)進(jìn)入伊朗的情況下，單純的遠(yuǎn)程打擊難以幫助伊朗國內(nèi)的反對派勢力建立與伊斯蘭革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)相抗衡的軍事實(shí)力，也就難以實(shí)現(xiàn)其推動(dòng)政權(quán)更迭的目標(biāo)。
2026年3月6日星期五，在伊朗首都德黑蘭，伊朗抗議者在伊瑪目霍梅尼大清真寺外舉行反美以集會(huì)，他們手持已故最高領(lǐng)袖阿里·哈梅內(nèi)伊的畫像和伊朗國旗。圖源：Getty Images
從提振國內(nèi)選情的目標(biāo)來看，本輪軍事行動(dòng)的實(shí)際政治后果將受到持續(xù)時(shí)間、美軍傷亡、石油價(jià)格等因素的影響。當(dāng)前美國國內(nèi)已經(jīng)大量出現(xiàn)對軍事行動(dòng)的質(zhì)疑聲音，甚至在共和黨內(nèi)部以及MAGA群體中，也出現(xiàn)了對特朗普是否過于好戰(zhàn)、是否偏離“美國優(yōu)先”的質(zhì)疑。[3]
即便美國向伊朗境內(nèi)派遣地面作戰(zhàn)部隊(duì)全面介入局勢，在伊朗國內(nèi)未出現(xiàn)嚴(yán)重精英分裂與政治動(dòng)蕩的前提下，上述戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)也很難在短期內(nèi)實(shí)現(xiàn)，反而會(huì)使美國徹底陷入特朗普此前反復(fù)批判的那種“戰(zhàn)爭泥潭”。
因此，特朗普政府最具可行性的戰(zhàn)略選擇，是在維持階段性打擊后，通過單方面宣布“任務(wù)完成、取得勝利”的敘事方式終止本輪軍事行動(dòng)。
本輪軍事行動(dòng)已取得的階段性戰(zhàn)場成果，足以支撐特朗普完成符合其“贏學(xué)”敘事邏輯的政治成果包裝，并將其塑造為執(zhí)政周期內(nèi)的標(biāo)志性外交與軍事政績。同時(shí)，終止軍事行動(dòng)也能夠及時(shí)止損，避免美國綜合國力的持續(xù)消耗，以及特朗普政府政治與外交資源的進(jìn)一步透支。
在當(dāng)前形勢下，停戰(zhàn)的主動(dòng)權(quán)仍然掌握在美國手中。特朗普隨時(shí)可以宣布“勝利”并實(shí)施?；?。如果伊朗在此后繼續(xù)實(shí)施大規(guī)模軍事反擊，它將極易在國際輿論與外交層面成為眾矢之的，甚至招致臨近的海灣國家以及眾多依賴霍爾木茲海峽航道安全的國家的集體反對與外交施壓。
文章于2026年3月7日刊登于CGTN官網(wǎng)，點(diǎn)擊圖片鏈接閱讀原文。圖源：CGTN網(wǎng)站截圖
*以下為英文譯文，供讀者對照參考（請上下滑動(dòng)查看）。
Since the US and Israel launched high-intensity strikes against Iran on February 28, the key variable shaping the battlefield has gradually shifted. The critical factor has shifted from the tactical accuracy and destructive impact of a single strike to whether the US is capable of sustaining the rapid consumption of precision-guided munitions and air and missile defense interceptors during a prolonged, high-intensity confrontation.
Media reports indicate that the White House is planning to convene executives from major defense contractors and urge them to accelerate production, while the Pentagon is also preparing a supplemental budget of approximately $50 billion to address stockpile shortfalls caused by recent operations. These developments suggest that the capacity of the US defense industry, especially its ability to produce munitions and replenish inventories, has already become a major factor constraining further military operations against Iran.
Real-world constraints on US military strikes against Iran
Meanwhile, domestic political skepticism over military action against Iran has intensified in the US. The tug-of-war in Congress concerning the president's war powers has escalated. Despite the Senate's rejection of a resolution that would have restricted President Trump's authority to use force against Iran, the discord between the two parties over war authorization has escalated significantly.
Moreover, a Reuters/Ipsos poll shows that only 27% of Americans support military strikes on Iran, reflecting strong public resistance to grinding conflicts. This suggests that the Trump administration's domestic political legitimacy and popular support for sustaining large-scale, long-duration military operations against Iran are relatively weak. In this context, the high cost of a protracted war may reshape the Trump administration's willingness and strategic choices, pushing it toward ending the current campaign with a "narrative victory" rather than continuing to pursue difficult long-term objectives.
While the US has the capacity to address the funding needs for operations against Iran in the short term by enacting a supplemental appropriations bill, the stockpiles and production capacity of relevant weaponry may constrain further military actions. Beyond deploying considerable naval and air assets to the Middle East, the US has also expended large quantities of precision-guided munitions and advanced air defense and anti-missile interceptors during this campaign, including Tomahawk cruise missiles, Patriot missiles, Standard Missile-3 missiles, THAAD interceptors and LUCAS drones. According to The Washington Post, the US is depleting its stocks of precision weapons and sophisticated air defense missiles at a striking pace, which could force the US military to "prioritize which targets to intercept" within days.
These key weapons share several characteristics: high production costs, slow manufacturing rates and lengthy replenishment cycles for stockpiles. Given the current conflict's ammunition expenditure far exceeding expectations, the defense industry's production capacity will soon become a strategic constraint limiting the sustainability of US military operations against Iran.
It is true that, relying on its globally leading military capabilities and vast strategic reserves, the US could, if determined to pursue a long and high-intensity campaign against Iran, sustain battlefield consumption in the short term by reallocating munitions from stockpiles positioned across different theaters. However, this "robbing Peter to pay Paul" approach to inventory allocation would directly erode the US military's strategic reserves for higher-intensity scenarios, resulting in irreversible strategic depletion of its global military posture.
From the perspective of attacking, as the US and Israel rapidly secure air superiority over Iranian airspace and suppress Iran's air-defense capabilities, US forces can reduce its reliance on high-cost precision strike munitions such as Tomahawk cruise missiles. Instead, it can sustain strikes against Iran through the large-scale use of guided bombs such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), which exist in larger stockpiles, can be replenished through mass production more quickly and have a lower unit cost. This would significantly reduce the cost of operations against Iran and materially improve the sustainability of the campaign.
However, from the perspective of defending, intercepting Iranian retaliations will entail continued and large-scale depletion of interceptor munitions. The long-term trajectory of this conflict will largely depend on the competition between the two sides with regard to stockpile size, the defense industry's capacity for mass production and supply-chain resilience. Should US strikes achieve decisive progress in destroying Iran's missile launch platforms, its missile and drone stockpiles and its core military production capabilities, this would fundamentally weaken Iran's counterstrike capacity.
Thus, the constraints imposed on US military operations by ammunition depletion on the defensive front would be substantially alleviated. Conversely, if Iran is able to preserve a degree of military production and retaliatory capacity, and continues to use relatively low-cost missiles and cheap drones to deplete US munitions stocks, the inventory of interceptor missiles deployed to protect forward bases in the Middle East and key sites of regional allies would become a major constraint on the sustainability of its military operations against Iran.
Such shortages may compel the US military to change its operational patterns, including setting interception priorities according to the threat level of incoming targets, increasing reliance on low-cost counter-drone measures and even proactively narrowing protective coverage by foregoing the defense of non-essential assets. The direct consequence of such adjustments would be a significant escalation in risks faced by US forward bases in the Middle East and critical facilities of regional allies. This would not only undermine the credibility of US security commitments in the region, but would also rapidly accumulate political and military pressure on the Trump administration.
Trump could declare a 'win' and end the war
Prior to the start of this round of military strikes against Iran, diplomatic negotiations between the US and Iran were still progressing. Nevertheless, the terms demanded by the US were perceived by Iran as crossing its core red lines and were never accepted by the Iranian side. Judging from the troop deployment and operational characteristics of the current campaign, the Trump administration has not demonstrated clear indication of deploying ground combat forces into Iran in the near future. It appears that its primary strategic intent is to leverage military superiority to forcefully reset the negotiation parameters and thereby compel Iran to accept more stringent restrictive terms.
In summary, the Trump administration has achieved the following short-term strategic objectives through strikes against Iran: the targeted elimination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and several senior leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the substantial crippling of Iran's main naval combat capabilities and the systematic weakening of Iran's conventional long-range strike capabilities. But the broader strategic goals the US seeks to advance through sustained military action – destroying Iran's nuclear capabilities, toppling the Iranian government and gaining domestic support ahead of the US midterm elections – remain elusive.
Such objectives are difficult to accomplish through the medium of long-range strikes alone. When it comes to destroying Iran's nuclear capabilities, long-range strikes can inflict substantial damage on identified fixed nuclear facilities and specific critical research and development nodes. However, the protracted nature of the Iranian nuclear issue has resulted in Iran establishing decentralized, underground and concealed nuclear facilities alongside backup systems. Relying solely on long-range strikes, the US military cannot comprehensively eliminate these facilities, let alone achieve the permanent destruction of Iran's nuclear capabilities.
Regarding a change in Iran's leadership, long-range strikes alone would be inadequate to deliver such an outcome unless the Iranian government was already in a state of collapse, with its legitimacy eroded and its governing system close to breakdown. This would require a considerable split among elites and extensive social mobilization on a large scale, coupled with opposition forces possessing armed capabilities strong enough to challenge the IRGC. In the absence of a deployment of US ground forces to Iran, long-range strikes are unlikely to help domestic opposition forces in establishing military capabilities comparable to the IRGC. Consequently, the objective of toppling the Tehran government proves difficult to achieve.
As for domestic support, the actual political consequences of this operation will depend on factors including its duration, the number of US casualties and oil prices. At present, there is already substantial domestic criticism of the campaign. Even within the Republican Party and among MAGA supporters, questions have emerged over whether Trump is becoming overly aggressive and whether he is deviating from the "America First" principle.
Even if the US were to deploy ground combat forces to Iran to fully intervene, these strategic objectives would still be difficult to achieve in the short term, provided that Iran does not undergo a severe elite split and political turmoil. Instead, such a move would risk embroiling the US in the very kind of war quagmire that Trump has repeatedly denounced in the past. Accordingly, the most viable strategic option for the Trump administration would be to sustain a period of limited strikes and then conclude this round of military operations by unilaterally declaring "mission accomplished" and "win."
The strategic objectives achieved in this round of military operations provide sufficient grounds for Trump to package political outcomes aligned with his "winning narrative," allowing him to present the campaign as a signature foreign and military achievement during his term in office. Also, ending the military operations would assist in the prevention of further erosion of US comprehensive national strength and prevent the further exhaustion of the Trump administration's political and diplomatic resources.
Under current conditions, the initiative for a ceasefire still lies with Trump. He could declare victory and implement a ceasefire at any time. Should Iran subsequently proceed with large-scale military retaliation, it would swiftly become the target of international criticism and diplomatic pressure. Such actions could provoke collective opposition and diplomatic pressure from neighboring Gulf countries, as well as many countries that depend on the security of shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz.
參考文獻(xiàn)：
Jason Lange, “Just one in four Americans say they back US strikes on Iran, Reuters/Ipsos poll finds,” Reuters, March 1, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/just-one-four-americans-support-us-strikes-iran-reutersipsos-poll-finds-2026-03-01/.
Noah Robertson, et al., “Top defense officials push back on concerns about U.S. munitions shortage,” The Washington Post, March 4, 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/04/us-iran-air-defense-missile-burn-rate/.
參見：Nandita Bose, Gram Slattery and Bo Erickson, “Trump presses ahead with Iran war despite warnings of political risk for midterms,” Reuters, March 2, 2026, ; Nathan Layne and Aleksandra Michalska, “Iran crisis tests Trump standing with young men who helped power 2024 win,” Reuters, March 4, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/iran-crisis-tests-trump-standing-with-young-men-who-helped-power-2024-win-2026-03-04/.
徐偉鈞 華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院 副研究員
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