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導(dǎo)語：繼4月12日美伊在伊斯蘭堡的談判無果后，美國已于美國東部時(shí)間4月13日宣布對(duì)所有進(jìn)出伊朗港口船只實(shí)施封鎖。美伊圍繞霍爾木茲海峽的博弈仍在持續(xù)。隨著戰(zhàn)事進(jìn)入新階段，各方也在重新評(píng)估相關(guān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，調(diào)整政策應(yīng)對(duì)。

在IPP榮譽(yù)教授梅赫里·馬達(dá)爾沙希看來，當(dāng)前這場圍繞美國、以色列與伊朗展開的對(duì)抗，不僅僅是一場區(qū)域危機(jī)，而是一場嵌入更廣泛戰(zhàn)略體系的沖突，在這個(gè)體系中，區(qū)域戰(zhàn)爭、大國對(duì)抗和地緣經(jīng)濟(jì)變化深深交織在一起。在這個(gè)不斷演變的框架內(nèi)，中東已成為多種且往往相互競爭的戰(zhàn)略議程的匯合點(diǎn)。軍事行動(dòng)、經(jīng)濟(jì)脅迫、技術(shù)能力和有爭議的規(guī)范現(xiàn)在在同一個(gè)空間運(yùn)作，并日益相互影響。然而，沖突并不能形成一個(gè)連貫的秩序構(gòu)建。相反，它突顯了一個(gè)支離破碎的國際體系的不穩(wěn)定性，在這個(gè)體系中，各國正在重新審視自己的弱點(diǎn)，重新定義自己的利益，并適應(yīng)更具爭議的戰(zhàn)略格局。

The Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s Strategic Center of Gravity

霍爾木茲海峽：伊朗的戰(zhàn)略重心所在

本文作者：Mehri Madarshahi（梅赫里·馬達(dá)爾沙希）

IPP榮譽(yù)教授、聯(lián)合國教科文組織下屬國際創(chuàng)意和可持續(xù)發(fā)展中心（ICCSD）顧問委員會(huì)成員

引言：碎片化世界秩序中的多層次戰(zhàn)略體系

Introduction：A Fragmented World Order in a Multi-Layered Strategic System

當(dāng)前中東沖突，尤其是圍繞伊朗、以色列、美國以及黎巴嫩等周邊地區(qū)行為體不斷演化的對(duì)抗，不能僅僅通過“局部升級(jí)”或“傳統(tǒng)國家間戰(zhàn)爭”的分析框架得到充分理解。它同樣也不能被簡單視為對(duì)一個(gè)原本穩(wěn)定的全球秩序所進(jìn)行的一場被動(dòng)“壓力測試”。

The ongoing conflict in the Middle East, particularly the evolving confrontation involving Iran, Israel, the United States, and adjacent regional actors such as Lebanon, cannot be adequately understood through the analytical lenses of either localized escalation or conventional interstate war. Nor can it be reduced to a passive “stress test” of an otherwise stable global order.

本文認(rèn)為，這場沖突實(shí)際上展開于一個(gè)多層次的戰(zhàn)略體系之中，在這一體系內(nèi)，地區(qū)戰(zhàn)爭、大國競爭與地緣經(jīng)濟(jì)重組彼此交織，并持續(xù)相互塑造。在這一框架下，中東不僅僅是一個(gè)動(dòng)蕩地區(qū)，更是一個(gè)多重戰(zhàn)略項(xiàng)目相互匯聚的場域；多個(gè)行為體在軍事、經(jīng)濟(jì)、技術(shù)與規(guī)范等不同維度上，圍繞部分彼此競爭的目標(biāo)持續(xù)展開博弈。

This article argues instead that the conflict unfolds within a multi-layered strategic system in which regional warfare, great-power competition, and geoeconomic restructuring intersect and continuously shape one another. Within this framework, the Middle East is not merely a site of instability, but a convergent arena of overlapping strategic projects in which multiple actors pursue partially competing objectives across military, economic, technological, and normative domains.

除直接的戰(zhàn)場結(jié)果外，這場沖突至少還體現(xiàn)出四種彼此交互的戰(zhàn)略邏輯：

Beyond immediate battlefield outcomes, the conflict reflects at least four interacting strategic logics:

(1) 圍繞能源體系與戰(zhàn)略資源的影響力整合與爭奪；

(1) the consolidation and contestation of influence over energy systems and strategic resources;

(2) 對(duì)不斷演進(jìn)的軍事技術(shù)——包括精確打擊體系和非對(duì)稱作戰(zhàn)體系——進(jìn)行實(shí)戰(zhàn)測試與能力展示；

(2) the operational testing and demonstration of evolving military technologies, including precision-strike and asymmetric systems;

(3) 有關(guān)領(lǐng)土主權(quán)與軍事干預(yù)的法律和規(guī)范約束，正在逐步被侵蝕并被重新界定；

(3) the gradual erosion and redefinition of legal and normative constraints governing territoriality and intervention;

(4) 在一個(gè)日益由碎片化而非凝聚力所塑造的更廣泛全球秩序之中，圍繞地區(qū)陣營的競爭正變得更加突出。

(4) the implicit competition over regional alignment structures within a broader global order increasingly shaped by fragmentation rather than cohesion.

在這一結(jié)構(gòu)之下，這場沖突并不體現(xiàn)某一種單一的戰(zhàn)略設(shè)計(jì)，也不體現(xiàn)某一種統(tǒng)一的霸權(quán)藍(lán)圖。相反，它反映出多種權(quán)力理性同時(shí)發(fā)生互動(dòng)，這些理性分別作用于體系的不同層級(jí)，并產(chǎn)生遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出該地區(qū)本身的累積性影響。

Within this configuration, the conflict does not express a singular strategic design or a unified hegemonic blueprint. Rather, it reflects the simultaneous interaction of multiple rationalities of power, each operating at different levels of the system and generating cumulative effects that extend far beyond the region itself.

其結(jié)果是，全球所處的環(huán)境中，冷戰(zhàn)后的秩序既未得到完整保留，也未被一種清晰的新秩序所取代。取而代之而浮現(xiàn)的，是一個(gè)碎片化的“中間時(shí)期”，其特征在于：霸權(quán)模式并不完整，治理邏輯彼此競爭，軍事能力、經(jīng)濟(jì)影響力與被感知的戰(zhàn)略可靠性之間的分化不斷擴(kuò)大。

The result is a global environment in which the post-Cold War order is neither fully intact nor clearly replaced. What emerges instead is a fragmented interregnum, characterized by incomplete hegemonic models, competing governance logics, and a widening divergence between military capability, economic influence, and perceived strategic reliability.

近期的發(fā)展進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)化了這一判斷。在持續(xù)升級(jí)的局勢之下出現(xiàn)了2026年4月11日的高級(jí)別談判，隨后談判迅速破裂，并立即重新回到包括對(duì)關(guān)鍵能源咽喉通道發(fā)出威脅在內(nèi)的破壞性行動(dòng)（2026年4月13日），這表明，外交本身正日益嵌入沖突動(dòng)態(tài)之中，而不再作為一種外部的穩(wěn)定機(jī)制發(fā)揮作用。在這一語境下，談判與其說是通向解決的路徑，不如說是更廣泛戰(zhàn)略序列中的一種戰(zhàn)術(shù)工具，這也進(jìn)一步凸顯了當(dāng)代沖突所具有的多層次和非線性特征。

Recent developments reinforce this interpretation. The emergence of high-level negotiations (April 11, 2026) conducted under conditions of ongoing escalation, followed by their rapid breakdown and the immediate return to disruptive actions, including threats to critical energy chokepoints (April 13, 2026), suggests that diplomacy itself is increasingly embedded within the conflict dynamic rather than functioning as an external stabilizing mechanism. Negotiation, in this context, operates less as a pathway to resolution than as a tactical instrument within a broader strategic sequence, further underscoring the multilayered and non-linear character of contemporary conflict.

4月15日，相關(guān)海上交通數(shù)據(jù)顯示，仍有大批船只等待通過霍爾木茲海峽。圖源：BBC

碎片化體系中的權(quán)力角色互動(dòng)

Interacting Power Roles in a Fragmented System

這場正在展開的沖突，并不是由某一占主導(dǎo)地位的大國塑造或任何一種穩(wěn)定的國家等級(jí)制度所主導(dǎo)。相反，它揭示出一個(gè)體系，其主要行為體所施加的影響都是局部且往往彼此矛盾的：擁有軍事力量，卻缺乏經(jīng)濟(jì)控制力；具備經(jīng)濟(jì)中信地位，卻缺乏安全承諾；政治姿態(tài)鮮明，卻缺乏實(shí)際操作杠桿。

The unfolding conflict is not being shaped by a single dominant power, nor by a stable hierarchy of states. Rather, it reveals a system in which major actors operate with partial and often contradictory forms of influence: military strength without economic control, economic centrality without security commitment, or political positioning without operational leverage.

由此浮現(xiàn)出來的并不是一種協(xié)調(diào)有序的秩序，而是一個(gè)持續(xù)互動(dòng)的場域：其中，一方行為體的每一步行動(dòng)，都會(huì)重塑其他行為體所面臨的約束與機(jī)會(huì)。從這個(gè)意義上說，碎片化并不僅僅是一種預(yù)先存在的狀態(tài)，其本身就是這些互動(dòng)作用的產(chǎn)物。

What emerges is not coordinated order, but a field of constant interaction in which every move by one actor reshapes the constraints and opportunities of others. Fragmentation, in this sense, is not simply a pre-existing condition. It is the product of these interactions.

在升級(jí)態(tài)勢的中心位置，美國和以色列仍然保持著明確的軍事優(yōu)勢和行動(dòng)主動(dòng)權(quán)。它們通過力量投送、威懾以及定點(diǎn)打擊，力圖遏制伊朗并維持其地區(qū)主導(dǎo)地位。然而，這種軍事優(yōu)勢并不能轉(zhuǎn)化為體系性控制。每一次升級(jí)都會(huì)帶來迅速超出戰(zhàn)場范圍的后果，擾亂能源市場，動(dòng)搖盟友，并加深外交裂痕。

At the center of escalation, the United States and Israel retain clear military superiority and operational initiative. Through force projection, deterrence, and targeted strikes, they seek to contain Iran and preserve regional dominance. Yet this military advantage does not translate into systemic control. Each escalation produces consequences that quickly exceed the battlefield, disrupting energy markets, unsettling allies, and widening diplomatic fractures.

這種軍事控制與系統(tǒng)性后果之間的脫節(jié)，在外交領(lǐng)域正變得愈發(fā)明顯。即便在局勢持續(xù)升級(jí)之際仍在進(jìn)行的高級(jí)別談判，也已不再發(fā)揮通向真正解決的路徑作用。相反，它們更像是戰(zhàn)略性間歇：是發(fā)出信號(hào)、重新調(diào)整位置或暫時(shí)停頓的時(shí)刻，而非能夠調(diào)和那些根本相悖目標(biāo)的機(jī)制。

This slippage between military control and systemic consequence is increasingly visible in the diplomatic arena. High-level negotiations, conducted even as escalation continues, no longer function as genuine pathways to resolution. Instead, they appear as strategic interludes: moments of signaling, repositioning, or temporary pause rather than mechanisms capable of reconciling fundamentally incompatible objectives.

當(dāng)升級(jí)態(tài)勢觸及全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施時(shí)，其更深層次的意義便會(huì)充分顯現(xiàn)出來?；魻柲酒澓{的不穩(wěn)定，使一場地區(qū)性對(duì)抗轉(zhuǎn)化為一場全球經(jīng)濟(jì)事件。這條狹窄的海上通道并不僅僅是一條運(yùn)輸路線；它還是一個(gè)結(jié)構(gòu)性節(jié)點(diǎn)，世界能源供應(yīng)中相當(dāng)大的一部分正是經(jīng)由此處流動(dòng)。一旦它變得不穩(wěn)定，其影響便是立竿見影且波及深遠(yuǎn)的。

The deeper significance of escalation becomes fully visible when it reaches the infrastructure of the global economy. The destabilization of the Strait of Hormuz transforms a regional confrontation into a global economic event. This narrow maritime corridor is not merely a transit route; it is a structural node through which a significant share of the world’s energy supply flows. Once it becomes unstable, the effects are immediate and far-reaching.

在這一背景下，權(quán)力已不僅僅通過軍事力量來施加，它同樣體現(xiàn)在擾亂流通的能力之中：轉(zhuǎn)移風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、抬高成本，并將不穩(wěn)定性跨境傳導(dǎo)。伊朗盡管在軍事上相對(duì)處于劣勢，卻恰恰展現(xiàn)出了這種能力。

In this context, power is no longer exercised solely through military force, but also through the ability to disrupt circulation: to shift risks, raise costs, and transmit instability across borders. Iran, despite its relative military inferiority, has demonstrated precisely this capacity.

停泊在阿曼首都馬斯喀特的船只。圖源：新華社

伊朗：非對(duì)稱性力量、戰(zhàn)略杠桿與破壞邏輯

Iran: Asymmetric Power, Strategic Leverage, and the Logic of Disruption

如果說美國代表的是技術(shù)優(yōu)勢，以色列代表的是精確威懾，那么伊朗所代表的則是另一種戰(zhàn)爭模式：非對(duì)稱的、經(jīng)濟(jì)性的和體系性的。

If the United States represents technological superiority and Israel precision deterrence, then Iran represents a different model of warfare: asymmetric, economic, and systemic.

伊朗的戰(zhàn)略并不是為了在一場針對(duì)軍事上更強(qiáng)大力量的常規(guī)戰(zhàn)爭中取勝。它圍繞著一個(gè)更具可實(shí)現(xiàn)性的目標(biāo)展開：把沖突成本提高到其對(duì)手在政治上或經(jīng)濟(jì)上都無法承受的程度。

Iran’s strategy is not designed to win a conventional war against militarily superior powers. It is built around a more attainable objective: raising the cost of conflict to a level that its adversaries cannot politically or economically sustain.

從防御走向非對(duì)稱進(jìn)攻

From Defense to Asymmetric Offense

隨著時(shí)間推移，尤其是自2025年至2026年局勢升級(jí)以來，伊朗已從一種以防御為主的姿態(tài)，轉(zhuǎn)向更具主動(dòng)性的非對(duì)稱作戰(zhàn)理論。這一轉(zhuǎn)變主要體現(xiàn)在以下幾個(gè)方面：

Over time, and especially since the escalation of 2025–2026, Iran has moved from a largely defensive posture toward a more assertive asymmetric doctrine. This shift includes:

• 大規(guī)模使用彈道導(dǎo)彈和無人機(jī)；

• 在整個(gè)地區(qū)部署代理人網(wǎng)絡(luò)及合作性力量網(wǎng)絡(luò)；

• 將打擊目標(biāo)從單純的軍事資產(chǎn)擴(kuò)大到經(jīng)濟(jì)與民用基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。

• the use of ballistic missiles and drones in large volumes;

• the deployment of proxy and partner networks across the region;

• the targeting of economic and civilian infrastructure, not only military assets.

伊朗并未試圖完全阻止來襲打擊，而是著重于在承受破壞的同時(shí)保全報(bào)復(fù)能力，這種策略可被稱為“非對(duì)稱韌性”。這使其能夠在持續(xù)高壓下維持行動(dòng)能力，并確保局勢始終保留進(jìn)一步升級(jí)的可能。

Rather than attempting to block incoming attacks entirely, Iran has focused on absorbing damage while preserving retaliatory capability, a strategy that may be described as asymmetric endurance. This allows it to remain operational under sustained pressure and ensures that escalation always remains possible.

伊朗沙赫德無人機(jī)從卡車式支架上發(fā)射。圖源：伊斯蘭革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)

霍爾木茲海峽：伊朗的戰(zhàn)略重心

The Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s Strategic Center of Gravity

伊朗最強(qiáng)大的資產(chǎn)，是其地理位置。伊朗位處霍爾木茲海峽沿線，這使其具備將一場地區(qū)戰(zhàn)爭轉(zhuǎn)化為全球經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)的能力。伊朗并未謀求徹底封鎖海峽，而是采取了一種更為有效的策略：選擇性擾亂。

Iran’s most powerful asset is geography.Its position along the Strait of Hormuz gives it the ability to transform a regional war into a global economic crisis. Rather than seeking a full closure of the strait, Iran has adopted a more effective strategy: selective disruption.

這包括：

• 布設(shè)水雷行動(dòng)；

• 使用無人機(jī)和快艇發(fā)動(dòng)襲擾；

• 對(duì)商業(yè)航運(yùn)實(shí)施騷擾與干擾。

This includes:

• mining operations;

• drone and fast-boat attack

• harassment of commercial shipping.

其目的并非實(shí)行全面封鎖，而是制造一種經(jīng)過校準(zhǔn)的不確定性：足以推高價(jià)格、擾亂供應(yīng)鏈，并迫使全球予以關(guān)注。這由此形成了一種根本性的戰(zhàn)略不對(duì)稱。伊朗并不需要在軍事上擊敗美國；它所需要的，只是擾亂全球經(jīng)濟(jì)。

The purpose is not total blockade, but calibrated uncertainty: enough to raise prices, unsettle supply chains, and compel global attention. This produces a fundamental strategic asymmetry. Iran does not need to defeat the United States militarily; it only needs to disrupt the global economy.

4月9日伊朗國家安全委員會(huì)發(fā)布的霍爾木茲海峽分道通航方案。圖源：伊斯蘭革命衛(wèi)隊(duì)

經(jīng)濟(jì)戰(zhàn)作為“拉平差距”的手段

Economic Warfare as Equalizer

因此，伊朗已將戰(zhàn)場從領(lǐng)土范圍擴(kuò)展到了全球市場。對(duì)海灣地區(qū)能源基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和海上航線的擾動(dòng)，會(huì)通過通貨膨脹、貿(mào)易、保險(xiǎn)、航運(yùn)以及金融穩(wěn)定等領(lǐng)域產(chǎn)生連鎖反應(yīng)。

Iran has thus expanded the battlefield beyond territory and into global markets. The disruption of Gulf energy infrastructure and maritime routes reverberates through inflation, trade, insurance, shipping, and financial stability.

這也正是伊朗戰(zhàn)略尤為有效之處。它能夠：

This is where Iran’s strategy becomes especially effective. It:

• 將壓力轉(zhuǎn)嫁給依賴進(jìn)口的經(jīng)濟(jì)體；

• 分化西方與非西方國家的應(yīng)對(duì)；

• 對(duì)遠(yuǎn)在該地區(qū)之外的行為體形成間接杠桿。

• shifts pressure onto import-dependent economies;

• divides Western and non-Western responses;

• creates indirect leverage over actors far beyond the region.

從這個(gè)意義上說，伊朗并不只是在打一場戰(zhàn)爭。它是在將相互依存武器化。其戰(zhàn)略并不依賴于戰(zhàn)場主導(dǎo)地位，而是依賴于其在能源市場、供應(yīng)鏈和通脹動(dòng)態(tài)等方面放大體系性壓力的能力。其結(jié)果是，一種不再受地理范圍所限、而是以結(jié)構(gòu)性方式分布于全球體系之中的升級(jí)形態(tài)。

In this sense, Iran is not merely fighting a war. It is weaponizing interdependence. Its strategy does not depend on battlefield dominance, but on its capacity to amplify systemic pressure across energy markets, supply chains, and inflationary dynamics. The result is a form of escalation that is no longer geographically contained, but structurally distributed across the global system.

一種以生存而非勝利為目標(biāo)的戰(zhàn)略

A Strategy of Survival, Not Victory

盡管擁有上述優(yōu)勢，伊朗仍面臨嚴(yán)峻制約：經(jīng)濟(jì)脆弱、制裁壓力、內(nèi)部政治緊張，以及部分地區(qū)影響力網(wǎng)絡(luò)的弱化。即便如此，它也展現(xiàn)出相當(dāng)?shù)捻g性。即使在屢遭打擊之后，其海上力量和非對(duì)稱作戰(zhàn)能力中的關(guān)鍵部分仍然保持完好。

Despite these advantages, Iran operates under serious constraints: economic fragility, sanctions pressure, internal political tensions, and the weakening of some regional influence networks. Yet it has also demonstrated resilience. Even after repeated strikes, key elements of its naval and asymmetric capabilities have remained intact.

這進(jìn)一步印證了一個(gè)關(guān)鍵判斷：伊朗的目標(biāo)是戰(zhàn)略生存與持續(xù)性擾亂的結(jié)合。隨著傳統(tǒng)能源通道趨于不穩(wěn)定，全球市場也開始重新配置。替代性供應(yīng)方，尤其是俄羅斯，因而獲得了出人意料的戰(zhàn)略分量。由于其出口通道較少受到霍爾木茲海峽局勢影響，再加上美國解除對(duì)俄制裁，俄羅斯能夠提供一種在危機(jī)時(shí)期愈發(fā)稀缺的東西：相對(duì)可靠性。這里的悖論十分清楚：一場本意在于削弱某一行為體的沖突，最終卻強(qiáng)化了其他行為體，而這種強(qiáng)化并非通過結(jié)盟實(shí)現(xiàn)，而是通過經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)會(huì)在非預(yù)期中的再分配實(shí)現(xiàn)的。從這個(gè)意義上說，戰(zhàn)爭不僅會(huì)摧毀，也會(huì)重新分配。

This reinforces a critical point: Iran’s objective is not decisive victory, but strategic survival combined with sustained disruption.

As traditional energy routes become unstable, the global market begins to reconfigure itself. Alternative suppliers, especially Russia, gain unexpected strategic weight. With export routes less exposed to Hormuz and lifting of its sanction bt the United States, Russia can offer what becomes scarce in times of crisis: relative reliability. The paradox is clear. A conflict intended to weaken one actor ends up strengthening others, not through alliance, but through the unintended redistribution of economic opportunity. War, in this sense, does not merely destroy. It also reallocates.

與此同時(shí)，中國處于一種更為模糊的地位。作為深度嵌入全球貿(mào)易體系、且依賴中東能源流動(dòng)的大國，中國在結(jié)構(gòu)上直接暴露于這場危機(jī)之中。然而，它仍然避免將這種暴露轉(zhuǎn)化為直接的安全介入。其應(yīng)對(duì)依舊審慎，強(qiáng)調(diào)穩(wěn)定與對(duì)話，同時(shí)依賴間接性的影響渠道。

Meanwhile, China occupies a more ambiguous position. Deeply embedded in global trade and dependent on Middle Eastern energy flows, it is structurally exposed to the crisis. Yet it continues to avoid translating that exposure into direct security engagement. Its response remains cautious, emphasizing stability and dialogue while relying on indirect channels of influence.

這種策略或許能夠帶來短期靈活性，但也引出了一個(gè)更長遠(yuǎn)的問題：一個(gè)在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中占據(jù)如此核心位置的大國，如果在地緣政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)急劇上升的時(shí)刻選擇缺席，它還能否保持戰(zhàn)略可信度？隨著時(shí)間推移，這種選擇性介入，可能會(huì)削弱那些面臨安全威脅、卻得不到相應(yīng)保障的伙伴對(duì)其的信心。

This strategy may offer short-term flexibility, but it raises a longer-term question: can a power so central to global economic networks remain strategically credible if it is absent at moments of acute geopolitical risk? Over time, selective engagement may erode confidence among partners facing security threats without corresponding guarantees.

德黑蘭一處廣告牌上繪有霍爾木茲海峽圖案，并懸掛著一條寫有 “永遠(yuǎn)掌控在伊朗手中” 的橫幅。圖源：《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》

以色列：戰(zhàn)術(shù)優(yōu)勢與戰(zhàn)略模糊性

Israel: Tactical Superiority, Strategic Ambiguity

以色列在塑造這場沖突的軍事節(jié)奏方面發(fā)揮了決定性作用，然而，其所處位置始終帶有一種持續(xù)存在的張力：一方面是戰(zhàn)術(shù)上的成功，另一方面則是戰(zhàn)略上的不確定性。

Israel has played a decisive role in shaping the military tempo of the conflict, yet its position is marked by a persistent tension between tactical success and strategic uncertainty.

戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)：削弱，而非占領(lǐng)

Strategic Objectives: Degrade Rather Than Occupy

以色列的核心目標(biāo)通常并不是領(lǐng)土征服，而是能力削弱。

Israel’s core objective has not often been territorial conquest, but capability degradation.

這包括：

• 削弱伊朗的導(dǎo)彈與無人機(jī)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施；

• 延緩或削弱伊朗與核相關(guān)的能力；

• 降低地區(qū)代理人網(wǎng)絡(luò)的實(shí)際作戰(zhàn)效能。

This included:

• weakening Iran’s missile and drone infrastructure;

• delaying or degrading nuclear-related capabilities;

• reducing the operational effectiveness of regional proxy networks.

這種做法反映了以色列長期以來的一項(xiàng)戰(zhàn)略原則：防止對(duì)手在戰(zhàn)略能力上接近均勢，尤其是在導(dǎo)彈能力和核潛力方面。

This approach reflects a long-standing Israeli doctrine: preventing adversaries from approaching strategic parity, particularly in missile capability and nuclear potential.

空襲行動(dòng)已造成嚴(yán)重破壞。然而，伊朗似乎仍保有相當(dāng)程度的殘余能力，尤其是在導(dǎo)彈力量方面。這凸顯出一個(gè)結(jié)構(gòu)性限制：空中力量可以削弱深嵌式基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，但很難將其徹底清除。

Air campaigns have inflicted serious damage. Yet Iran appears to retain substantial residual capability, especially in missile forces. This underlines a structural limitation: air power can degrade embedded infrastructure, but it rarely eliminates it entirely.

升級(jí)邏輯與戰(zhàn)略風(fēng)險(xiǎn)

Escalation Logic andStrategic Risk

以色列的戰(zhàn)略同樣包含升級(jí)管理這一層面。它試圖通過提高沖突烈度，改變既有戰(zhàn)略方程，迫使對(duì)手作出代價(jià)高昂的回應(yīng)，或陷入誤判。

Israel’s strategy also continue to include an element of escalation management. By raising the intensity of the conflict, it seeks to alter the strategic equation and force adversaries into costly responses or miscalculation.

然而，升級(jí)本身也伴隨著風(fēng)險(xiǎn)：

• 在持續(xù)作戰(zhàn)中對(duì)美國形成更深程度的依賴；

• 引發(fā)地區(qū)外溢；

• 一旦行動(dòng)進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大，國際政治成本也將不斷上升。

Yet escalation carries risks:

• deeper dependence on the United States for sustained operations;

• regional spillover;

• growing international political costs if operations broaden.

其中的悖論十分明顯：以色列在戰(zhàn)術(shù)層面優(yōu)勢清晰，但其長期戰(zhàn)略結(jié)果仍然充滿不確定性。

The paradox is evident. Tactical superiority is clear, but long-term strategic outcomes remain uncertain.

攔截困境

The Interception Dilemma

以色列的一項(xiàng)關(guān)鍵脆弱性，體現(xiàn)在攔截的經(jīng)濟(jì)性上。伊朗使用相對(duì)低成本的無人機(jī)和導(dǎo)彈，迫使以色列動(dòng)用價(jià)格高昂的攔截系統(tǒng)。久而久之，這就形成了一種不利的交換比率：進(jìn)攻方付出較少，防御方卻要承擔(dān)高得多的成本。

One of Israel’s key vulnerabilities lies in the economics of interception. Iran’s use of relatively low-cost drones and missiles obliges Israel to deploy expensive interception systems. Over time, this creates an unfavorable exchange ratio: the attacker spends less; the defender spends far more.

如果這種模式持續(xù)下去，即便是技術(shù)先進(jìn)的軍隊(duì)，也會(huì)承受顯著壓力。簡言之，以色列在戰(zhàn)術(shù)上是有效的，但這并不意味著它必然能夠取得戰(zhàn)略主導(dǎo)地位。

If sustained, such a pattern can impose significant strain even on a technologically advanced military. Israel, in short, is tactically effective, but not guaranteed strategic dominance.

在2025年6月的十二日戰(zhàn)爭期間，遭受伊朗導(dǎo)彈襲擊后，以色列巴特亞姆的建筑遭到嚴(yán)重破壞。圖源：Wikimedia Commons

歐洲：從戰(zhàn)略震蕩到戰(zhàn)略重估

Europe: From Strategic Shock to Strategic Reassessment

在這場戰(zhàn)爭中，歐洲及其他次級(jí)行為體所扮演的角色受到更大限制。這些行為體并不塑造沖突的發(fā)展軌跡；它們所承受的是沖突帶來的后果。能源價(jià)格波動(dòng)、供應(yīng)中斷和通貨膨脹，將外部沖擊轉(zhuǎn)化為國內(nèi)的政治與經(jīng)濟(jì)壓力。即便是加強(qiáng)戰(zhàn)略自主的努力，也在很大程度上仍然是被動(dòng)反應(yīng)，其驅(qū)動(dòng)力不是去主導(dǎo)不穩(wěn)定，而是去應(yīng)對(duì)不穩(wěn)定。

In this war, the role of Europe and other secondary actors is even more constrained. These actors do not shape the trajectory of the conflict; they absorb its consequences. Energy price volatility, supply disruptions, and inflation convert external shocks into domestic political and economic stress. Even efforts to strengthen strategic autonomy remain largely reactive, driven by the need to manage instability rather than direct it.

這場沖突進(jìn)一步激化了一場已醞釀多年的爭論：歐洲對(duì)外部安全保障的依賴，以及其自主行動(dòng)能力的有限性。

The conflict has sharpened a debate that has been building for years: Europe’s dependence on external security guarantees and its limited capacity for autonomous action.

歐洲安全框架仍然錨定于北約，并由此延伸至美國。然而，這場沖突的早期階段暴露出歐洲各國政府對(duì)升級(jí)決策的影響力十分有限，從而進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)化了外界對(duì)于其依賴性以及能動(dòng)性減弱的擔(dān)憂。

The European security framework remains anchored in NATO and, by extension, the United States. Yet the early stages of the conflict exposed the limited influence of European governments over escalation decisions, reinforcing concerns about both dependence and diminished agency.

因此，“戰(zhàn)略自主”這一理念已不再只是停留在理論層面，而是開始切實(shí)進(jìn)入具體政策討論，議題包括：

As a result, the idea of strategic autonomy is no longer merely theoretical. It now informs concrete policy debates over:

• 重建歐洲的國防工業(yè)基礎(chǔ)；

• 儲(chǔ)備彈藥和關(guān)鍵零部件；

• 降低對(duì)非歐洲供應(yīng)商提供關(guān)鍵軍事技術(shù)的依賴；

• 提升聯(lián)合采購與快速反應(yīng)能力。

• rebuilding Europe’s defense-industrial base;

• stockpiling munitions and critical components;

• reducing dependence on non-European suppliers for key military technologies;

• improving joint procurement and rapid-response capabilities.

這一討論并非抽象空泛。它直接關(guān)系到俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭所帶來的教訓(xùn)；這場戰(zhàn)爭暴露出歐洲在軍事準(zhǔn)備方面存在嚴(yán)重的彈藥短缺和深層次的工業(yè)能力不足。

This discussion is not abstract. It is directly linked to the lessons of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which exposed severe ammunition shortages and deep industrial deficiencies in European military preparedness.

在這場不斷演進(jìn)的討論中，法國占據(jù)著尤為突出的地位。作為歐盟中唯一擁有獨(dú)立核威懾力量的成員國，法國日益被視為不是集體防務(wù)的替代者，而是一個(gè)更具自主性的歐洲安全框架的潛在支柱。

Within this evolving debate, France occupies a particularly prominent position. As the only EU member with an independent nuclear deterrent, France is increasingly viewed not as a substitute for collective defense, but as a potential pillar of a more autonomous European security framework.

歐洲軍力規(guī)?？捎^：歐洲北約成員合計(jì)擁有約190萬現(xiàn)役軍人，并配備包括F-35戰(zhàn)機(jī)和豹2主戰(zhàn)坦克在內(nèi)的先進(jìn)裝備。自2023年以來，歐洲整體防務(wù)支出也顯著上升，波蘭等國甚至提出將軍費(fèi)提升至GDP的5%。圖源：路透社

全球南方：影響不止于能源

The Global South: Beyond Energy

這場戰(zhàn)爭對(duì)全球南方的沖擊，遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出了能源價(jià)格層面。沖突加劇了全球糧食體系原有的脆弱性。非洲、中東和南亞的許多國家，仍然高度依賴進(jìn)口化肥，尤其是氮肥產(chǎn)品。航運(yùn)線路受擾、能源價(jià)格上漲以及與制裁相關(guān)的摩擦，都推高了化肥成本。

The impact of the war on the Global South extends far beyond energy prices.The conflict has aggravated existing vulnerabilities in global food systems. Many countries across Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia remain highly dependent on imported fertilizers, particularly nitrogen-based products. Disruptions to shipping routes, rising energy prices, and sanctions-related frictions have all increased fertilizer costs.

由于化肥生產(chǎn)本身高度依賴能源，特別是以天然氣為原料的氮肥，其生產(chǎn)成本會(huì)直接受到能源價(jià)格上升的傳導(dǎo)影響，并進(jìn)一步推高糧食生產(chǎn)成本。其結(jié)果是：

Because fertilizer production is highly energy-intensive, especially in the case of nitrogen fertilizers derived from natural gas, higher energy prices feed directly into food production costs. The result is:

• 糧食價(jià)格上漲；

• 糧食進(jìn)口國面臨更大壓力；

• 脆弱地區(qū)的糧食不安全狀況進(jìn)一步惡化。

• rising food prices;

• greater pressure on food-importing states;

• worsening food insecurity in vulnerable regions.

因此，許多發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟(jì)體不得不同時(shí)承受能源、糧食和物流成本的多重沖擊，使其成為這場沖突中在結(jié)構(gòu)上暴露程度最高、受損最深的一類輸家。

Many developing economies are therefore forced to absorb simultaneous shocks in energy, food, and logistics costs, making them among the most structurally exposed losers of the conflict.

戰(zhàn)爭戰(zhàn)略、能力約束，以及正在浮現(xiàn)的贏家與輸家

War Strategies, Capacity Constraints, and Emerging Winners and Losers

這場沖突并不只是海灣地區(qū)的一場區(qū)域性軍事對(duì)抗。它同時(shí)也是一場具有啟示意義的檢驗(yàn)，檢驗(yàn)大國如何發(fā)動(dòng)戰(zhàn)爭、如何管理資源，以及如何為更長期的競爭進(jìn)行布局。這里關(guān)注的是實(shí)踐層面的問題：誰在做什么，使用了哪些工具，以及由此誰受益、誰受損。

This conflict is not merely a regional military confrontation in the Gulf. It is also a revealing test of how major powers wage war, manage resources, and position themselves for longer-term competition. The focus here is practical: who is doing what, with which tools, and who benefits or loses as a result.

美國：受制約的高強(qiáng)度戰(zhàn)爭

The United States: High-Intensity Warfare Under Constraint

美國仍然憑借航母打擊群、遠(yuǎn)程空中力量以及精確制導(dǎo)彈藥，持續(xù)投射無與倫比的軍事力量。這種作戰(zhàn)主導(dǎo)地位，從沖突一開始便已清晰可見。

The United States continues to project unparalleled military power through naval strike groups, long-range air assets, and precision-guided munitions. This operational dominance has been visible from the earliest stages of the conflict.

然而，這種戰(zhàn)爭模式也暴露出一種日益加劇的張力。美國雖然能夠迅速投送壓倒性的力量，但要在一段時(shí)間內(nèi)持續(xù)維持這種強(qiáng)度則更加困難。精確制導(dǎo)彈藥、攔截導(dǎo)彈以及先進(jìn)空射系統(tǒng)的快速消耗，暴露出其在庫存深度和生產(chǎn)能力方面的脆弱性。

Yet this model of warfare also reveals a growing tension. While the United States can deliver overwhelming force quickly, sustaining that level of intensity over time is more difficult. The rapid consumption of precision-guided munitions, interceptor missiles, and advanced air-launched systems exposes vulnerabilities in stockpile depth and production capacity.

這一挑戰(zhàn)并不僅僅是財(cái)政問題，更是工業(yè)問題。國防供應(yīng)鏈依賴專用零部件、熟練勞動(dòng)力以及復(fù)雜制造流程，而這些都無法在短時(shí)間內(nèi)迅速擴(kuò)張。因此，關(guān)鍵系統(tǒng)的補(bǔ)充周期可能需要以“年”而非“月”來計(jì)算。

The challenge is not purely financial. It is industrial. Defense supply chains depend on specialized components, skilled labor, and complex manufacturing processes that cannot be expanded rapidly. Replenishing key systems may therefore take years rather than months.

另一個(gè)值得關(guān)注的維度，是軍事行動(dòng)與美國國防工業(yè)基礎(chǔ)之間的關(guān)系。這場沖突中所動(dòng)用的諸多武器系統(tǒng)，主要來自既有庫存，以及原本部署于歐洲或其他戰(zhàn)區(qū)的資源。它們的投入使用，會(huì)進(jìn)一步加快替換與現(xiàn)代化升級(jí)的需求。這種補(bǔ)充循環(huán)支撐著國防生產(chǎn)，帶動(dòng)工業(yè)活動(dòng)，并維持就業(yè)。

A further dimension concerns the relationship between military operations and the U.S. defense-industrial base. Systems deployed in this conflict are drawn from existing stockpiles and mainly from Europe, or in other theaters. Their use accelerates the demand for replacement and modernization. This replenishment cycle sustains defense production, generates industrial activity, and supports employment.

從這個(gè)意義上說，現(xiàn)代戰(zhàn)爭不僅關(guān)乎“能否作戰(zhàn)”，也關(guān)乎“能否在時(shí)間推移中持續(xù)維持并再生戰(zhàn)力”。

In this sense, modern warfare is not only about the ability to fight. It is also about the ability to sustain and regenerate force over time.

與此同時(shí)，美國也存在能力短板。其中一個(gè)例子是反水雷能力。在霍爾木茲海峽這類狹窄海上咽喉要道中，這種能力至關(guān)重要。而相關(guān)資產(chǎn)的相對(duì)稀缺，恰恰凸顯出高端力量投送能力與實(shí)際作戰(zhàn)適應(yīng)能力之間存在失衡。

There are also capability gaps. One example concerns mine countermeasure capacity, which is crucial in narrow maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz. The relative scarcity of such assets highlights an imbalance between high-end force projection and operational adaptability.

綜合來看，這些動(dòng)態(tài)表明，盡管美國依然保持著無可匹敵的軍事投射范圍，但其在長期沖突情境下的可持續(xù)性正越來越受到審視，尤其是在未來可能與中國或其他競爭對(duì)手發(fā)生對(duì)抗的背景下，更是如此。

Taken together, these dynamics suggest that while the United States retains unmatched military reach, its sustainability in prolonged conflict scenarios is increasingly under scrutiny, especially in light of a possible future confrontation with China or other competitors.

俄羅斯：通過擾動(dòng)實(shí)現(xiàn)戰(zhàn)略機(jī)會(huì)主義

Russia: Strategic Opportunism Through Disruption

對(duì)俄羅斯而言，這場沖突與其說是一個(gè)直接軍事介入的戰(zhàn)場，不如說是一個(gè)獲取間接戰(zhàn)略收益的機(jī)會(huì)。由于已深度卷入烏克蘭戰(zhàn)事，莫斯科總體上采取了一種借勢獲利的姿態(tài)。

For Russia, the conflict is less a direct military arena than an opportunity for indirect strategic gain. Already deeply engaged in Ukraine, Moscow has largely adopted a posture of opportunistic benefit.

能源價(jià)格上漲、市場波動(dòng)加劇以及全球能源流向的重新調(diào)整，都對(duì)俄羅斯有利。更高的油氣收入有助于對(duì)沖烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭帶來的成本壓力，而西方注意力的轉(zhuǎn)移，也減輕了俄羅斯周邊直接戰(zhàn)略環(huán)境所承受的外部壓力。

Rising energy prices, market volatility, and the redirection of global energy flows work to Russia’s advantage. Higher hydrocarbon revenues help offset costs impounded by the war in Ukrain, and while Western distraction reduces pressure on Russia’s immediate strategic environment.

從這個(gè)意義上說，俄羅斯的姿態(tài)可以概括為：借由體系性分散注意力而實(shí)現(xiàn)被動(dòng)獲益。

In this sense, Russia’s posture may be described as one of passive gain through systemic distraction.

中國：謹(jǐn)慎布局與經(jīng)濟(jì)收益

China: Cautious Positioning and Economic Advantage

中國的處境則有所不同。北京避免直接軍事介入，同時(shí)將自身定位為一個(gè)審慎的穩(wěn)定維護(hù)者和經(jīng)濟(jì)受益者。

China’s position is different. Beijing has avoided direct military involvement while positioning itself as both a cautious stabilizer and an economic beneficiary.

其核心利益主要在于能源安全與貿(mào)易連續(xù)性。海灣局勢的不穩(wěn)定，提升了替代性供應(yīng)安排、折價(jià)能源獲取以及物流網(wǎng)絡(luò)多元化的價(jià)值。與此同時(shí)，這場沖突也為中國提供了一個(gè)觀察美國軍事承壓、供應(yīng)鏈脆弱性以及聯(lián)盟行為模式的機(jī)會(huì)，而這些經(jīng)驗(yàn)對(duì)于未來印太地區(qū)的情境具有高度相關(guān)性。

Its primary interests lie in energy security and trade continuity. Gulf instability increases the value of alternative supply arrangements, discounted energy access, and diversified logistics networks. At the same time, the conflict provides China with an opportunity to observe U.S. military strain, supply chain weaknesses, and alliance behavior, lessons that are highly relevant to future Indo-Pacific scenarios.

中國的優(yōu)勢，相比于高調(diào)介入，更集中于戰(zhàn)略耐心與有選擇性的經(jīng)濟(jì)獲益。

China’s advantage lies less in dramatic intervention than instrategic patience and selective economic gain.

聯(lián)盟裂痕與歐洲缺位

Coalition Fractures and the European Gap

這場沖突最引人注目的特征之一，是西方陣營缺乏凝聚性的協(xié)調(diào)，尤其是在歐洲內(nèi)部表現(xiàn)得更為明顯。若干歐洲國家并未真正參與早期戰(zhàn)略決策，因此對(duì)相關(guān)政策的政治認(rèn)同有限，在某些情況下甚至僅提供審慎或不情愿的支持。這與以往一些跨大西洋協(xié)調(diào)看起來更為穩(wěn)固的危機(jī)形成鮮明對(duì)比。

One of the most striking features of this conflict has been the absence of cohesive Western alignment, particularly within Europe.

Several European states were not meaningfully involved in early strategic decisions, producing limited political ownership and, in some cases, cautious or reluctant support. This stands in contrast to earlier crises in which transatlantic coordination appeared more robust.

隨著局勢演進(jìn)，尤其是歐盟，愈發(fā)像一個(gè)旁觀者，而非具有決定性影響的行為體。這進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)化了歐洲內(nèi)部原已存在的一場辯論：是否需要更大程度的戰(zhàn)略自主。

As this scenario unfolds, the European Union, in particular, look more like an observer than a decisive actor. This has reinforced an existing internal debate over the need for greater strategic autonomy.

在這一背景下，法國的重要性再次上升。其核威懾力量正越來越多地被討論為未來歐洲安全架構(gòu)中的一個(gè)潛在支柱。盡管更廣泛的“歐洲核保護(hù)傘”設(shè)想在政治上仍然敏感，但它已不再只是停留在理論討論之中。

Within this setting, France has acquired renewed importance. Its nuclear deterrent is increasingly discussed as a potential pillar of a future European security architecture. While the notion of a broader European nuclear umbrella remains politically sensitive, it is no longer confined to theoretical debate.

沖突經(jīng)濟(jì)中的贏家

Winners of the Conflict Economy

除直接卷入敵對(duì)行動(dòng)的國家之外，這場沖突還催生出一批相對(duì)明確的經(jīng)濟(jì)受益者。

Beyond the states directly engaged in hostilities, the conflict has generated a distinct set of economic beneficiaries.

其中包括：

• 能源生產(chǎn)國，它們受益于價(jià)格上漲和市場趨緊；

• 俄羅斯，其收益來自油氣收入增加以及能源流向重組；

• 中國，其可能獲得更有利的能源安排和更大的貿(mào)易杠桿；

• 保險(xiǎn)與航運(yùn)企業(yè)，它們從更高保費(fèi)和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)定價(jià)中獲利；

• 國防工業(yè)，尤其是美國和歐洲的軍工產(chǎn)業(yè)，它們受益于對(duì)武器、彈藥、攔截系統(tǒng)以及補(bǔ)充更新周期的持續(xù)需求。

These include:

• energy producers, who benefit from elevated prices and tighter markets;

• Russia, which gains from hydrocarbon revenues and shifting energy flows;

• China, which may secure favorable energy arrangements and greater trade leverage;

• insurance and shipping firms, which profit from higher premiums and risk-related pricing;

• defense industries, particularly in the United States and Europe, which benefit from sustained demand for weapons, ammunition, interception systems, and replacement cycles.
  

輸家與結(jié)構(gòu)性成本

Losers and Structural Costs

在主要輸家之中，其所承受的成本同樣不容忽視：

Among the principal losers, the costs are equally significant:

• 美國，面臨不斷加劇的資源壓力、持續(xù)上升的作戰(zhàn)成本以及過度擴(kuò)張的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)；

• 歐盟，在政治上被邊緣化，在經(jīng)濟(jì)上高度暴露，且內(nèi)部意見分裂；

• 地區(qū)穩(wěn)定本身，因海灣國家正面對(duì)更強(qiáng)烈的不安全感與不確定性；

• 全球南方，在那里，能源、化肥、運(yùn)輸和糧食成本的上升，不成比例地沖擊著本已脆弱、依賴進(jìn)口的經(jīng)濟(jì)體。

• the United States, which faces mounting resource strain, rising operational costs, and the risk of overextension;

• the European Union, which is politically marginalized, economically exposed, and internally divided;

• regional stability itself, as Gulf states confront heightened insecurity and uncertainty;

• the Global South, where higher energy, fertilizer, transport, and food costs disproportionately affect already vulnerable, import-dependent economies.

• These losses are not evenly distributed. They fall most heavily on those least able to shape the strategic environment.

全球絕大多數(shù)最不發(fā)達(dá)國家都是能源凈進(jìn)口國。

初步教訓(xùn)與正在顯現(xiàn)的方向

Early Lessons and Emerging Directions

從這場沖突中，已經(jīng)可以總結(jié)出若干初步教訓(xùn)。

Several early lessons can already be drawn from this conflict.

第一，在現(xiàn)代戰(zhàn)爭中，可持續(xù)性與能力本身同樣重要。

第二，工業(yè)能力如今已是一種戰(zhàn)略資產(chǎn)，而不再只是背景條件。

第三，聯(lián)盟不僅需要軍事上的協(xié)調(diào)一致，也需要政治上的包容與參與。

第四，在塑造沖突結(jié)果方面，經(jīng)濟(jì)行為體的重要性并不亞于軍事行為體。

第五，非對(duì)稱戰(zhàn)爭有可能通過更為復(fù)雜、更具總體性的戰(zhàn)略取得勝勢。

First, sustainability matters as much as capability in modern warfare.

Second, industrial capacity is now a strategic asset, not a background condition.

Third,alliances require political inclusion, not merely military alignment.

Fourth, economic actors are as influential as military actors in shaping conflict outcomes.

Fifth, Asymetric warfare could be won with a more sophisticated and all encompassing strategies.

對(duì)歐洲來說，這些教訓(xùn)正日益沉淀為一套新的戰(zhàn)略表述：自力更生、戰(zhàn)略自主和防務(wù)一體化。盡管這些表述能否最終落實(shí)為具體政策仍存不確定性，但相關(guān)討論的總體走向已十分清晰。

For Europe, these lessons are increasingly being translated into a new strategic vocabulary: self-reliance, strategic autonomy, and defense integration. Whether this vocabulary becomes policy remains uncertain, but the direction of debate is unmistakable.

結(jié)論：一場沒有勝者的沖突，一個(gè)失去錨點(diǎn)的體系

Conclusion: A Conflict Without Victory, a System Without Anchor

這里所考察的這場沖突，并未走向決定性的軍事勝利，也沒有帶來清晰的權(quán)力再分配。相反，它揭示出國際政治中一種更深層的結(jié)構(gòu)性現(xiàn)實(shí)：單一權(quán)力組織中心正在被侵蝕，而穩(wěn)定的替代性安排卻并未出現(xiàn)。

The conflict examined here does not culminate in a decisive military victory or a clear redistribution of power. Instead, it reveals a deeper structural reality in international politics: the erosion of a single organizing center of power without the emergence of a stable alternative.

那種認(rèn)為壓倒性的軍事能力能夠帶來決定性結(jié)果的傳統(tǒng)假設(shè)，已變得越來越難以維持。盡管美國擁有技術(shù)優(yōu)勢，但它在工業(yè)產(chǎn)能、庫存補(bǔ)充以及政治承載力方面正面臨日益增大的約束。這些限制并不以任何簡單意義上的方式構(gòu)成衰落，但它們的確削弱了這樣一種假設(shè)：在持久、跨戰(zhàn)區(qū)沖突的時(shí)代，單靠軍事力量就能夠確保政治結(jié)果。

The traditional assumption that overwhelming military capability can produce decisive outcomes has become increasingly difficult to sustain. Despite its technological superiority, the United States faces growing constraints in industrial capacity, stockpile regeneration, and political bandwidth. These limitations do not amount to decline in any simple sense, but they do weaken the assumption that military power alone cannot secure political outcomes in an era of prolonged, multi-theater conflict.

對(duì)以色列而言，這場戰(zhàn)爭表明，戰(zhàn)術(shù)上的成功在實(shí)現(xiàn)戰(zhàn)略性解決方面是有其限度的。其作戰(zhàn)能力依然強(qiáng)大，但更廣泛的目標(biāo)——永久性削弱伊朗的能力——仍然難以實(shí)現(xiàn)。伊朗導(dǎo)彈力量和非對(duì)稱作戰(zhàn)資產(chǎn)的持續(xù)存在，指向了現(xiàn)代沖突中的一種反復(fù)出現(xiàn)的模式：技術(shù)上占優(yōu)的行為體能夠施加代價(jià)，但往往難以施加終局。

For Israel, the war demonstrates the limits of tactical success in achieving strategic resolution. Its operational capabilities remain formidable, yet the broader objective of permanently degrading Iran’s capabilities remains elusive. The persistence of Iran’s missile and asymmetric assets points to a recurring pattern in modern conflict: technologically superior actors can impose costs, but they often struggle to impose finality.

伊朗則使局勢進(jìn)一步復(fù)雜化。盡管遭受了重大打擊，它仍保有通過擾亂能源市場和制造地區(qū)不穩(wěn)定、在其疆域之外施加代價(jià)的能力。這并不等同于勝利，但確實(shí)構(gòu)成了一種戰(zhàn)略杠桿。伊朗既非明確的贏家，也不是被擊敗的力量，而是一個(gè)持續(xù)性的擾動(dòng)者，能夠在其常規(guī)軍事實(shí)力之外影響局勢走向。

Iran further complicates the picture. Despite significant damage, it has retained the ability to impose costs well beyond its borders through disruption of energy markets and regional instability. This does not amount to victory, but it does constitute a form of strategic leverage. Iran emerges neither as a clear winner nor as a defeated power, but as a persistent disruptor capable of influencing outcomes beyond its conventional military weight.

與此同時(shí)，歐洲呈現(xiàn)出來的并不是一個(gè)核心行為體，而是一個(gè)受到限制的行為體。這場沖突強(qiáng)化了人們長期以來對(duì)戰(zhàn)略依賴和決策碎片化的擔(dān)憂。圍繞戰(zhàn)略自主的新一輪討論，以及法國作為潛在安全支點(diǎn)所受到的日益關(guān)注，反映出各方對(duì)依賴外部安全保障日益增長的不安。然而，制度、政治和戰(zhàn)略層面的分歧，仍在繼續(xù)限制歐洲采取協(xié)調(diào)一致行動(dòng)的能力。

Europe, meanwhile, emerges not as a central actor, but as a constrained one. The conflict reinforces longstanding concerns about strategic dependence and fragmented decision-making. The renewed debate over strategic autonomy, and the growing attention given to France as a possible security anchor, reflect rising unease over reliance on external guarantees. Yet institutional, political, and strategic divisions continue to limit Europe’s capacity to act cohesively.

除直接參戰(zhàn)方之外，這場沖突還產(chǎn)生了顯著的次生效應(yīng)。能源生產(chǎn)國、國防工業(yè)以及與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)相關(guān)的金融部門從這種擾動(dòng)中獲益，而全球南方則因能源價(jià)格上漲、糧食成本上升以及經(jīng)濟(jì)脆弱性加劇而承擔(dān)了不成比例的代價(jià)。這種不對(duì)稱性揭示了國際體系中權(quán)力與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分布的不均衡。

Beyond the immediate participants, the conflict has generated significant secondary effects. Energy producers, defense industries, and risk-related financial sectors have benefited from disruption, while the Global South has borne disproportionate costs through higher energy prices, rising food costs, and increased economic vulnerability. This asymmetry reveals the uneven distribution of both power and risk in the international system.

綜合來看，這些動(dòng)態(tài)指向了一場更廣泛的轉(zhuǎn)型。這場沖突并未開啟一種新的穩(wěn)定秩序，而是加速了一個(gè)本已展開的過渡進(jìn)程：國際體系正從單極格局走向一個(gè)更加碎片化、競爭性更強(qiáng)的局面。然而，碎片化并不會(huì)自動(dòng)帶來均衡。更常見的情況是，它會(huì)催生彼此交疊的競爭地帶、不斷變動(dòng)的結(jié)盟關(guān)系，以及不穩(wěn)定的威懾格局。

Taken together, these dynamics point to a broader transformation. The conflict does not inaugurate a new stable order. Rather, it accelerates a transition already underway: a movement away from a unipolar system toward a more fragmented and contested landscape. Yet fragmentation does not automatically produce balance. More often, it generates overlapping zones of competition, shifting alignments, and unstable deterrence.

在缺乏一個(gè)能夠強(qiáng)制維持秩序的主導(dǎo)性霸權(quán)力量的情況下，未來可能出現(xiàn)幾種不同的演變路徑。

In the absence of a dominant hegemonic power capable of enforcing order, several trajectories become possible.

其一，是進(jìn)一步的碎片化，其特征是相互競爭的勢力范圍、經(jīng)濟(jì)脫鉤以及多邊機(jī)構(gòu)作用的削弱。在這樣的世界中，權(quán)力將變得更加地方化，而合作也會(huì)愈發(fā)呈現(xiàn)交易性特征。

One is deeper fragmentation, marked by competing spheres of influence, economic decoupling, and weakened multilateral institutions. In such a world, power becomes more localized and cooperation increasingly transactional.

其二，是區(qū)域秩序的鞏固，即各地區(qū)強(qiáng)國在自身勢力范圍內(nèi)承擔(dān)更多安全與治理責(zé)任。這可能提升區(qū)域自主性，但也可能加劇區(qū)域之間的競爭。

A second is the consolidation of regional orders, in which regional powers assume greater responsibility for security and governance within their own spheres. This may increase regional autonomy, but it may also intensify interregional rivalry.

其三，則是中等強(qiáng)國之間聯(lián)盟的漸進(jìn)形成。那些既非超級(jí)大國、也非邊緣小國的國家，可能會(huì)越來越多地圍繞安全、經(jīng)濟(jì)韌性和技術(shù)治理展開協(xié)調(diào)，通過構(gòu)建靈活的對(duì)齊關(guān)系來共同管理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。這類聯(lián)盟不會(huì)取代現(xiàn)有制度，但可能在一定程度上彌補(bǔ)其侵蝕所造成的缺口。

A third lies in the gradual emergence of coalitions among middle powers. States that are neither superpowers nor minor actors may increasingly coordinate on security, economic resilience, and technological governance, forming flexible alignments to manage shared risks. These coalitions would not replace existing institutions, but they might partially compensate for their erosion.

就目前而言，這幾種路徑都尚未占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位。因此，國際體系仍處于流動(dòng)狀態(tài)，其運(yùn)行特征表現(xiàn)為局部性的對(duì)齊、間歇性的合作，以及反復(fù)出現(xiàn)的不穩(wěn)定。因此，這里所討論的這場沖突，并不只是一次地區(qū)危機(jī)。它更是世界秩序更廣泛轉(zhuǎn)型的一種體現(xiàn)：在這一轉(zhuǎn)型中，權(quán)力更加分散，權(quán)威更具爭議，結(jié)果也更難預(yù)測。這個(gè)新興時(shí)代最鮮明的特征，不是任何單一行為體的支配地位，而恰恰是不確定性本身的持續(xù)存在。

At present, none of these trajectories is dominant. The international system therefore remains fluid, shaped by partial alignments, episodic cooperation, and recurrent instability.

The conflict examined here is thus not simply a regional crisis. It is a manifestation of a wider transition in world order: one in which power is more dispersed, authority more contested, and outcomes less predictable. The defining feature of this emerging era is not the dominance of any single actor, but the persistence of uncertainty itself.

梅赫里·馬達(dá)爾沙希（Mehri Madarshahi）

華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院（IPP）榮譽(yù)教授、聯(lián)合國教科文組織下屬國際創(chuàng)意和可持續(xù)發(fā)展中心（ICCSD）顧問委員會(huì)成員

Honorary Professorof The Institute of Public Policy (IPP) , South China University of Technology (SCUT) ; Member of the Advisory Committee of the International Center for Creativity and Sustainable Development under the auspicious of UNESO (ICCSD).

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伊朗前副總統(tǒng)發(fā)文：美國“已處下風(fēng)”，伊朗可以“見好就收”？｜IPP編譯

關(guān)于IPP

華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院（IPP）是一個(gè)獨(dú)立、非營利性的知識(shí)創(chuàng)新與公共政策研究平臺(tái)。IPP圍繞中國的體制改革、社會(huì)政策、中國話語權(quán)與國際關(guān)系等開展一系列的研究工作，并在此基礎(chǔ)上形成知識(shí)創(chuàng)新和政策咨詢協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展的良好格局。IPP的愿景是打造開放式的知識(shí)創(chuàng)新和政策研究平臺(tái)，成為領(lǐng)先世界的中國智庫。