龔鵬程對話海外學(xué)者第八十五期：在后現(xiàn)代情境中，被技術(shù)統(tǒng)治的人類社會(huì)，只有強(qiáng)化交談、重建溝通倫理，才能獲得文化新生的力量。這不是誰的理論，而是每個(gè)人都應(yīng)實(shí)踐的活動(dòng)。龔鵬程先生遊走世界，并曾主持過“世界漢學(xué)研究中心”。我們會(huì)陸續(xù)推出“龔鵬程對話海外學(xué)者”系列文章，請他對話一些學(xué)界有意義的靈魂。范圍不局限于漢學(xué)，會(huì)涉及多種學(xué)科。以期深山長谷之水，四面而出。

烏蘇拉·庫普教授（Professor Ursula Coope）

牛津大學(xué)古代哲學(xué)系教授

龔鵬程教授：您好。在您的著作《動(dòng)物與天體運(yùn)動(dòng)：外部的作用》中，您詳述了亞里士多德是如何試圖從研究動(dòng)物的運(yùn)動(dòng)去理解天體運(yùn)動(dòng)的。那么亞里士多德得出了什么結(jié)論呢？

烏蘇拉·庫普教授：龔教授，您好。動(dòng)物通過推動(dòng)與之相對的外部事物來移動(dòng)自己。例如，當(dāng)動(dòng)物奔跑時(shí)，它們用腳推著地面；當(dāng)動(dòng)物游泳時(shí)，它們推著周圍的水。亞里士多德曾提出疑問，是否整個(gè)宇宙的運(yùn)動(dòng)與動(dòng)物的移動(dòng)方式類似。會(huì)不會(huì)有一種原動(dòng)力使整個(gè)宇宙運(yùn)動(dòng)，并通過對穩(wěn)定的東西進(jìn)行反推來實(shí)現(xiàn)：比如宇宙外部或者內(nèi)部的一種跳板或平臺(tái)？但亞里士多德認(rèn)為，不可能有這樣一個(gè)跳板或平臺(tái)。移動(dòng)宇宙所需的力量是如此之大，以至于沒有這樣的跳板或平臺(tái)可以保持穩(wěn)定并提供所需的力。

盡管如此，亞里士多德認(rèn)為，宇宙的運(yùn)動(dòng)確實(shí)與動(dòng)物的運(yùn)動(dòng)有一些共同之處。當(dāng)動(dòng)物自己運(yùn)動(dòng)時(shí)，它們的運(yùn)動(dòng)是由欲望促使的。例如，一只口渴的動(dòng)物向河邊移動(dòng)，因?yàn)樵谀撤N意義上，動(dòng)物的運(yùn)動(dòng)是因?yàn)樗鼈兛释臇|西（水）而激發(fā)的。同樣，亞里士多德認(rèn)為，宇宙最外層的運(yùn)動(dòng)是對宇宙以外的靜止物體產(chǎn)生欲望引起的。這表明，球體的最外層有一個(gè)類似靈魂的東西，可以解釋為球體的運(yùn)動(dòng)是因?yàn)樗鼘o止物體的欲望。

因此，亞里士多德認(rèn)為，動(dòng)物的自我運(yùn)動(dòng)和天體運(yùn)動(dòng)之間有顯著的相似之處，但也有顯著的區(qū)別。這兩種運(yùn)動(dòng)在某種意義上來說都是由一個(gè)欲望驅(qū)使的。然而，動(dòng)物有能力停止自己的運(yùn)動(dòng)，而且動(dòng)物的運(yùn)動(dòng)可以被干擾因素所打斷，而天體的運(yùn)動(dòng)則是必然會(huì)發(fā)生的。此外，動(dòng)物通過推動(dòng)外部事物來移動(dòng)自己，而在天體運(yùn)動(dòng)中，沒有任何東西可以發(fā)揮這種作用。

Animals move themselves by pushing off against something external to them. For instance, when animals run, they push their feet against the ground; when animals swim, they push against the surrounding water. Aristotle asks whether something analogous is true of the movement of the whole universe. Could there be an agent that moves the whole universe, and does so by pushing back against something stable: a kind of springboard or platform, either external to or internal to the universe? Aristotle argues that there couldn’t be such a springboard or platform. The force required to move the universe would be so great that no such springboard or platform could remain stable and offer the needed resistance.

Nevertheless, Aristotle argues that the movement of the universe does have something in common with the movement of animals. When animals move themselves, their movements are prompted by desire. For example, a thirsty animal moves towards the river because it wants to drink; the animal’s movement is, in a certain sense, caused by the object of its desire, the water. Similarly, Aristotle argues, the movement of the outermost sphere of the universe is caused by an external unmoved mover that functions as an object of desire. This suggests that the outermost sphere has something like a soul, and that the sphere’s movement is explained by its desire for the unmoved mover.

Thus, Aristotle thinks that there are important similarities, but also important differences, between animal self-motion and celestial motion. Both kinds of motion are in some sense explained by an object of desire. However, animals have the power to stop themselves moving, and their movements can be interrupted by interfering factors, whereas the celestial movements occur by necessity. Moreover, animals move themselves by pushing against something external, whereas there is nothing that could play this role in the explanation of celestial movement.

龔鵬程教授：在您的文章《自由思考？認(rèn)知權(quán)威和自我思考》中，您根據(jù)希臘哲學(xué)家的著作來分別評判了自我思考與聽從專家意見的利弊。為什么希臘哲學(xué)家對這個(gè)問題感興趣？這與希臘的民主思想有關(guān)嗎?

烏蘇拉·庫普教授：正如我在本文中所強(qiáng)調(diào)的，民主國家的公民需要能夠從專家的建議中獲益。柏拉圖對平衡民主治理與信任專家的必要性上的困難，做出了生動(dòng)的描述。當(dāng)我們生病時(shí)，我們向醫(yī)生咨詢最好的治療方法。那么，為什么我們認(rèn)為在一些其他的問題上 ，比如如何治理國家的問題，就需要通過投票而不是咨詢專家來解決呢？如果我們真的這樣想，那么專業(yè)知識(shí)還能發(fā)揮什么作用呢?這些都是現(xiàn)代民主倡導(dǎo)者們需要面對的具有挑戰(zhàn)性的問題。

當(dāng)柏拉圖敦促人們獨(dú)立思考時(shí)，他并不是認(rèn)為我們應(yīng)該減少對專家建議的依賴。

柏拉圖本人對一個(gè)運(yùn)作良好的民主政體持悲觀態(tài)度。他強(qiáng)調(diào)的問題之一是一些蠱惑人心的人物：這些人沒有專業(yè)知識(shí)，但善于說服別人贊同自己的觀點(diǎn)。所有民主國家都面臨這個(gè)問題。如果公民能夠深思熟慮并做出自己的決定，那么這就有可能削弱煽動(dòng)者的力量。

此外，柏拉圖堅(jiān)持自我思考的價(jià)值還有一個(gè)更深層次的原因。他認(rèn)為最好的生活要充分理解人生，我們只有通過自己思考才能獲得這種理解。

后期的古代哲學(xué)家就自我思考的價(jià)值展開了熱烈的討論。古代的懷疑論者認(rèn)為他們有獨(dú)特的自由，因?yàn)樗麄儧]有承諾接受由他們的哲學(xué)學(xué)派傳遞下來的任何特定的教義。

古代柏拉圖學(xué)派強(qiáng)調(diào)，如果一個(gè)人想要真正的理解，獨(dú)立思考是很重要的，但值得注意的是，獨(dú)立思考與追隨專家的方式是可以共存的。這些后期的哲學(xué)家并不是生活在民主國家。他們的想法是，無論一個(gè)人的政治環(huán)境如何，她都有思想自由。

古希臘哲學(xué)家伊壁鳩魯（Epictetus）本人是一個(gè)被釋放的奴隸，他指出:“暴君可以把你關(guān)進(jìn)監(jiān)獄，但暴君不能決定你的想法或你的價(jià)值�！�

As I emphasise in this paper, citizens of a democracy need to be able to benefit from expert advice. Plato gives a particularly vivid account of the difficulties of reconciling democratic governance with the need to trust experts. When we are ill, we consult a doctor about the best treatment. Why, then, do we think certain other questions – questions about how to run the state, should be settled by vote rather than by consulting experts? And if we do think this, what role is left for expertise? These are challenging questions that any modern advocate of democracy needs to face.

When Plato urges people to think for themselves, this is certainly not because he thinks we should rely less on expert advice. Plato himself is pessimistic about the possibility of a well-functioning democracy. One of the problems he emphasises is the role of demagogues: people who have no expert knowledge, but who are good at persuading others to go along with their views. All democracies face this problem. If citizens are able to deliberate and make up their own minds, then this has the potential to lessen the power of demagogues. Moreover, Plato also has a further reason for insisting on the value of thinking for oneself. He holds that the best kind of life is a life of full understanding, and that we can only acquire such understanding by thinking for ourselves.

Later ancient philosophers engaged in lively discussions of the value of thinking for oneself. Ancient sceptics argued that they were uniquely free, since they were not committed to accepting any particular doctrine passed down by their philosophical school. Ancient Platonists emphasised that thinking for oneself is important if one is to arrive at understanding, while also noting that this kind of thinking for oneself is quite compatible with following the lead of experts. These later philosophers were not living in democracies. Their idea was that one can exercise a kind of freedom of thought, regardless of one’s political circumstances. Epictetus, himself a freed slave, pointed out that a tyrant can throw you into prison, but a tyrant cannot determine how you think or what you value.

龔鵬程教授：在您的文章《新柏拉圖主義思想中的自由與責(zé)任》中，您描述了對新柏拉圖派的理解是如何能夠闡明當(dāng)代的辯論的。能否請您舉一些例子？

烏蘇拉·庫普教授：當(dāng)代關(guān)于自由和責(zé)任的討論，常常以自由意志是否與決定論兼容為出發(fā)點(diǎn)。新柏拉圖主義者關(guān)注的是一系列不同的問題。

對他們來說(事實(shí)上，對大多數(shù)早期的古希臘哲學(xué)家來說)，你是否自由的問題與你是否有(現(xiàn)代哲學(xué)家稱之為)“自由意志”的問題大不相同。如果你是自由的，那么你就在各個(gè)方面完全控制了自己，你都是你想成為的樣子。既然每個(gè)人都想要好的，自由就是完美的好。

這種自由的概念是非�？量痰�。新柏拉圖主義者面臨著一個(gè)有趣的問題，在處于更高的神圣力量之下時(shí)，這種意義上的自由要如何實(shí)現(xiàn)。他們認(rèn)為，只有自知的個(gè)體，才能有自我決策的能力和自由。

這些討論闡明了一個(gè)人行為的根源是什么，以及自我認(rèn)識(shí)和自決之間的關(guān)系等問題。

在新柏拉圖主義者看來，一個(gè)人并不一定在自由的時(shí)候才能對自己的行為負(fù)責(zé)。即使是一些不自由的普通人，也要為他們所做的事情負(fù)責(zé)。

新柏拉圖主義者提出疑問，責(zé)任是如何被定義的：是什么讓人類（不同于其他動(dòng)物）成為贊美或責(zé)備的對象？

他們的答案是，人類有使用理性的能力。人類可以判斷一個(gè)行為是否恰當(dāng)，權(quán)衡各種理由去決定是否行動(dòng)。但當(dāng)然，這只是提出了一個(gè)進(jìn)一步的問題，即理性的能力如何與責(zé)任相聯(lián)系。在回答這個(gè)問題時(shí)，新柏拉圖主義者對人類的理性，以及對理性欲望（與非理性食欲欲望相反）的獨(dú)特性質(zhì)提供了有趣的解釋。

Contemporary discussions of freedom and responsibility often take as their starting point the question of whether free will is compatible with determinism.The Neoplatonists focus on a different set of questions. For them (and indeed, for most earlier ancient Greek philosophers) the question whether you are free is quite different from the question of whether you have (what modern philosophers call) ‘free will’. If you are free, then you are wholly in control of yourself and you are, in every respect, just as you want to be. Since everyone wants the good, to be free is to be perfectly good. This notion of freedom is very demanding. The Neoplatonists face interesting questions as to how it is possible to be free in this sense, while being under a higher divine power. They argue that only a self-knowing agent can be self-determining and free. These discussions shed light on questions about what it is to be an origin of one’s own activity, and on the relation between self-knowledge and self-determination.

For the Neoplatonists, one does not need to be free in order to count as responsible for one’s actions. Ordinary human agents who act wrongly are responsible for what they do, even though they are not free. The Neoplatonists ask what explains responsibility: what is it about human beings that makes them (unlike other animals) subject to praise or blame? Their answer is that human beings have the use of reason. Human beings can judge whether an action is appropriate, and they can weigh up reasons for or against acting in a certain way. But of course, this just raises the further question of how the capacity for reason is connected to responsibility. In answering this question, the Neoplatonists provide interesting accounts of human rationality, and of the distinctive nature of rational desires (as opposed to nonrational appetitive cravings).

龔鵬程教授：您最近編撰的著作《古代倫理與自然世界》探討了古代哲學(xué)的一個(gè)鮮明特征:古代倫理與自然界研究之間的密切關(guān)系。這兩者在古代和現(xiàn)代的關(guān)系是什么?

烏蘇拉·庫普教授：倫理學(xué)主要是研究人類應(yīng)該如何行事。自然界與這種研究的相關(guān)性體現(xiàn)在兩點(diǎn)。

首先，人類本身就是動(dòng)物，所以他們是自然界的一部分。在研究人類之善時(shí)，我們既要考慮到人類是動(dòng)物，因此與自然界的其他居民有一些共同點(diǎn)，也要考慮到人類在擁有理性方面的與眾不同。

第二，我們?nèi)祟惿钤谧匀唤缰�。正因如此，關(guān)于我們應(yīng)該如何應(yīng)對自然界變化的問題上，存在著重大的倫理問題：既涉及我們對特定自然災(zāi)害（地震、洪水、瘟疫）的態(tài)度，也涉及我們對環(huán)境的責(zé)任（特別是對氣候變化的責(zé)任）。

這些都是當(dāng)代哲學(xué)家和古希臘及羅馬人所討論的問題�，F(xiàn)代哲學(xué)家仍然可以從古希臘關(guān)于人類與其他動(dòng)物相似但又不同的描述中學(xué)習(xí)到很多東西。

亞里士多德在這個(gè)問題上特別具有啟發(fā)性，因?yàn)樗麑ψ匀唤绾蛣?dòng)物行為的復(fù)雜性有著深刻的興趣。他既強(qiáng)調(diào)人類與其他動(dòng)物之間的相通性，也強(qiáng)調(diào)人類的與眾不同之處。

例如，人類和其他動(dòng)物都會(huì)感到憤怒，但是亞里士多德聲稱，人類的憤怒是理性的反應(yīng)，因此與非人類動(dòng)物所經(jīng)歷的那種憤怒有很大不同。

同樣，某些其他動(dòng)物從事的活動(dòng)也很像推理，但亞里士多德認(rèn)為，非人類的動(dòng)物不能斟酌或判斷在宏觀角度上來看什么是最好的。

古希臘和羅馬的思想家對我們應(yīng)該如何應(yīng)對自然災(zāi)難帶來的威脅也提出了啟發(fā)性的說法。當(dāng)然，氣候變化是現(xiàn)代人特別關(guān)注的問題，但盧克萊修（ Lucretius）和塞涅卡（ Seneca）的作品顯示了對人類脆弱性的生動(dòng)認(rèn)識(shí)，警告了我們，并假設(shè)了如果人類可以掌握自然環(huán)境的危險(xiǎn)性。

Ethics is primarily the study of how human beings should behave. There are two obvious ways in which the natural world is relevant to such a study. First, human beings are themselves animals, so they are part of the natural world. In studying the human good, we need to take account both of the fact that humans are animals and thus have something in common with other inhabitants of the natural world, and also of the fact that humans are distinctive in possessing reason. Second, we human beings live our lives within the natural world. Because of this, there are significant ethical questions about how we should respond to changes in the natural world: both about our attitude to particular natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, plagues) and about our responsibilities in relation to the environment (in particular, in relation to climate change).

These are questions discussed both by contemporary philosophers and by the ancient Greeks and Romans. Modern philosophers still have much to learn from ancient Greek accounts of the ways in which humans are similar to, and yet differ from, other animals. Aristotle is especially illuminating on this topic, because of his profound interest in the natural world and in the complexities of animal behaviour. He emphasizes both the continuities between humans and other animals, and also what is distinctive about humans. For instance, both humans and other animals feel anger, but – Aristotle claims – human anger is responsive to reason, and hence differs importantly from the kind of anger experienced by non-human animals. Similarly, certain other animals engage in an activity that is quite like reasoning, but Aristotle thinks that nonhuman animals cannot deliberate or make judgements about what is overall best. Ancient Greek and Roman thinkers also have illuminating things to say about how we should react to the threat of natural catastrophe. Of course, climate change is a specific modern concern, but the works of Lucretius and Seneca show a lively awareness of human fragility and warn us of the dangers of presuming that we have mastery over the natural environment.

龔鵬程，1956年生于臺(tái)北，臺(tái)灣師范大學(xué)博士，當(dāng)代著名學(xué)者和思想家。著作已出版一百五十多本。

辦有大學(xué)、出版社、雜志社、書院等，并規(guī)劃城市建設(shè)、主題園區(qū)等多處。講學(xué)于世界各地。并在北京、上海、杭州、臺(tái)北、巴黎、日本、澳門等地舉辦過書法展。現(xiàn)為中國孔子博物館名譽(yù)館長、美國龔鵬程基金會(huì)主席。