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期刊介紹：

《Journal of Political Economy》（政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)雜志）是經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)領(lǐng)域中歷史悠久、最負(fù)盛名的期刊之一，在經(jīng)濟(jì)理論和實(shí)踐方面提供了重要的學(xué)術(shù)成果。該雜志發(fā)表多個領(lǐng)域中高度選擇性和廣泛引用的分析類型、解釋類型和實(shí)證類型的研究工作，涉及領(lǐng)域包括貨幣理論、財政政策、勞動經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、發(fā)展、微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)和宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)理論、國際貿(mào)易和金融、產(chǎn)業(yè)組織和社會經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)。該刊每年發(fā)行12期，每期發(fā)表文章6-9篇左右，2024年影響因子為6.3。

本期看點(diǎn)：

●對災(zāi)害持悲觀態(tài)度的主體更傾向于通過杠桿購買高風(fēng)險資產(chǎn)，并偏好期限較長的債務(wù)合約，其保險覆蓋范圍隨期限延長而隱性增加。

●密蘇里州的失業(yè)保險福利期限削減使再就業(yè)率提升了12%，這一效果通過促進(jìn)企業(yè)創(chuàng)造崗位空缺和提高失業(yè)者求職努力共同實(shí)現(xiàn)。

●因殘疾喪失工作能力的女性被拒賠的概率比同等條件的男性高12.8個百分點(diǎn)，這一差異源于女性在評估過程中被認(rèn)定具有更高的剩余工作能力，篩查錯誤的性別差異主要源于錯誤拒賠女性申請人時所承擔(dān)的（制度性）成本更低。

●更嚴(yán)格的動態(tài)定價監(jiān)管對提升消費(fèi)者福利的影響有限，同時會降低保險公司利潤并加劇市場集中度。

●德國長期健康保險是全球規(guī)模最大的私營長期健康保險合約市場，其合約設(shè)計與終身收入穩(wěn)定人群的最優(yōu)動態(tài)合約高度吻合，其實(shí)現(xiàn)的福利水平較最優(yōu)合約至多低4%。

●非正式護(hù)理的可獲得性會使長期護(hù)理保險需求降低7個百分點(diǎn)，并抑制醫(yī)療補(bǔ)助計劃的支出。若為提供非正式護(hù)理的家庭成員提供等額現(xiàn)金補(bǔ)貼的政策，則能顯著提升保險需求與家庭福利，同時降低醫(yī)療補(bǔ)助支出。

※ 本期目錄

●Bakkensen, L., Phan, T., & Wong, T.-N. (2025). Leveraging the Disagreement on Climate Change: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Political Economy, 133(10), 3132–3166.

●Karahan, F., Mitman, K., & Moore, B. (2025). Micro and Macro Effects of Unemployment Insurance Policies: Evidence from Missouri. Journal of Political Economy, 133(9), 2836–2873.

●Low, H., & Pistaferri, L. (2025). Disability Insurance: Error Rates and Gender Differences. Journal of Political Economy, 133(9), 2962–3018.

●Aizawa, N., & Ko, A. (2025). Dynamic Pricing Regulation and Welfare in Insurance Markets. Journal of Political Economy, 133(8), 2371–2413.

●Atal, J. P., Fang, H., Karlsson, M., & Ziebarth, N. R. (2025). German Long-Term Health Insurance: Theory Meets Evidence. Journal of Political Economy, 133(6), 1840–1885.

●Mommaerts, C. (2025). Long-Term Care Insurance and the Family. Journal of Political Economy, 133(1), 1–52.

Leveraging the Disagreement on Climate Change: Theory and Evidence

利用氣候變化爭議：理論與實(shí)踐

作者

Bakkensen, Laura（俄勒岡大學(xué)），Phan, Toàn（里奇蒙德聯(lián)邦儲備銀行），Wong, Tsz-Nga（Wong, Tsz-Nga）

摘要：We develop a credit search model with maturity choice where agents disagree on when a long-run disaster will damage collateral assets. It predicts that disaster-pessimistic agents are more likely to leverage risky asset purchases and prefer debt contracts with longer maturities. Intuitively, pessimists value the default option of debt contracts as implicit disaster insurance, whose coverage increases with maturity implicitly and costs less to optimistic lenders. Using high-resolution sea level rise projections and comprehensive propriety data on coastal real estate and mortgages, we find robust evidence of these predictions. The findings provide relevant policy implications on insurance mandates, securitization, disaster assistance, and financial stability.

我們構(gòu)建了一個包含期限選擇的信貸搜尋模型，其中不同主體對長期災(zāi)害何時會損害抵押資產(chǎn)的看法存在分歧。該模型預(yù)測，對災(zāi)害持悲觀態(tài)度的主體更傾向于通過杠桿購買高風(fēng)險資產(chǎn)，并偏好期限較長的債務(wù)合約。從直覺上看，悲觀者將債務(wù)合約的違約期權(quán)視為隱性災(zāi)害保險，其保險覆蓋范圍隨期限延長而隱性增加，且對于樂觀的貸款人而言成本較低。通過使用高分辨率的海平面上升預(yù)測數(shù)據(jù)，并結(jié)合沿海房地產(chǎn)及抵押貸款的詳盡專有數(shù)據(jù)，我們?yōu)檫@些預(yù)測找到了有力證據(jù)。研究結(jié)果為保險強(qiáng)制規(guī)定、證券化、災(zāi)害援助及金融穩(wěn)定等政策領(lǐng)域提供了相關(guān)啟示。

原文鏈接：https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/737236

Micro and Macro Effects of Unemployment Insurance Policies: Evidence from Missouri

密蘇里州失業(yè)保險政策的微觀與宏觀效應(yīng)：實(shí)證研究

作者

Karahan, Fatih（土耳其共和國中央銀行），Mitman, Kurt（斯德哥爾摩大學(xué)），Moore, Brendan（斯坦福大學(xué)）

摘要：We develop a method to jointly measure the response of worker search effort (micro effect) and vacancy creation (macro effect) to changes in the duration of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. To implement this approach, we exploit an unexpected cut in UI durations in Missouri and provide quasi-experimental evidence on the effect of UI on the labor market. In our baseline specification, the data indicate that the cut in Missouri increased job-finding rates by 12% by raising firm vacancy creation and the search effort of unemployed workers. Both channels contribute roughly equally to the total effect.

我們開發(fā)了一種方法來共同衡量工人求職努力（微觀效應(yīng)）與崗位空缺創(chuàng)造（宏觀效應(yīng)）對失業(yè)保險福利期限變化的響應(yīng)。為實(shí)施這一方法，我們利用密蘇里州失業(yè)保險期限意外削減的政策變動，為失業(yè)保險對勞動力市場的影響提供了準(zhǔn)實(shí)驗證據(jù)。在我們的基準(zhǔn)設(shè)定中，數(shù)據(jù)顯示密蘇里州的福利期限削減使再就業(yè)率提升了12%，這一效果通過促進(jìn)企業(yè)創(chuàng)造崗位空缺和提高失業(yè)者求職努力共同實(shí)現(xiàn)。兩種渠道對總效應(yīng)的貢獻(xiàn)大致相當(dāng)。

原文鏈接：https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/736215

Disability Insurance: Error Rates and Gender Differences

殘疾保險：誤差率與性別差異

作者

Low, Hamish（芝加哥聯(lián)邦儲備銀行），Pistaferri, Luigi（斯坦福大學(xué)）

摘要：We show the extent of screening errors made in disability insurance awards using matched survey-administrative data. False rejections are widespread, with large gender differences. Work-disabled women are 12.8 percentage points more likely to be rejected than work-disabled men, controlling for health conditions, occupation, and demographics. Gender differences arise because women are assessed with more residual work capacity. We model the Social Security Administration (SSA) decision-making process and estimate that gender differences in screening errors originate from lower costs to the SSA from incorrectly rejecting women. Noise in self-reported work limitation leads to overstating screening errors, but the gender difference remains.

本研究利用匹配的調(diào)查與行政數(shù)據(jù)，揭示了殘疾保險評定中篩查錯誤的發(fā)生程度。錯誤拒賠現(xiàn)象普遍存在，且存在顯著的性別差異：在控制健康狀況、職業(yè)及人口統(tǒng)計特征后，因殘疾喪失工作能力的女性被拒賠的概率比同等條件的男性高12.8個百分點(diǎn)。這一差異源于女性在評估過程中被認(rèn)定具有更高的剩余工作能力。通過對美國社會保障局決策過程建模分析，我們估計篩查錯誤的性別差異主要源于該機(jī)構(gòu)錯誤拒賠女性申請人時所承擔(dān)的（制度性）成本更低。盡管自報工作能力受限數(shù)據(jù)中存在噪聲干擾可能導(dǎo)致篩查錯誤被高估，但性別差異現(xiàn)象依然穩(wěn)健存在。

原文鏈接：https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/736207

Dynamic Pricing Regulation and Welfare in Insurance Markets

保險市場中的動態(tài)定價監(jiān)管與福利效應(yīng)

作者

Aizawa, Naoki（威斯康星大學(xué)麥迪遜分校），Ko, Ami（喬治敦大學(xué)）

摘要：While the traditional role of insurers is to provide protection against individuals' idiosyncratic risks, insurers themselves face substantial uncertainties due to aggregate shocks. To prevent insurers from passing these aggregate risks onto consumers, governments have increasingly adopted dynamic pricing regulations, which limit insurers' ability to change premiums over time. We evaluate dynamic pricing regulation using an equilibrium model of the US long-term care insurance market, featuring insurers' lack of commitment and endogenous market structures. We find that stricter dynamic pricing regulation has a limited impact on improving consumer welfare, while it reduces insurer profits and increases market concentration.

盡管傳統(tǒng)上保險公司的職能是為個體提供特異性風(fēng)險保障，但其自身也面臨著因總體沖擊帶來的巨大不確定性。為防止保險公司將這類總體風(fēng)險轉(zhuǎn)嫁給消費(fèi)者，政府日益推行動態(tài)定價監(jiān)管政策，以限制保險公司隨時間調(diào)整保費(fèi)的能力。本文通過構(gòu)建一個包含保險公司缺乏承諾能力與內(nèi)生市場結(jié)構(gòu)的美國長期護(hù)理保險市場均衡模型，對動態(tài)定價監(jiān)管政策進(jìn)行評估。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，更嚴(yán)格的動態(tài)定價監(jiān)管對提升消費(fèi)者福利的影響有限，同時會降低保險公司利潤并加劇市場集中度。

原文鏈接：https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/735512

German Long-Term Health Insurance: Theory Meets Evidence

德國長期健康保險：理論與實(shí)證

作者

Atal, Juan Pablo（賓夕法尼亞大學(xué)），F(xiàn)ang, Hanming（賓夕法尼亞大學(xué)）， Karlsson, Martin（杜伊斯堡-埃森大學(xué)），Ziebarth, Nicolas R.（曼海姆大學(xué)）

摘要：German long-term health insurance (GLTHI) represents the largest market for private long-term health insurance contracts in the world. We show that GLTHI's contract design coincides with the optimal dynamic contract for individuals with constant lifetime income profiles. After estimating the key ingredients of a life-cycle model, we find that, under a variety of assumptions, GLTHI achieves welfare that is at most 4% lower than for the optimal contract. Relative to the gains of replacing short-term contracts with either of the two long-term contracts, this welfare gap is smallest when reclassification risk is high.

德國長期健康保險（GLTHI）是全球規(guī)模最大的私營長期健康保險合約市場。研究表明，GLTHI的合約設(shè)計與終身收入穩(wěn)定人群的最優(yōu)動態(tài)合約高度吻合。通過對生命周期模型核心要素的估計，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)在多種假設(shè)條件下，GLTHI實(shí)現(xiàn)的福利水平較最優(yōu)合約最多僅低4%。相較于用短期合約替換為任意長期合約帶來的收益，這一福利差距在再分類風(fēng)險較高時達(dá)到最小。

原文鏈接：https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/734781

Long-Term Care Insurance and the Family

長期護(hù)理保險與家庭

作者

Mommaerts, Corina（威斯康星大學(xué)麥迪遜分校）

摘要：This paper examines whether informal care by family members influences the demand for long-term care insurance. Motivated by evidence that the availability of informal caregivers correlates with lower insurance demand and that informal care substitutes for formal care, I estimate a dynamic model of long-term care decisions between an elderly parent and her adult child. The availability of informal care lowers demand for insurance by 7 percentage points and suppresses Medicaid spending. A policy that provides equivalent cash benefits for informal care for such families can generate meaningful increases in insurance demand and family welfare and decreases in Medicaid spending.

本研究探討了家庭成員提供的非正式護(hù)理是否會影響長期護(hù)理保險的需求�；诜钦阶o(hù)理的可獲得性與保險需求降低存在相關(guān)性、且非正式護(hù)理能替代正式護(hù)理的實(shí)證依據(jù)，本文構(gòu)建了一個老年父母與成年子女間長期護(hù)理決策的動態(tài)模型。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，非正式護(hù)理的可獲得性會使保險需求降低7個百分點(diǎn)，并抑制醫(yī)療補(bǔ)助計劃的支出。若針對此類家庭實(shí)施為提供非正式護(hù)理的家庭成員提供等額現(xiàn)金補(bǔ)貼的政策，則能顯著提升保險需求與家庭福利，同時降低醫(yī)療補(bǔ)助支出。

原文鏈接：https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/732887

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